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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
RETHINKING THE NATIONAL QUESTION: ANTI-STATIST DISCOURSES
WITHIN THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT
by
Ozum Yesiltas
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Co-Major Professor
Professor Rebecca Mae Salokar, Co-Major Professor
Why and under what conditions have the Kurds become agents of change in the
Middle East in terms of democratization? Why did the Kurds’ role as democratic agents
become particularly visible in the 1990s? How does the Kurdish movement’s turn to
democratic discourse affect the political systems of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria? What
are the implications of the Kurds’ adoption of democratic discourse for the transnational
aspect of the Kurdish movement?
Since the early 1990s, Kurdish national movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Syria have undergone important political and ideological transformations. As a result of
the Kurds’ growing role in shaping the debates on human rights and democratization in
these four countries, the Kurdish national movement has acquired a dual character: an
ethno-cultural struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity, and a democratization
movement that seeks to redefine the concepts of governance and citizenship in Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria. The process transformation has affected relations between the
Kurdish movements and their respective central governments in significant ways.
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On the basis of face-to-face interviews and archival research conducted in Turkey,
Iraq and parts of Europe, the present work challenges the current narrative of Kurdish
nationalism, which is predominantly drawn from a statist interpretation of Kurdish
nationalist goals, and argues instead that the Kurdish question is no longer a problem of
statelessness but a problem of democracy in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
The main contributions of this work are three fold. First, the research unfolds the
reasons behind the growing emphasis of the Kurdish movement on the concepts of
democracy, human rights, and political participation, which started in the early 1990s.
Second, the findings challenge the existing scholarship that explains Kurdish nationalism
as a problem of statelessness and shifts the focus to the transformative potentials of the
Kurdish national movement in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria through a comparative lens.
Third, this work explores the complex transnational coordination and negotiations
between the Kurdish movements across borders and explains the regional repercussions
of this process.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In Iraq, we are not struggling for independence, but for our liberty. We
will continue our struggle until we obtain humane living conditions. Our
struggle only serves for defending ourselves. The Arabs, with whom we
commonly form the Iraqi State, have engaged in a battle to exterminate us.
They denied our existence. We maintain this struggle to make ourselves
recognized.1
In 1968, after seven years of fighting with the Iraqi army, this was the answer that
Molla Mustafa Barzani gave to the Turkish journalist Hulusi Turgut who asked him about
the Iraqi Kurdish movement’s stance on the establishment of an independent Kurdish
state in the Middle East. By the late 1960s, the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq was
viewed as a dangerous experiment of Kurdish self-rule by Baghdad as well as by Ankara,
Tehran and Damascus. The emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
insurgency in Turkey after roughly a decade further exacerbated the claims regarding the
right and ability of the Kurds to run their own affairs and led to a great deal of discontent
in the neighboring countries. These events left a major mark on the literature about the
Kurds throughout the 1990s during which the question of Kurdish statehood intrigued a
large number of scholars. Accordingly, the reasons behind the Kurds’ historical failure to
achieve statehood, their lack of political unity, and the cultural, political and economic
suffering imposed by the host country policies upon the Kurdish populations in Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria have been widely discussed in the literature.

1

Turgut, Hulusi (1969). Barzani Dosyası (Barzani File), Istanbul: Hasmet Matbaası, 33-34.

1

Although the Kurdish question has been predominantly studied in the context of
the discourse of statehood both in the academic and policy circles,2 throughout the history
of Kurdish struggle for national liberation, “independent statehood” was referred to only
rarely by the major actors and political parties that shaped the Kurdish national
movement in all four parts of Kurdistan.3 Although there has been a notable increase in
Kurdish aspirations for independence at a mass level since the early 1990s, particularly
following the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as a de-facto autonomous region, political
independence was rarely stated explicitly at the elite level. Rather, the Kurdish demands
were often defined within the framework of the broader term “the right to selfdetermination” with a focus on various decentralization projects, recognition of cultural
rights and increased democracy in the host countries.
The acceptance of the constitution of 2005 in Iraq, which strengthened the
position of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) within both domestic and
regional politics, introduced “federalism,” a new administrative concept, with farreaching implications for both Iraq and the entire Middle East.4 On the other hand, as the
struggle between young Turkish conscripts and Kurdish militants in the mountains of
2

I am using the phrase “discourse of statehood” in the meaning of having an independent sovereign state –
defined as the exercise of organized political power, without intervention by a superior authority, over a
territory and people (Baty 1930: 9-10). The existing scholarship approaches the “Kurdish question”
predominantly as a problem of “statelessness” which is viewed as the root cause of the suppression and
denial of the Kurds.
3

Contemporary use of Kurdistan refers to large parts of eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran
and northeastern Syria. Kurdistan covers small portions of Armenia as well and may also include the Kurds
living in Russia and Azerbaijan. The Kurds living in Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not included in
the present study mainly because of their insignificant numbers and marginal influence they have on their
respective political environments.

4

Ahmed, Mohammed M. A. (2007). “Laying the Foundation for a Kurdistani State in Iraq: 1991-2006” in
The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism edited by Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter, Costa
Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 184.
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southeastern Turkey gradually moved into the more mundane settings of local
government offices, the national parliament, and civic organizations since the early
1990s,5 the pro-Kurdish political parties of Turkey have increasingly become the major
locomotives of the internal policy debates on political decentralization, constitutional
change and democratization in Turkey. Furthermore, as the so-called process of the Arab
Spring has dramatically transformed the political landscape in the Middle East since late
2010, the Syrian Kurds have appeared as crucial actors in shaping both the future of Syria
and the Kurdish question in general. As the terminology and focus dedicated to the recent
political transformations in the Middle East remained largely “Arab” and little has been
written over the role of non-Arab minorities have in shaping the future of the region, the
Syrian Kurds’ radical change of discourse from achieving citizenship and cultural rights
to struggling for the establishment of a federal and democratic Syria has only enhanced
the academic and policy significance of the Kurdish role in the Middle East.
In this context, the present work is an attempt to challenge the current narrative of
Kurdish nationalism, which is predominantly derived from a statist interpretation of
Kurdish nationalist goals,6 and to explore, instead, the Kurds’ growing role in shaping the
debates on governance, human rights and democratization in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
As opposed to the analyses of Kurdish nationalism from the viewpoint of the official state
discourses, the present work is a deliberate effort to present the Kurdish viewpoint and
focus on Kurdish nationalism as a movement in its own right and not just a reaction to the
5

Watts, Nicole F. (2010). Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey, Seattle, WA:
University of Washington Press, 3-4.

6

The “statist” interpretation of the Kurdish question refers to the notion that every nation is supposed to
have a state of its own and that nationalism is mainly a struggle for maintaining or attaining statehood.

3

processes of modernization and state-building in the Kurds’ host countries. From this
perspective, the Kurdish question is no longer defined as a problem of “statelessness,”
but a problem of “democracy” in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, I argue that
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria do not suffer from a “Kurdish problem,” but rather a
“democracy problem.”
Analysis of the Kurdish question in the context of democratization in the Middle
East is a recently developing subject of inquiry, yet the analyses that consider the Kurds
as the “agents” of democratization remain relatively scarce. The literature does not offer
any detailed study of the Kurds’ role in the democratization processes in Iran or Syria.
The studies that investigate the Kurdish role in Iraqi politics, on the other hand, usually
have a stronger tendency to focus on the issues of partition or a possible Kurdish
secession than to examine the Kurds as a force for the development of a democratically
pluralistic Iraq.7 Since 2005, the establishment of a federal system in Iraq has led to the
emergence of a growing literature on the issue of federalism and democratization in the
Middle East.8 The pro-Kurdish democratic movement in Turkey has started to attract
scholarly attention only recently.9 However, the major deficiency in these studies is that

7

See Özcan, Nihat Ali (Spring 2004). “Could a Kurdish State Be Set Up In Iraq?,”Middle East Policy, 11
(1): 119-122; Rafaat, Araam (Fall 2007). “An Independent Kurdish State: Achievable or Merely a Kurdish
Dream?,” The Journal of Social Political and Economic Studies, 32 (3): 267-304; Dawoody, Alexander
(2006). “The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 41
(5-6): 483-505. For a discussion of the Iraqi Kurds’ commitment to new forms of national affirmation
beyond statehood see Salih, Khaled (Spring 2004). “Kurdish Reality in an Emerging Iraq,” Middle East
Policy, 11 (1): 122-126.
8

See O’Leary, B., McGarry, J., Salih, K. (2005). The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press; Stansfield, G., Anderson, E. (2010). Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and
Emergent Democracy, London and New York: Routledge; Visser, R., Stansfield, G. (2007). Iraq of Its
Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?, New York: Columbia University Press.
9

Demir, Eyüp (2005). Yasal Kürtler (Legal Kurds), İstanbul: Tevn Yayınları; Watts, Nicole F. (2010).
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although they discuss the demands raised by the pro-Kurdish political parties and the
structural conditions that facilitate the emergence of pro-Kurdish legal activism, they do
not present how those demands are articulated within the Kurdish movement’s wider
discourse of democratization and political change in Turkey and how they challenge the
established notions of democracy and political representation.
Why and under what conditions do the Kurds become democratic agents? Why do
the Kurdish demands become tied to the broader problem of democracy in Turkey, Iran,
Iraq and Syria? Why do the Kurdish politicians argue that the problems of governance,
democracy and human rights in these four countries are closely linked to the solution of
their respective “Kurdish problem?” The existing scholarship is not well equipped to help
answer those questions because of the emphasis placed on the independent state
discourse, which is predominantly informed by a modernist understanding of nationalism
and the tendency to view the nation as a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain
kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state. Driven by this particular theoretical
stance, the Kurdish scholarship, more often than not, offers structural analyses of the
issue that explores the trajectory of the Kurds either through modernist state discourses,
that is, in terms of “failure” “lack” or “fragmentation” or through narratives of
victimhood which treat the Kurdish case as a form of reactive nationalism that is shaped
by the suppression and denial of Kurdish identity. This situation discounts the important
changes the Kurdish movement has undergone over the last two decades and their impact
on both domestic and regional politics. The present study aims to shift the attention to the
proactive characteristics and transformative potentials of the Kurdish movement in the

5

context of the debates on human rights and democratization in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Syria since the early 1990s.
Discussing the Kurdish national movement as a democratic agent and
transformative force does not mean that Kurdish nationalists are a monolithic, unitary
community whose strategies unfold similarly in every context. The Kurdish movements
in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria maintain quite distinctive internal dynamics in
organizational, ideological and strategic terms. As emphasized numerously in the
literature, Kurdish movements in each of the four countries in question act in diverse
political environments, which largely affect how Kurdish nationalism is defined in each
political context and what strategies are chosen to achieve the set goals. In this respect,
the political structures of the Kurds’ host countries play a major role in determining how
the Kurdish political action is constrained and facilitated at different time frames and in
various ways.10 However, while reacting to the constraints and opportunities they face,
the Kurdish actors also affect and reshape the legal and institutional structures and
political alignments within their respective polities in diverse ways. This situation creates
a typically fluid, reciprocal and unpredictable relationship between the Kurdish
movements and the political systems in which they act.
Nor does the focus of the present study on the anti-statist discourses11 within the
Kurdish national movement serve to deny the Kurdish aspiration for statehood or to
10

Natali, Denise (2005). The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity, New York: Syracuse
University Press.

11

The dictionary meaning of the prefix “anti” is “against”, “hostile to” or “counteracting”. However, I use
the term anti-statist mainly to place an emphasis on the Kurdish political elite’s articulation of the Kurdish
demands outside the dominant paradigm that identifies nationalism with the goal of seeking sovereign
statehood. In that sense, the purpose of using of the term “anti-statist discourses” is not to make a point that
Kurdish national movement is against or hostile to the idea of a Kurdish nation-state.
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dismiss the discourse of independent statehood as a scholarly perspective in studying the
Kurdish question. Rather, the purpose is to challenge the long-established perceptions
regarding the Kurdish nationalism that has been continuously reproduced in the literature
as a state-seeking movement. First, the concrete articulations of the Kurdish demands
expressed through the statements of the Kurdish political elite do not match up to this
narrative, and second, such an approach provides persistent ground for the regional states
to legitimize their security-oriented policy making in dealing with the Kurdish question.
Furthermore, this approach overlooks the complex and dynamic nature of the
phenomenon of ethnic mobilization by over-emphasizing the host states’ capacity and
propensity for repression as factors that determine the rise and fall of cycles of Kurdish
protest and political action, and considers the Kurdish movement simply as a
phenomenon that derives from the negative and positive incentives offered by the Kurds’
respective central governments.
The discourse of decentralization and cultural rights promoted by the Kurdish
political elite has significant implications for the processes of democratization in Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, a statist reading of the Kurdish nationalist goals
immediately eliminates the context through which these implications could be discussed.
The statist approach deprives the Kurds of their agency and fails to capture the fluid and
reciprocal relationship of Kurdish movements with their respective political systems.
From this perspective, the Kurds’ capacity to effect political change becomes exclusively
tied to the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state whose absence, in turn, leads to a
failure to undertake any serious accounting of movement-initiated changes in the political
structures of the countries in which they live.

7

The present work undertakes three tasks:
(1)

Unpacking the reasons behind the growing emphasis, since the early 1990s, of the
Kurdish movements on democracy, human rights, and political participation and
explaining the new ways through which the notions of a united Kurdistan,
Kurdish rights and independence were reinterpreted in the context of political
change and the protection of territorial integrity in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

(2)

Challenging the work that restricts Kurdish nationalism as a reactive force against
suppression and denial, and focusing instead on the transformative potentials of
the Kurdish national movement by discussing movement-initiated legislative
change and other forms of change designed to restructure the legal and
institutional basis of the political systems in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

(3)

Explaining the complex transnational coordination and negotiations between the
Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria as major factors that account
for the still unfolding process of strategic convergence among the Kurdish
political demands across borders, and investigating the regional repercussions of
this process.

Kurdish Nationalist Goals Revisited
In 1970, while the negotiations between the commission headed by Saddam
Hussein and Mullah Mustafa Barzani were still going on in order to settle the Kurdish
issue in Iraq, Masoud Barzani, son of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, asked Saddam Hussein
how Baghdad would solve the democracy problem in greater Iraq. Saddam Hussein said,

8

“The system that we govern the rest of Iraq is none of your business. You will have
autonomy in Kurdistan. Why do you care about this?”12
The 1970 autonomy agreement between Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) and the Baath government did not lead to implementation of genuine autonomy in
Iraqi Kurdistan. Nevertheless, Masoud Barzani’s question gained additional meaning
after the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and became even more significant after the
withdrawal of the U.S. forces at the end of 2011. As the centralization efforts of the
Baghdad government, headed by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, increasingly caused
friction between the KRG and Baghdad after the U.S. forces left Iraq, the political
scenarios established on an approaching declaration of political independence by the
KRG proliferated rapidly, while relatively little attention was paid to the policies of the
Al-Maliki government as a threat to the unity of Iraq.13
The predictions concerning a possible Kurdish secession from Iraq have been
compounded by the breakdown of authority in Syria after the start of the Syrian uprising
in March 2011, and the creation of a Kurdish enclave along much of the country’s border
with Turkey by July 2012. As the Kurds have advanced in several Kurdish-populated
towns and cities in northern Syria, a potential union of the Kurdistan region in northern
Iraq with the Kurdish territories in Syria around the common cause of an independent

12

Galbraith, Peter (2006). The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End,
New York: Simon and Schuster, 63.
13

For the centralization policies of the Maliki government and the resulting conflict between the KRG and
Baghdad see Özpek, B. B. (Summer 2012). “Democracy or Partition: Future Scenarios for the Future of
Iraq,” Insight Turkey, 14 (3): 127-140; Stansfield, G., Anderson, L. (Spring 2009) “Kurds in Iraq: The
Struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,”Middle East Policy, 16 (1): 134-145.

9

Kurdish state quickly came on to the agendas of the scholarly communities as well as the
political analysts.14
Despite the considerable attention paid to the discourse of independent statehood
in the political analyses concerning the Kurdish question, there is a significant mismatch
between the focus of these analyses and how the Kurdish politicians articulate their
demands in public sphere. Twenty years after Masoud Barzani’s question to Saddam
Hussein, in 1991, the Persian Gulf War triggered another Kurdish uprising in the north of
Iraq. Following the uprising, Barzani explained the goal of the Kurdish movement with
the motto, “Autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq.”
At this stage in our struggle, what we want is clear: We want real
autonomy in Kurdistan and democracy for Iraq. However, our struggle in
Iraqi Kurdistan is also part of the Kurdish movement in general. It’s
inevitable for the Kurdish nation to obtain its legitimate rights like all the
other nations. Through what stages would this become a reality? How our
struggle would progress in time would determine that.15
Although many scholars regarded the KRG as a de facto state,16 Barzani
continued to underscore the Kurds’ commitment to a unified Iraq after the autonomous
status of the Kurdistan region gained constitutional recognition in 2005. In 2012, when
the centralization policies of the Maliki government started to deepen the tensions

14

See Mansour, Renad. “The Role of Iraqi Kurdistan in the Syrian-Kurd Pursuit of Autonomy,” Aljazeera
Center for Studies, September 19, 2012; Arango, Tim. “Kurds Prepare to Pursue More Autonomy in a
Fallen Syria,” New York Times, September 19, 2012; Weiss, Stanley. “It’s Time for an Independent
Kurdistan,” Huffington Post, November 5, 2012; Cafiero, Giorgio. “The Dreams and Dilemmas of Iraqi
Kurdistan,” Foreign Policy in Focus, January 24, 2012.
15

Ballı, Rafet (1991). Kürt Dosyası (Kurdish File), İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 444-445.

16

See Romano, David (2010). “Challenges of Autonomy in the Wake of U.S. Withdrawal,” International
Affairs, 86 (6): 1345-1359; Gunter, M. (2011). “Arab-Kurdish Relations and the Future of Iraq,” Third
World Quarterly, 32 (9): 1623-1635.
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between Baghdad and Erbil, Barzani reiterated the KRG’s commitment to the unity and
integrity of Iraq provided that Iraq remains federal and democratic:
Unfortunately, after many years the situation is being changed and turned
into the previous version. We don’t accept the return of dictatorship and
we are only partner in governance by name. We cannot accept Kurds or
any other community to be marginalized. The problem here is not only the
Kurds, it is with all Iraq. If Iraq was democratic, federal and plural then it
will be one and united. We don’t threaten the unity of Iraq; it is
dictatorship that threatens the unity of Iraq.17
The Kurdish question in Syria has usually been a marginal issue not only in the
media but also in the academic research dedicated to either Syria or the Kurdish question.
The Qamishli Revolt of 2004 marked the beginning of a new era for the Syrian Kurds by
giving rise to a dramatic upsurge of Kurdish national feelings that shook the Syrian
government and brought the Kurdish issue to the forefront of the debate about the future
of Syria.18 However, the major breakthrough in Syrian Kurdish politics took place as a
result of the spread of the uprisings known as the Arab Spring into Syria in March 2011,
after which the prospects for greater Kurdish autonomy in the country became a crucial
part of the discussions on how events should unfold after the toppling of the President
Bashar al-Assad.
As of October 2011, a total of fourteen Kurdish parties exist in Syria and none of
them formally demand an independent Syrian-Kurdish state or the inclusion of the Syrian

17

“President Barzani: We don’t threaten the unity of Iraq; it is dictatorship that threatens the unity of Iraq”
May 8, 2012. Available at http://www.malpress.com/english/news/302-president-barzani-we-dont-threatenthe-unity-of-iraq-it-is-dictatorship-that-threatens-theunity-of-iraq.html (Accessed June 4, 2012).

18

Lowe, Robert (2007). “Kurdish Nationalism in Syria” in The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism edited by
Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter, Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 287.
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Kurdish regions in a united Kurdistan.19 On May 14, 2011, the Kurdish parties in Syria
presented their demands publicly for the first time since the beginning of the uprising.
Among the eight items listed as demands of the Kurds, one states that the solution of the
Kurdish question in Syria can be achieved through “the implementation of a just and
democratic solution to the Kurdish question by recognizing in the constitution that the
Kurds are an integral part of the Syrian people and by guaranteeing their national
rights.”20
The same document also puts forward the position of the Kurds towards the
broader minorities question in Syria, seeking “the protection and guarantee of the cultural
rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Syria.”21
On June 11, 2012, a joint session of the Kurdish National Council and the
People’s Council of West Kurdistan, the two main Kurdish opposition groups in Syria,
took place in Erbil, Iraq. The meeting led to the signing of a cooperation agreement on
July 12, 2012, the Erbil Accords, which created the Kurdish Supreme Committee as a
governing body of all Kurdish-controlled territories in Syria. The goal of the Committee
was explained as follows:
. . . work towards the overthrow of the dictatorship in Damascus, the
construction of a democratic, pluralistic state, and the creation of a new
Syria with many ethnicities. This new Syria will satisfy the aspirations of

19
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our people by recognizing its existence as an original people in the
constitution. The Kurdish question must be solved democratically.22
As the Syrian Kurds buried their internal differences and gained control of several
towns in northern Syria, the idea of decentralized rule as the most appropriate solution for
the future of minorities in a post-Assad era became increasingly called for by the Kurdish
leaders. This situation, combined with the ongoing conflict between the KRG and the
central Iraqi government, has led to much speculation that the birth of an independent
Kurdish state might be at hand.
Salih Muslim Muhammad, the leader of the most powerful Kurdish party in Syria,
the Democratic Union Party (PYD), made the Kurdish position in Syria’s revolution clear
in a statement dated July 25, 2012:
We do not follow any separatist policies. We have no demand for
independence. We want our demands to be fulfilled in the context of
democratic rights and territorial integrity of Syria. We have been working
on a project for four years which is based on the constitutional recognition
of the Kurdish nation, and acknowledgement of their national rights such
as education in mother tongue. We call this democratic autonomy. This
project is not only for the Kurds but may be applied to all the other regions
in Syria in case there is a consensus.23
After the joint session in Erbil, Shelal Keddo, a member of the Kurdish National
Council, issued a statement declaring that federalism is the most viable and convenient
solution for the Syrian issue in general and the Kurdish issue in particular:
Federalism could be considered a guarantee for the unity of Syrian land
and preservation of the rights of each component of the Syrian
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community. As it has been successfully achieved in many countries
around the world, we should take the idea of federalism for Syria into
consideration and study it seriously, and try to look into the possibilities of
achieving it in order to prevent any potential civil war in the country after
the collapse of the current tyrannical regime.24
Until today, the only major Kurdish organization that openly adopted the
discourse of independent statehood with the goal of establishing a united Kurdish state as
part of its official program is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has carried out
armed struggle mainly in the southeastern Turkey since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, the
PKK abandoned its objective of establishing an independent united Kurdish state by the
early 1990s, and engaged in a comprehensive reorganization of its entire program
throughout the 2000s, on the basis of democratic transformation in Turkey as the ultimate
solution to the Kurdish question.
Since the capture, in 1999, of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, the discussion on
the future of the Kurdish question in Turkey has shifted towards an alleged radical break
in the PKK’s objectives. The conventional view in the literature is that the PKK began to
disintegrate and lost its way after the capture of Öcalan and gave up the ideal of an
independent united Kurdistan.25 However, the political-ideological change PKK has
undergone since the early 1990s was, in fact, more complex than a simple tactical retreat,
and it has received very little recognition in the literature thus far. This situation played a
significant role in the continuation of the “separatist” taboo surrounding the Kurdish
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question in Turkey and the persistent dominance of security-oriented policymaking
within the state.
Öcalan refers to the “nation-state” mainly as an outdated model, and he sets forth
an in-depth critique of the concept of state by arguing that liberation cannot be achieved
by means of state-building, but rather by the deepening of democracy. In his defense
texts, he particularly aims to disassociate democracy from nationalism, and independence
from statehood, and he criticizes the national condition of modernity as exclusive and
intolerant. Within this framework, Öcalan concludes the nation-state concept itself is
antagonistic and destructive to the liberation of peoples, be they Kurdish or otherwise. He
envisions a “democratic confederalism” in which numerous “self-governing bodies
throughout Kurdistan” (all the territories where the Kurds live) operate through the
autonomy of the citizens of local communities rather than state authorities.26 In that
sense, he considers democratic confederalism not only a mechanism for the unification of
Kurdistan and the Kurds, but also a model for the resolution of Middle East’s problems
originating from ethnic and religious differences.
The Kurdish experience in Iran, although it usually appears weaker than its
counterparts in either Iraq or Turkey, is blessed with the fact that it was in Iran the first
and only (to this date) independent Kurdish Republic, Mahabad, existed from 1945 to
1946. According to Nader Entessar, The Republic of Mahabad still stands as a beacon of
light for Kurdish movements throughout the region.27 In September 1945, the Kurdistan
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Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was established, replacing the Kurdish nationalist
organization Komala that had been active since 1942. Two months after its formation, the
KDPI issued a statement specifying its program of policies, and calling for “the Kurds to
be free and independent in the management of their local affairs and to receive Kurdish
independence within the borders of Persia.”28
Shortly after the establishment of KDPI, on January 22, 1946, the Republic of
Mahabad was proclaimed. According to its Manifesto, some of the aims of the Republic
were mentioned as “autonomy for the Iranian Kurds within the Iranian state; the use of
Kurdish as the medium of education and administration; and the election of a provincial
council for Kurdistan to supervise state and social matters.”29 Although the Republic of
Mahabad was crushed by the central Iranian government in less than a year after its
establishment, it is still considered as the first and only Kurdish republic in modern
history and the most significant event in the imagination of all nationalist Kurds.
Nevertheless, despite the Republic’s ambiguous posture between autonomy and
independence as well as the explicit demands for the recognition of the Kurds’ cultural
rights in Iran, the ultimate aims of the Kurdish Republic did not attract much scholarly
attention. Instead of treating the Republic as a genuine effort by the Kurdish people to
achieve their national rights within the framework of the Iranian state, the scholarly
analyses that recount the history of the Kurdish Republic of 1946 explain it largely in
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terms of the power politics of the Cold War era and as an extension of Soviet
expansionist policy in the Persian Gulf.30
The KDPI continued to be the main vehicle of Kurdish political efforts in Iran in
the following decades. The party mainly embraced the protection of the interests of the
people of Kurdistan-Iran, and of all the national movements throughout Iran, as the main
defining principle of its general course of action. Within this framework, autonomy for
Kurdistan within a democratic Iran and the struggle for obtaining the national rights of all
the oppressed peoples of Iran remained to be the party’s principal objective until 2004.31
In the 13th congress of the party in July 2004, the previous platform of “democracy for
Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan” was replaced by the proclamation of federalism for Iran
and national rights for the Kurds and other nationalities.32
An examination of the general goals of other prominent Kurdish parties in Iran
does not indicate major programmatic differences. The Komala Party of Iranian
Kurdistan places democracy as the main theme of its political agenda and identifies its
mission as fighting for Kurdish rights, for a regime change in Iran, and for a democratic
secular pluralist federal Iran.33 The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), which is a
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relatively new party known for its active use of armed strategies since 2004, defines its
goal as the establishment of a democratic organization of people as well as practice of the
democratic values to achieve a radical type of democracy and to launch a democratic
confederacy in eastern Kurdistan.34
The Regional Context
Besides the critical role the Kurdish movement plays in the domestic politics of
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, particularly regarding these countries’ paths towards
meaningful democratization since the early 1990s, there has been also an emerging
Kurdish dynamic at the regional level since the Gulf War of 1991. After the creation of
an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq, the Kurdish question has become an
increasingly important issue in Middle Eastern and international politics. The war to
remove Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 furthered this discussion. More recently,
the uprisings in the Arab world unexpectedly pushed the Kurds to the forefront of
regional politics after the breakdown of authority in Syria, which generated an
unprecedented degree of unity and transnational cooperation among the Kurdish political
groups.
Since the partition of Kurdistan in the aftermath of World War I, the aspirations
of Kurdish people in one country have directly affected the aspirations and actions of the
Kurdish populations across the borders. For several decades, the Kurds had to endure
different socio-political circumstances and pressures in four different countries. However,
despite the diverse political experiences and strategic trajectories followed by different
34
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Kurdish groups in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, transnational politics have always been an
integral part of Kurdish nationalism.
Relations between Syria and Iraq worsened significantly in the 1980s when
Damascus sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Following that, the relations between
the Kurdish parties, which were dominating northern Iraq, and the Syrian regime
strengthened. The Syrian regime turned a blind eye to the recruitment of hundreds of
Syrian Kurds to the ranks of peshmergas (Kurdish guerilla forces in Iraqi Kurdistan),
mainly in Barzani’s KDP.35 After the establishment of KRG in 1992, the economic
stranglehold of a double embargo and the political isolation of the Iraqi Kurds made
contacts with Damascus even more crucial for the Iraqi Kurdish political groups. The
KDP and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) kept offices in the Syrian
capital and in Qamishli until 2003, which allowed them to secure outside contacts.36
The tensions between Turkey and Syria derived from border disputes as well as
conflicts over water supplies. Strained relations between the two countries pushed the
Syrian regime to provide open support for the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey
led by the PKK throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, lived in
Syria for two decades until his arrest in 1999, and northern Syria became a major
organizational ground for the PKK militants. Similar to the cross-border dynamics
between the KDP, the PUK and the Kurds in Syria, considerable militant engagement by
the Syrian Kurds in the ranks of the PKK also took place until the late 1990s.
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Despite interruptions by regional power struggles, notably the Iran-Iraq war, the
Kurdish nationalist parties of Iran and Iraq have traditionally supported each other.
Particularly after the establishment of the KRG, cross-border contacts between the
Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish communities increased through political party representations.
Since the 1990s, Iranian Kurdish nationalist parties such as the KDPI and Komala have
established offices and communication networks in northern Iraq to advance their
nationalist claims.37 This enabled the Iranian Kurdish groups to not only coordinate
activities with their supporters inside Iran, but to also engage in activities such as issuing
press releases, training militants, and sponsoring military campaigns, actions that would
otherwise have been prohibited in Iran.38
Similar to the literature on the relationship of the Kurdish movements to their
respective central governments, the scholarly accounts of the transnational aspects of the
Kurdish question also reflect the limits of adopting a structural/statist approach in
explaining Kurdish political action at the regional level. Rather than providing an
understanding of the strategies pursued by Kurdish political actors to gain leverage in the
regional states, these accounts portray the Kurds as victims of regional power politics and
essentially conclude that lack of political and cultural unity among the Kurds across
borders made it easier for the host states to manipulate the Kurdish political groups
according to their own domestic and regional interests.

37

Natali, 177.

38

Ibid.

20

For example, Denise Natali argues that “asymmetrical transnational space39 has
created greater complexity and diversification in Kurdish nationalist sentiment across
borders. This diversification, alongside distinct historical trajectories that have emerged
in conjunction with different states, limits the likelihood of a unified Kurdish nationalist
project from emerging at the local, regional, or international level.”40 Likewise, Abbas
Vali asserts that because of the diversity of the general political and cultural processes of
denial and exclusion of Kurdish identity in their respective national territories, Kurdish
national identity has been deeply fragmented since its inception.41 He argues that:
. . . the transnational ethos of Kurdish nationalism has its structural
limitations in the internal conditions and diverse development of Kurdish
societies. These conditions have seriously debased the transnational
character of Kurdish nationalism, effectively undermining its centripetal
tendencies . . . . Deprived of its structural, political and cultural unity, it is
reduced to local autonomist movements riven with parochial interests and
clientelist relations.42
. . . when they are patronized, maintained and used in cross-border politics
by neighboring sovereign states against their own fragmented self, as is
often the case in the region; the autonomist movements seriously obscure
the political and cultural boundaries separating ethnic and national
identities.43
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Although they principally recognized the cross-border character of the Kurdish
question, these scholarly accounts primarily take the fragmentation of Kurdish society as
their point of departure and conclude that the transnational space works “against” rather
than “in favor” of the consolidation of Kurdish nationalist movement and leads to further
diversification among the Kurdish political groups. Vali and Natali’s discussion on the
diverse development of Kurdish societies draws attention to the linguistic, religious, and
tribal divisions among the Kurds that were deepened by the fragmentation of the Kurdish
national movement after the post-World War I partition of Kurdistan. Nevertheless, while
they focus on the Kurds’ religious, tribal and linguistic differences and the distinct
internal political conditions they had to face, these accounts do not take into
consideration how the Kurds contest these local differences through the political
discourses they develop both at the domestic and regional level. Since the 1990s, and
particularly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, trans-border
activities increasingly brought the Kurdish groups’ political consciousness together
around the overarching discourse of human rights, democracy and political
decentralization. This common democratic discourse not only transcends the tribal,
linguistic and religious divisions, but also creates a unified Kurdish political dynamic on
a regional level that continues to develop alongside the separate Kurdish nationalist
projects in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
In order to explain this discursive convergence among the separate Kurdish
movements, one needs to move beyond a structural/statist approach to Kurdish
nationalism. The argument that Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria
followed distinct historical trajectories and were shaped by diverse processes of exclusion
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and denial contains much truth. Nonetheless, it falls short of shedding light on how the
collective Kurdish entity is defined by the Kurdish political actors themselves and
incorporated into the domestic as well as cross-border political engagements by the
Kurdish groups in the contemporary period. Although the exact sense of “imagined
community” could differ from one Kurdish community to another, it has been the
common notion of membership rather a common understanding of what membership
means that has throughout the history of Kurdish resistance, played an important role in
sustaining the broader Kurdish movement, which encompasses Kurdish activists from
multiple countries in the context of a complex transnational network.
The Syrian government’s policy of providing Kurdish groups fighting against
Turkey and Iraq with relative freedom of action from the 1970s onwards originated
mainly from the regional ambitions of the Assad regime, which aimed to push its own
Kurdish problem on to its neighbors. Accordingly, the PKK, KDP and PUK were allowed
to pursue activities in Syria only on the condition they would keep the Syrian Kurdish
movement under control. However, Hafiz Assad gradually lost control of his own game
as a result of the strengthening of the Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalist sentiments
among the Syrian Kurds who were affected by the cultural and political activities of the
PKK, KDP and PUK in Syria. This situation paved the way for the Syrian Kurds to
eventually break out of their muted existence in the 1990s, and laid the foundation for the
emergence of the Kurdish movement as an important political oppositional force in Syria
by the early 2000s. This increasing political consciousness and organizational
development among the Syrian Kurds from the 1990s onwards played a significant role
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in the swift organization of the Syrian Kurdish parties as a separate oppositional bloc
during the Syrian uprising of 2011.
By the 1990s, transnational relationships among the Kurds also developed
considerably as a result of the escalation of the PKK’s activities in the region. As the
traditional Iranian Kurdish political parties were mostly absent from Iranian Kurdistan,
many Kurdish activists saw the PKK as an organization that could express their
nationalist and revolutionary aspirations.44 After the arrest of Öcalan in February 1999,
Kurdish demonstrators in Sanandaj, Mahabad and Urmiya took to the streets and staged
mass protests against the Islamic regime in support of Öcalan. After the structural and
ideological changes it experienced in the aftermath of Öcalan’s capture, the PKK shifted
its activities to include Iran and Syria by establishing independent political parties in
these countries. The PJAK, which was established in 2004, soon attracted attention and
showed considerable potential for organizing social and cultural activities and also for
carrying out armed struggle against the Islamic regime.45 Likewise, the PYD, which was
founded in Syria in 2003, strengthened its position as the successor of the PKK whose
sphere of influence among the Syrian Kurds diminished after Damascus handed over
Öcalan. Although the leaders of both PJAK and PYD emphasized on numerous occasions
that they are distinct parties and have no organic ties to the PKK, both parties
acknowledge they share the same leadership, membership and ideological orientation
with the PKK.
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There is no doubt the establishment of the KRG in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992
increased the regional significance of the Kurdish question and inspired Kurds in other
parts of Kurdistan in their search for autonomy and cultural rights. Given its concern for
establishing working relationships with its neighbors, the KRG principally followed a
cautious attitude towards the Kurdish militant groups fighting against the Turkish and
Iranian governments. Although the KRG has been careful to distance itself from the PKK
and PJAK in order not to antagonize Turkey and Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan continued to be a
safe haven for various Kurdish groups including the Iranian Komala and KDPI.
Despite constant pressure from both Turkey and Iran to crackdown on the Kurdish
groups operating in northern Iraq, the KRG traditionally avoided armed confrontation
with these groups mainly because of the massive support base these groups have among
the Iraqi Kurds. The regional government in northern Iraq was fragile and facing an
uncertain future in the early 1990s, which was exacerbated by disastrous episodes of civil
war between the KDP and PUK in the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, since the end of internal
fighting in 1997, and particularly after the constitutional recognition of the KRG in 2005,
both the KDP and PUK became more consistent in their statements about their support
for a political solution to their neighbors’ respective Kurdish problems and declared the
regional government would not participate in military solutions.
While the academic discussions on the growing significance and legitimacy of
Kurdish nationalism increased considerably after the Gulf wars of 1991 and 2003, these
discussions led to the emergence of a perspective that reduces the regional dimension of
the Kurdish question to the study of the autonomous status of the Iraqi Kurds and the
politics of the KRG. Since the early 1990s, such a stance created a tendency to assign a
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primary status to Iraqi Kurdistan in order to explain the course of events of the Kurdish
movements in Turkey, Iran and Syria and the cross-border character of the Kurdish issue.
Ofra Bengio states that:
. . . the traditionally marginalized Kurds of Syria have found new energy
in the cauldron of the Syrian uprising and are now demanding a federal
system in which they would gain significant autonomy in a post-Assad
Syria. The extremely restive Kurds of Turkey are pressing for what they
call democratic autonomy. The Kurds of Iran, typically unremarked upon
in the media, are stirring beneath their blanket of obscurity. But most
important of all these are the Kurds of Iraq. Iraq was the epicenter of the
Kurds’ great leap forward in the early 1990s: the establishment of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which is a euphemism for a de
facto Kurdish state. It is to the KRG experience that Iranian, Syrian and
Turkish Kurds increasingly look for lessons and guidance, and rightly so.46
In a similar vein, Jordi Tejel argues that:
The acceptance in the constitution in 2005 of federalism as the new Iraqi
state’s system of organization only served to strengthen the centrality of
the Iraqi Kurds, both in Iraq and in the Kurdish arena in the Middle East.
Almost immediately, demands for administrative autonomy following the
Iraqi model were made with varying degrees of intensity in Turkey, Iran,
and even Syria, confirming the cross-border character of the Kurdish
issue.47
It is true that the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq has become a major inspiration for
Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan mainly because of the fact that the autonomy of the
KRG has survived longer and been more meaningful than any other Kurdish autonomous
experiment in recent history.48 However, it would be a misleading approach to consider
this fact as grounds for assigning centrality to the Iraqi Kurds in analyzing the broader
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Kurdish phenomenon in the Middle East or to consider the Kurdish demands in Turkey,
Iran and Syria as originating directly from the politics of the KRG. The growing
international legitimacy enjoyed by Iraqi Kurdistan gave greater voice to the Kurdish
cause in the international arena. Nevertheless, this situation also created an opportunity
for the regional states to disregard their respective Kurdish problems by pursuing a policy
of identifying the regional dimension of the Kurdish question solely with the
developments concerning the status of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey, Iran, and Syria sought
military and political support from the KRG for their policies towards the Kurdish
movements within their own borders in exchange for granting recognition to the
autonomous status of Iraqi Kurdistan. In other words, for Turkey, Iran and Syria,
conducting diplomacy with the Iraqi Kurds emerged as a useful political strategy to
increase their control over their respective Kurdish movements.
As rarely recognized in the literature, the demands for autonomy and cultural
rights have been on the agenda of the Kurdish movement in Turkey since the early 1990s.
The demand for democratic autonomy was officially declared for the first time in July
2011, and developed as a consequence of a complex ideological, strategic and
organizational transformation of the Kurdish movement in Turkey that took place over
the past two decades. Autonomy for Kurdistan within a democratic Iran, on the other
hand, has been the core political concept of the Kurdish movement in Iran since the
1970s. Even the experience of the Mahabad Republic of 1946, which is often viewed as
the symbol of Kurdish independence in the 20th century, was in fact informed by a
specific reading of the Iranian Constitution, which emphasizes political pluralism,
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decentralization of power, provincial and local administrative and cultural autonomy, and
respect for religious and ethnic differences.49
The revival of the Kurdish movement in Syria was affected largely by the Kurdish
experience in Iraq. According to one Syrian Kurdish political figure, the overthrow in
2003 of Saddam Hussein liberated the Syrian Kurds from a culture of fear and created a
strong motivation for changing the status of the Kurds in Syria.50 However, it is often
overlooked that besides the impact of the achievements of the Iraqi Kurds on the Kurds in
Syria, there has also been a significant influence of the Kurdish movement in Turkey on
the Syrian Kurds, particularly in ideological and organizational terms. Especially since
the beginning of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, most of the popular representations
of the events in Syrian Kurdish politics in media and scholarly accounts adopted a
tendency to portray the situation as a battleground between the pro-PKK PYD and the
pro-KRG Kurdish National Council.51 These accounts principally serve the goal of
reinforcing the status of the KRG as the central force in Kurdish regional politics while
marginalizing the influence of the PKK. Whereas, the Kurdish efforts to act as a united
front in Syria and the KRG’s mediating role, which included negotiations with the PYD
at the risk of antagonizing Turkey, have received relatively little attention.
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The actions of the major Kurdish political actors in the Middle East, particularly
the PKK, KDP and PUK, have been mostly evaluated from the perspective of the
regional power struggles and the political ambitions of the states and international powers
that affected the evolution of the Kurdish question. In this context, Kurds are often
viewed as victims of changing power relationships among the regional states as well as
the status-quo oriented approach of the international powers towards regional matters.
Notwithstanding the significance of these factors in shaping the Kurdish politics in the
Middle East, another crucial determinant of the regional dimension of the Kurdish
question has been the diplomatic capacity of the Kurdish political groups themselves.
These groups observe and review these regional power relations and position themselves
as non-state actors vis-à-vis the regional, as well as international, actors in order to
strengthen their political leverage and negotiating power. In this respect, incorporation of
the “Kurdish viewpoint” into the regional debate on the Kurdish issue is another task that
the present study undertakes.
Methodology
The present work is based on extensive archival research that incorporates a wide
variety of primary and secondary sources. The sources were collected during a six-month
period from multiple sites in Turkey, Iraq, parts of Europe and the United States. The
written sources include Turkish, Kurdish and English language newspapers and
periodicals; political party programs; parliamentary debates; newsletters published by
various non-governmental organizations; human rights reports; municipal reports; policy
papers published by think tanks; speeches and statements; election data; and personal
memoirs. The documents were gathered from the National Library and Parliamentary
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Library (Ankara, Turkey); the Kurdistan Parliament (Erbil, Iraq); the political party
offices of Peace and Democracy Party (Istanbul, Turkey), Kurdistan Democratic Party
(Erbil, Iraq), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Sulaymaniah, Iraq), the Goran Movement
(Sulaymaniah, Iraq), Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (Erbil, Iraq), Kurdistan Islamic
Union (Erbil, Iraq); Bilkent University Library (Ankara, Turkey) and Salahaddin
University Library (Erbil, Iraq); Kurdish Human Rights Watch (Erbil, Iraq); the Kurdish
Human Rights Project (London, UK); the Kurdish Institute of Paris (Paris, France);
Kurdistan Regional Government – Representation in the USA (Washington D.C., the
US); internet web sites; and individuals.
Throughout the field work, I supplemented these written sources with in-depth
interviews conducted with members of Parliament; party leaders; pro-Kurdish majors,
journalists and lawyers; activists from human rights organizations; and representatives of
think tanks and civil society organizations working in the field of Kurdish rights. I was
not able to travel to Iran and Syria to collect archival data because of time constraints and
personal safety concerns. To compensate for this deficiency, I conducted interviews with
the leaders of the Syrian Kurdish opposition parties and the Democratic Party of Iranian
Kurdistan in Erbil, Iraq,52 in order to gain first-hand information about the recent
developments concerning the Kurdish movements in Iran and Syria.
All interviews were done face-to-face, directly by me in Turkish, English and
Kurdish (with a translator available). The interviews were conducted to fill gaps in the
existing literature, which predominantly views the Kurdish issue as a question of
52
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statelessness and a case of reactive nationalism rather than a problem of democracy. In
my attempt to depart from structural explanations that trace the evolutionary trajectory of
the Kurds’ history as one of victimization, suppression and denial, I seek to uncover the
aspects of the Kurdish movement that transformed it into a powerful force for social and
political change. Within this framework, the present study focuses primarily on the
reasons behind the articulation of Kurdish demands within the scope of a wider
democratic movement for change, how these demands are communicated to the state and
the society in general, and what role this process plays in the transformation of both
Kurdish identity and political goals, and the established notions of democracy,
governance and citizenship within the Kurds’ respective polities.
Why I chose the political elite as my target group instead of the non-elite is
related directly to my research question and methodology. The main questions my
research seeks to answer relate to the transformation of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria and the diverse ways through which this process shapes Kurdish
identity and national demands as well as domestic and regional politics in the Middle
East. I draw mainly on a critical analysis of the modernist school of nationalism and the
discourse analysis framework that is based on the underlying premise that “our ways of
talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather play an
active role in creating and changing them.”53 In the field of politics, the discourse
analysis framework becomes particularly relevant given that engaging in politics often
involves engaging in discursive practices. In this regard, political discourse can be briefly
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defined as the text and talk of politicians and political institutions that are the principal
actors of political discourse.
Despite their crucial position in political science as the main actors of political
discourse and political practices, politicians and political institutions are not the only
participants in the domain of politics. Whether or not they actively engage in discursive
practices, the non-elite, the “masses” are also involved in political discourse as the
primary recipients of the political communicative events. However, given my research
question, which seeks to provide an understanding of a particular discursive articulation
of Kurdish political goals – the democratic discourse, the practices of the major political
entrepreneurs

in

the

movement

(politicians,

opposition

groups,

rights-based

organizations, journalists, lawyers, activists, etc.) are given methodological priority.
Rogers Brubaker draws attention to the methodological drawbacks of what he
calls “groupism” in the study of the ethnicity, race and nationhood, and in the study of
ethnic, racial and national conflict in particular.54 He speaks of the tendency to treat
ethnic groups, nations and races – Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Jews, Blacks, Hispanics and
Kurds, for example – as if they are internally homogeneous, even unitary collective
actors with a common purpose. In order to go beyond groupism, Brubaker suggests,
“ethnicity, race and nation should be thought not in terms of substantial groups or
entities, but in terms of practical categories, discursive frames, organizational routines,
institutional forms, political projects and contingent events.”55 In this respect, he
suggests:
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Although participants’ rhetoric and common sense accounts treat ethnic
groups as the protagonists of ethnic conflict, in fact the chief protagonists
of most ethnic conflict are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of
organizations, broadly understood and their empowered and authorized
incumbents. These include states, their organizational components, law
enforcement agencies, armed forces units, political parties, ethnic
associations, social movement organizations, churches, newspapers, radio
and television stations and so on.56
As it is with every society, Kurds are also diverse people in terms of their political
preferences. Therefore, the debate over whether the pro-Kurdish parties and organizations
represent all the ethnic Kurds57 is not directly relevant to the current study, which seeks
to explain primarily the articulation of Kurdish nationalism beyond the narrowly scoped
framework of ethnic nationalism. In this respect, rather than the question of “what is
Kurdish nationalism,” the current study endeavors to answer the question of “how and
with what consequences is Kurdish nationalism institutionalized and constituted as a
political and cultural form informed by the discourse of democracy.” This approach
opens up a large space for the consideration of human agency.
Discourse analysts, such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, submit that all
forms of identity are contingent and constructed within political discourse.58 They depart
from the idea that discourse constructs the social world in meanings that can never be
56

Ibid. 171-172.

57

For a discussion on the incongruence between the electoral results in Kurdish-populated areas of Turkey
and the ethnic identity of the voters see Tezcur, G. M. (2009) “Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey:
A Conceptual Reinterpretation,” European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10; for an analysis of the debate on
whether Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party pursues ethnic nationalism or acts as a “party of Turkey” see Kavak,
Şeref (2012). “Kürt Siyasetinin 2000’li Yılları: “Türkiyelileşme” ve Demokratik Toplum Partisi” (Kurdish
Ethnopolitics in the 2000s: Turkey-fication and the Democratic Society Party) in Türkiye Siyasetinde
Kürtler: Direniş, Hak Arayışı, Katılım (Kurds in Turkish Politics: Resistance, Struggle for Freedom,
Participation) edited by Büşra Ersanlı, Güney Göksu Özdoğan, Nesrin Uçarlar, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
58

Günes, Cengiz (2012). The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance, London
and New York: Routledge, 4.

33

permanently fixed. The overall idea of the Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that
social phenomena are never finished or complete, which opens up the way for constant
social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting social effects.59
Likewise, Brubaker and Craig Calhoun, treat nationalism mainly as a form of
“discourse” that comes into being as the conscious creation of a body of people.60 Instead
of adopting a conventional developmental treatment of nations, Brubaker and Calhoun
focus more on the temporality of nationalism and the contingent nature of nationness.
Emphasizing the active participation of people in creating and making sense of
nationalism, they explain the nation as an entity that is created and sustained by active
engagement of a relevant body of people into processes of thought and interchange.
Calhoun proposes we treat nationalism first as a discursive formation, which
means it should be examined as a way of thinking and comprehending the world.61 He
contends the system of nations is basic to our mental picture of the contemporary world
and political practice. This picture is reproduced through words and images as well as
through maps, systems of communication and other cultural and political practices, which
depict the world as compartmentalized into discrete nations with well-defined
boundaries. Calhoun sees it as a useless effort to explain nationalism by a single
explanatory variable such as state building, industrialization, unequal economic
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development or resentment. What is important for him is only the discourse of
nationalism.62
Brubaker rejects the understanding of nations as enduring collectivities and
emphasizes instead the necessity of determining how the nation is constituted in various
times and places, often via competing discourses of the same nation. According to
Brubaker, explaining the process through which a particular discursive articulation of the
nation becomes momentarily, yet powerfully realized in practice should be central to the
work of the analysts of nationalism.63
Academic discussions on the Kurds are often interested in historical-sociological
explanations about the rise and development of Kurdish nationalism.64 These studies
focus mainly on the development of Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century as an ethnic
stateless reaction against the official state nationalisms of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
Although they discuss in detail the social, economic and political conditions that gave
rise to the politicization of Kurdish identity and the struggle between the Kurds and their
respective governments, these analyses remained largely reliant on a single explanatory
variable – coercive state policies – while accounting for the evolution of Kurdish
nationalism. In that sense, how and why these processes were interpreted as “oppression”
and “assimilation” by the Kurds themselves and implicated in their conceptions of
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democracy, national identity, citizenship and governance did not attract much scholarly
attention.
Instead of taking a developmental stance, the present study elaborates on the
dialectical relationship between the competing political discourses raised by the Kurds
and their states, and discusses how the democratic discourse of the Kurds becomes
institutionalized and challenges the official state discourses on democracy and
governance both at the domestic and regional levels.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KURDISH NATIONALISM
Considering how the broader goals of democratization, decentralized rule and
achievement of cultural rights were incorporated into the Kurdish nationalist agenda over
the past two decades, the question of why the discourse of independent statehood
continues to be prominent in the academic as well as policy-oriented analyses of the
Kurdish question is intriguing. The fact the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the
world living in a geographically compact area with no nation-state of their own has been
viewed as problematic in the context of a modern world system defined by sovereign
nation-states. Most studies on the modern history of the Kurds examine the struggle
between the Kurds and their central governments with a particular focus on the
oppression of the Kurds as victims of assimilationist policies, and the resultant failure of
the Kurdish desire for an independent state. Nevertheless, the Kurdish nationalist
demands no longer fit this narrative given the proactive nature of the Kurdish movement,
which has been gradually unfolding since the 1990s, as well as the shifting discourse of
Kurdish nationalism towards an emphasis on democratization under the existing state
framework of the Middle East. In this respect, it is imperative to revisit those analyses
about the Kurdish question that are driven by a particular theoretical stance, which puts
the concept of nationalism exclusively in a state-centric framework.
There has been a remarkable increase in the volume of the academic writing on
nationalism, particularly since the end of the Cold War because of the proliferation of
ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world. Despite the lack of a scholarly agreement on
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how to define the concepts of nation and nationalism, there has been a growing consensus
that nationalism as an ideology and movement is a modern phenomenon that emerged
and developed as a result of the major socio-economic processes of modernity such as
industrialization, capitalism and the rise of the modern state.
Though Elie Kedourie’s Nationalism (1960) stimulated some discussion in the
beginning of the 1960s, Ernest Gellner’s essay on nationalism in Thought and Change
(1964) is recognized by many as the mark of the real beginning of the modern study of
nationalism. In the 1970s, the sequential work of Anthony D. Smith (1971, 1976, 1979)
not only made a substantial contribution to the conceptual development of nationalism as
a social phenomenon, but also laid the groundwork for the core debate within the field:
the divide between ethnicists and modernists. By the 1980s, the body of writing on
nationalism flourished further through the works of John Alexander Armstrong (1982),
Benedict Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Anthony D. Smith (1983, 1986) which were
followed by the works of Eric Hobsbawm (1990), Walker Connor (1993), and John
Breuilly (1994) during the 1990s. This large body of work produced from the 1970s
onwards generally investigates when and how nationalism developed and why it has
remained so significant.
Modernists and ethnicists differ mainly over the “when” and “how” of
nationalism. Although scholars of both camps agree nationalism is a relatively recent
phenomenon, dating from the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, significant
differences of opinion arise over the issue of whether the roots of nationalism can be
traced back to previous eras. Ethnicists challenge the modernist view primarily on the
grounds that while nations may be modern, their origins are not, and that the origins of
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nations can be traced back to earlier periods.65 In this regard, the arguments of the
ethnicists have important implications for understanding the role played by ethnic
identity and shared cultural traits in the emergence of ethnic nationalist challenges to
state authority. The modernist view, on the other hand, contributes greatly to the
understanding of how shared characteristics become politically activated and give way to
nationally conscious polities through its focus on the economic and political changes
caused by the process of modernity.
The theoretical divide between the modernists and ethnicists is often overstated.
What unites both camps is their emphasis on the territoriality of the nation and the link
between the rise of national consciousness and the constitution of independent political
entities in the form of states in the modern era. Despite their lack of a specific
engagement with the relationship between state and nation, ethnicists acknowledge that,
under the right stimulus, groups sharing distinctive religious, linguistic, or racial
characteristics will arrive at a corresponding group consciousness, a consciousness that
typically manifests itself in the nationalist desire for a state belonging to the group in
question.66 Modernists, however, consider the cultural aspects of nationalism only as a
means to accomplish political goals defined primarily in terms of achieving statehood.
Modernists vs. Ethnicists: A False Dichotomy?
The modernist stance emphasizes the state in addressing the national question.
Achievement of statehood is seen as vital for the survival and maintenance of the nation.
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The modernists’ main model, nation building, credits the existence of nations largely to
the deliberate, rational agency of elites promoting collective or individual interests. As
modernization disrupts traditional ties and means of subsistence, the nation serves to
mobilize the commitment and sacrifice necessary for socioeconomic development. As a
territorially sovereign political community featuring a culture of mass civic participation,
the nation subordinates all other allegiances of its members (gender, family, class, etc.) to
national consciousness. It constitutes the sole medium for development and social
redistribution and serves as the main actor in the international arena.
Gellner submits that nationalism is a sociologically contingent phenomenon that
possesses time- and context-bound roots.67 He argues that nations and nationalism are
sociologically necessary in modern, industrial societies where the intimate structures of
traditional society erode.68 Industrialization brings about a basic convergence towards
certain essential technical and occupational norms, and thus requires a homogeneous
culture with mass literacy, standardized knowledge and context-free communication.
Such a culture, according to Gellner, is possible only through a state-sponsored mass,
public education system. National identity constitutes the identification with such a
culture, and nations are its expression. In a characteristically modernist outlook, Gellner
states that nations are not cultures waiting to be awakened, but products of nationalism, a
functional movement inherent in and necessary for modernity. In this respect, he views
nationalism as a political principle that primarily refers to the congruence between the
political and the national unit.
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In the same vein, Eric Hobsbawm explains nationalism as a political project
aimed mainly at statehood. He sees nations primarily as the products of nationalism and
affirms that nation, as a social entity, belongs exclusively to a particular, historically
recent period.69 For Hobsbawm, nation becomes the perfect means for a new sociocultural integration of modern societies and for creating the cohesion and stability
necessary in such a society.70 In this respect, nationalism becomes politically significant
principally due to its state-making and economy-forming power. To control rapid social
change and the mass influx of enfranchised citizens, state capitalist elites resort to the
construction of emotionally and symbolically charged signs of group memberships.
These symbolic, ritualistic practices, which Hobsbawm calls “invented traditions,”
provide the inculcation of values and norms of behavior. Therefore, according to
Hobsbawm, it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except in so far as they relate
to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state.71
Anthony Giddens and John Breuilly demonstrate a more distinctive approach to
state-oriented nationalism by endorsing the view that nations and nationalism are mainly
the properties of the modern states. Giddens defines the nation as “a collectivity existing
within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration,
reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states.”72
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However, rather than nationalism per se, it is the nation-state in its unique administrative,
military and territorial properties that commands Giddens’ attention.73 He accords
nationalism a sociological significance only insofar as it is linked to the state. It is the
state’s centralization and administrative expansion that distinguishes the nation-state
from other polities and nationalism from other group identities.
Breuilly also sees nationalism as a political movement defined mainly by its
relationship with the state and/or goal for statehood. For him, nationalism is
inconceivable without the state and vice versa, and the central nationalist goal is
autonomy (usually meaning establishment of a sovereign state in the national territory)
justified in the name of the “nation”.74 Nationalist arguments, according to Breuilly, are
used to justify the quest for state power, and this is why theorists must focus on the
movement’s political aspect. Breuilly especially opposes the notion that pre-modern
ethnic identity necessarily has any bearing on modern nationalism. He criticized
ethnicists on the grounds they exaggerate and distort the occasional use of terms
concerning nationality in pre-modern states and they insufficiently appreciate that
“ethnicity” is material used, indeed, often invented by modern nationalism rather than
one of its essential conditions.75
The proponents of the ethnicist view do not deny the argument that both nations
and nationalism are, by and large, post-eighteenth century phenomena. Nevertheless, they
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object to the modernists’ tendency to assume a sharp break between modernity and
previous eras, which, according to ethnicists, leads to the neglect of the complex interplay
between the modern nations and the collectivities that predated them. Ethnicists argue the
modernizing processes such as industrialization, capitalism and the rise of the modern
state may convert the ethnic cultures into national cultures, but cannot “invent” them.
Although they do not have a particular tendency to conflate the nation with the state,
ethnicists do share the modernists’ state-centric understanding of nationalism by
emphasizing the relationship between the rise of ethno-nationalist consciousness and the
establishment of independent political units in the modern era.
Anthony Smith, who is a pioneering figure in the study of nationalism, argues that
most nations, including the earliest, were based on ethnic ties and sentiments and on
popular ethnic traditions, which have provided the cultural resources for later nationformation.76 Smith acknowledges nations are modern forms of community, yet he insists
that nations and nationalism draw sustenance from a “living,” pre-modern ethnic past
with ties to earlier ethnic communities (which Smith terms as ethnie), to their symbols,
and to the memories of their values and exploits.77 He contends that although nations and
nationalism are modern, a historic ethnic foundation is necessary for their survival and it
is the ethnie that provides that foundation.
Smith disputes the link that modernists highlight between the modern industrial
era and the rise of nationalism, and argues that modern forces revitalize, in changed form,
the social and cultural relations of past eras, and do not engender completely novel forms
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of collective belonging. In this respect, he sees ethnicity – which modernists almost
completely ignore – as a key explanatory variable in accounting for the origin of the
nation-states. In his definition of nationalism, Smith underlines the rise of modern, statecentered political consciousness as an important element for fostering nationalist
sentiments. However, he rejects the notion that ethnicity is a by-product and vehicle for
cultural homogeneity, statehood or socioeconomic emancipation. Rather, he attributes
causal primacy to ethnicity in the formation of the nation and the nation-state model.
Other prominent ethnicist scholars such as Walker Connor and John Hutchinson
also emphasize the inherently ethnic character of nationalism. Connor argues that
explaining nationalism simply as a rational quest for collective goods leaves no room for
collective values, memories, symbols, and emotions, and such an account is not enough
to explain the passion and wide appeal of nationalism. For Connor, what is crucial in the
study of nationalism is the subconscious belief in the group’s separate origin and
evolution, which is an important ingredient of national psychology.78 However, despite
his emphasis on the ethnic character of nations, Connor eventually refers to certain
aspects of modernization, such as the advances in mass communications and
transportation, while explaining the process through which ethnic groups reach the level
of consciousness as necessary for being a “self-aware” community. He asserts that the
growth of ethno-nationalist consciousness gave rise to increasing political mobilization in
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many parts of the world in the post-World War II period, and made political
independence a viable option for many smaller ethnic groups.79
In his criticism of the modernist scholars who confine the use of the term
“nationalism” to a purely political movement and its capacity for state-making,
Hutchinson makes a distinction between political and cultural nationalism. He defines
political nationalism as a civic polity of educated citizens whose objective is to secure a
representative state for their community, while the cultural nationalist perspective gives
primacy to the distinctive civilization of the nation, which is the product of its unique
history, culture, and geographical profile.80 Nevertheless, Hutchinson does not deny the
importance of political nationalism and points out that its focus on the state and
citizenship is regularly complemented by cultural forms of nationalism that seek a moral
regeneration of the community and an inner renovation of ethnic base.
The modernist-ethnicist divide within the contemporary debate on nationalism
presents more a mutually complementary framework than a dichotomy. The ethnicist
view begs the question of why some “objective” cultural groups fail to develop strong
group consciousness while others with more tenuously shared characteristics emerge as
fairly unified, ethnically conscious polities.81 The modernists’ emphasis on factors such
as capitalism, industrialization, mass communications and elite politics provides an
explanation regarding the stimuli through which shared cultural traits become politically
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activated and create a collective sense of belonging that manifests itself in the form of
nationalism. In other words, although the pre-modern ethnic ties and sentiments provide
the cultural resources for later nation-formation, the saliency of ethnic identification as a
political factor is determined by the social, economic and political changes evoked by the
process of modernization.
The modernist approach, on the other hand, overlooks the psychological aspects
of nation-building process by putting the nationalist sentiments in a purely instrumentalist
framework. Although the nation may be socially constructed, it cannot be pulled out of
thin air. The standard rational choice accounts assume that ethnic kinship ties are
fictional, and can therefore be seen instrumentally in the context of the leaders’ strategy
to manipulate ethnicity for the sake of personal or collective economic or political gains.
The difficulty with this account is that it fails to explain why ethnicity would be the basis
for mobilization at all rather than other types of allegiances such as economic interest,
class or gender. The modernist stance is not well equipped to answer this question mainly
because it overlooks the “value-rational” micro-foundations of ethnic or national
mobilization. For ethnicity to be instrumentally used by the leaders, ethnicity must exist
as a valued good for some in the first place.
The Limits of an Emerging Theoretical Synthesis
A view that takes the various components of ethnicity (language, culture, shared
origins and religion) as the building blocks from which national identification may be
constructed resolves the modernist/ethnicist divide. Although the modernists and
ethnicists account for two distinct aspects of nationalism – political and cultural,
respectively, for both, the nation-state model represents the institutionalized form of the
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nation. In other words, whether they see the pre-modern ethnic ties as fictitious or real,
both views embrace the state as the main guarantor of collective identity and presuppose
congruence between political and cultural boundaries. Thus, nationalism is considered
primarily as the locus of the claim to popular sovereignty, which presupposes an idealtype of the nation-state, an entity in which all citizens will be members of its uniform
community.82
For the modernist, while nationalism provides the state with ideological
legitimacy, the state guarantees the rights and freedoms of those it considers to be its own
members and provides them with protection. This formula works perfectly in cases where
the state and the nation align, as in Gellner’s terms, where there is congruence between
state and culture. If this is not the case, the people who do not have the “right” cultural
characteristics choose between assimilating, migrating or becoming irredentist
nationalists in order to change their situation. The options of the state toward those who
do not fit its local dominant characteristics range from assimilation to expulsion or
“ethnic cleansing.”83 Indeed, the majority of the 20th century’s ethnic conflicts validate
the premise that the cultural homogenization imposed by the elites is not sufficient for the
sustenance of the nation, and that pre-existing cultures, including ethnic cultures, are an
important basis for political mobilization in ethnically diverse societies.
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For the ethnicist, the causal relationship between state and nation is based upon
the primacy of ethnic unity as the necessary condition for the survival of the nation and
the viability of the nation-state. As the politico-administrative reach of the governments
was extended to the peripheral ethnic homelands in the modern era, these groups
developed a desire to preserve their autonomous lifestyles, which hardened the
attachments to ethnic identities. In this context, increased cultural awareness combined
with uneven diffusion of modernity leads to the emergence of ethnic nationalism as a way
to respond to the cultural disorientation and physical disruption of the traditional way of
life. As perceived dependence and exploitation gives rise to ethno-nationalism, achieving
self-determination, defined as political independence in the form of separate statehood,
becomes a major goal for most of the politically mobilized ethnic groups. In this context,
alignment of the cultural boundaries of the pre-modern ethnic homelands with the
political boundaries of the newly-established nation-states is viewed by the ethnicists as
the primary condition that guarantees the sustainability of the nation.
Although the ethnicists gain the upper hand in explaining the emergence of ethnonationalist movements, the state-based solution they offer in addressing the national
question eventually creates a variant of modernist view insofar as they see cultural
homogeneity as the major requirement of the nation-state. In other words, while
criticizing the exclusive and intolerant character of the “national” condition of modernity,
the perspective of the ethnicist serves to regenerate the state institution in its same
exclusionary form, referring to a unique people identified with unique cultural
characteristics. In that sense, both the modernist and ethnicist accounts of nationalism fall
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short of dealing with the issues of cultural diversity and the broader minority questions in
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and religiously diverse societies.
The contemporary debate on nationalism is largely silent on the question of
cultural heterogeneity. Rather, the notion of nation built on a common culture is taken for
granted, and the correspondence between the political and ethnic boundaries of the state
is seen as essential for the legitimacy of the nationalist cause and the national state.
Where cultural diversity poses a threat to the socio-political cohesiveness, political
stability and territorial integrity of the state, proponents of both sides of the debate leave
us with nothing but the options of either assimilation or the establishment of a new state
that would provide the necessary protection for those who secede. Within this framework,
the state is presented by both modernists and ethnicists as the main instrument of security
for the members of the nation. This approach leaves no room for debating an alternative
project that could entail the development of a profound unity respecting ethnic and
cultural diversity under conditions where the state becomes a source of insecurity for
certain segments of the population.
If the nation-state secures the rights of its citizens, then surely it is a necessity; but
if the nation-state relies on nationalism and invariably produces massive numbers of
stateless people, it certainly needs to be opposed.84 The idea of human rights born during
the Enlightenment was intended to be universal. Nonetheless, the evolution of the state
into the “nation-state” and the corresponding tendency to conflate nation with state gave
an exclusively national definition to the scope of the community whose rights were to be
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enforced and protected. Such a stance fails to address core questions about how nations
and states may engage in an ongoing social and political exchange in the configuration of
both domestic and international life. Clarifying these tensions is an important
precondition for developing politically more satisfying models.
If the nation-state falls short of ensuring the rights of everyone under its
jurisdiction and is to be opposed, the question then arises as to what will serve as its
alternative. If the realization of fundamental human rights presupposes some particular
state agency to guarantee rights and freedoms for those it considers to be properly its own
members, a problem arises for those who are culturally different and lacking their own
nation-state, notably the minorities. Feeling insecure, the more minority populations are
excluded from rights, the more they tend to look for a reintegration into a national
community of their own.85 Hannah Arendt argues the only way to make the state a safe
repository of human rights for all its citizens is by taking the nation out of the nationstate.86 The way to do this, according to Arendt, is by meshing the state to a web of
federal relations, both below and beyond the state, thereby moving away from the state as
a site of sovereignty. Insofar as nationalism is bound to the claim of national sovereignty,
any reconfiguration of the state depends upon a liberation from the nationalist legacy.87
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In her examination of the “Jewish question,”88 Arendt puts an emphasis on the
opportunity for Jews to become a nation and elaborates on the structure of the state that
might embody their nationhood and its principal condition.89 Within the framework of
her well-known and much debated notion of “the right to have rights,” which she sees as
the principal human right, she focuses on the right of a people to become a nation by
founding a state whose institutions announce and guard the civil rights of its citizens.90
However, while the foundation of a state, “a new kind of state,” was what Arendt saw as
the goal of the Jewish people, she rejected the idea that the structure of this new state in
Palestine should be that of a European nation-state. The binational Arab-Jewish state she
envisions is based on a council system of governing. “Local self-government and mixed
Jewish-Arab municipal and rural councils, on a small scale and as numerous as possible,
are the only realistic political measures that could eventually lead to political
emancipation of Palestine,”91 as Arendt puts it.
There is no doubt the Kurdish efforts at self-determination principally derive from
the failure of the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria to safeguard the rights of their
Kurdish citizens. According to the modernist and ethnicist accounts of nationalism, this
situation automatically lends itself to the solution of establishing a Kurdish nation-state
which would be the only entity that could provide the necessary protection. Nevertheless,
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it is striking that the evolutionary trajectory of Kurdish political discourse poses a
significant challenge to this assumption. In other words, the mainstream statist thought on
nationalism is not able to explain the Kurds’ political position in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Syria.
Building a “new state” had certainly become the main goal of the Kurdish
nationalist movement in the late twentieth century. However, the manner in which this
goal unfolds since the early 1990s suggests that the national liberation envisioned by the
Kurdish political elite has less to do with establishing a separate Kurdish nation-state than
becoming an effective oppositional force in pushing for political change within the
borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Although the dynamics of the relationship
between the Kurds and their respective central governments vary from one country to
another, the Kurdish movements’ move toward democratization has made them important
political players in each of the four states as they try to address such important issues as
minority rights, democracy and federalism. In that sense, contemporary Kurdish
nationalism warrants an objective scholarly investigation, not only as it impacts the
crucial political developments within the states in which the Kurds live, but also as it
shapes the Kurds’ interactions with each other across borders and with the regional and
global players involved in restructuring state-society relations in the Middle East.
Structural Approaches to the Study of Kurdish Nationalism
Structural explanations are the backbone of the modernist thought that traces the
origins, rise, and course of nations and nationalism to the consequences of uneven
capitalism, industrialism and rise of the modern state. Although they attribute a relatively
greater role to human agency in explaining nationalism by referring to shared ideas,
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sentiments, meanings and definitions among the adherents of a given cultural or ethnic
group, ethnicists also rely heavily on the process of modernization and the underlying
structural changes in explaining the development of group self-awareness and
politicization of ethnic identity. While the ethnicist approach defines nationalism on the
basis of a uniform ethnic origin ever-present in history, the modernist approach deduces it
from a mythical origin constructed by modernity. In both cases, the nationalist discourse
has no autonomy; it is an effect or expression of either real or assumed national origin
constituted by the objective structures of industrial capitalism and the culture of
modernity.
One of the main issues in treating the Kurdish question as a problem of
democracy rather than a problem of statelessness strictly defined in ethnic terms is that
one must maintain a distance from the structural analysis of the relationship between the
Kurds and the state. Adopting such an approach is crucial in order to understand Kurdish
nationalism from the perspective of the “Kurds.” It is the Kurdish political actors who
define the Kurdish question as a problem of human rights, democracy, and political
participation in the first place. Thus, any analysis that considers the Kurdish question in
the context of the democratization process in Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria needs to open up
a large space for the role of human agency rather than depending solely on the structural
factors as the main determinants of Kurdish political action.
The hegemonic representation of the Kurdish question as a case of “separatism”
and “terrorism” in state discourses puts constraints on the development of academic
debate and research on the Kurds throughout much of the 20th century. As the host
governments frequently prohibited or placed restrictions on the publication and
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dissemination of information on the Kurds, the “official” representation of the Kurds in
state and popular media discourses remained largely unchallenged until the 1960s. From
the 1960s to the 1980s, only a limited number of academic works were published in the
field of Kurdish Studies and they were focused primarily on the Kurdish cause in Iran
(Eagleton 1963; Ghassemlou 1965) and Iraq (Adamson 1964; Jawad 1981; Ghareeb
1981). From the 1960s onwards, Turkey’s official state discourse on the Kurdish question
started to face a challenge from the Kurdish activists who led to the emergence of the
Kurdish movement as an influential political oppositional force in Turkey in the 1970s.
Accordingly, from the 1980s onwards, the increase in Kurdish political activism
witnessed a corresponding increase in the number of books and articles on Kurdish
identity and nationalism in Turkey. The Kurdish factor in Syria, on the other hand,
remained marginal in academic research dedicated to either Syria or the Kurdish question
until the Qamishli revolt of 2004, which is accepted as a major milestone regarding the
growth of Kurdish nationalism in Syria.
By the 1990s, the increased salience of Kurdish nationalism as a political factor,
particularly in Turkish and Iraqi politics, resulted in a remarkable upsurge of academic
work on the Kurdish question. The first comparativist and more theoretical work on the
Kurds were published in this period (Entessar 1992; Chaliand 1993; Gunter 1993, 1997;
Olson 1996, McDowall 1996; Ciment 1996). From the late 1990s and throughout the
2000s, Kurdish Studies was increasingly integrated into country studies and comparative
work focusing on all four parts of Kurdistan. These studies address a diverse range of
issues and focus on different periods and aspects of Kurdish society and politics. An
overwhelming number of these studies focus on the historical origins and development of

54

Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East with particular attention paid to the conflict
analyses of Kurdish political actors and state authorities as well as the accounts of the
political history of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.92
The political history literature predominantly focuses on the evolution of Kurdish
national movement and the politicization of Kurdish identity after the establishment of
modern nation-states in the Middle East in the early twentieth century. The political
history accounts by Van Bruinessen (2000), White (2000), Natali (2005), Tahiri (2006),
Ahmed and Gunter (2007), Tejel (2009) and Aziz (2011) generally trace the evolutionary
trajectory of Kurdish nationalism with a particular focus on the nation-state building
processes in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria as the major determinant of the rise of Kurdish
ethno-nationalism in the 20th century. These studies not only highlight the significance of
the modernization process – increased urbanization, educational opportunities and
communications – in giving rise to the politicization of Kurdish identity in the newlyestablished nation-states of the Middle East, but also analyze the internal social and
economic characteristics of the Kurdish society as a causal factor in explaining the failure
of the Kurds to establish a nation-state of their own.
Similarly, the conflict analysis literature as exemplified by the works of Gunter
(1990), Kirişci and Winrow (1997), Barkey and Fuller (1998), Özcan (2006), Romano
(2006), Vali (2011) and Eccarius-Kelly (2011), examine the conflict between the Kurds
and their respective central governments in a historical context. They refer to particular
theoretical frameworks such as social movements and constructivist approaches in
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accounting for the origins and evolution of the encounters between the sovereign powers,
and the Kurdish communities and their political representatives.
Recently, studies that have a narrower focus on a particular aspect of the
contemporary Kurdish national movement have also been published such as the works by
O’Leary, McGarry and Salih (2005), Yıldız (2005), MacDonald and O’Leary (2007),
Lawrence (2008), Visser and Stansfield (2008), Gunter (2008) and Natali (2010). These
studies deal predominantly with the social and political changes that took place within the
Kurdish national movement since the early 1990s with a particular focus on the debates
on democracy and federalism in Iraq after the 2003 American intervention and the
increasing significance of the discourse on human rights regarding the Kurdish question
in Turkey within the context of Turkey’s EU accession process.
Following the first Gulf War, the literature on the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism
was enriched greatly through the political history and conflict analyses accounts of
Kurdish political activism. However, works produced in the field of Kurdish Studies
continue to focus on structural factors – the market, the economy, industrialization,
capitalism, education, communication, transportation – in explaining the rise and
development of the Kurdish national movement. Informed largely by the mainstream
structural-statist theoretical frameworks on nationalism, contemporary Kurdish
scholarship often highlights the causal relationship between the processes of statebuilding and modernization in the Kurds’ host countries and the social and economic
changes that took place in the Kurdish society. These studies usually trace the roots of
Kurdish nationalism back to the state formation period in the Middle East after World
War I, and examine the Kurdish national movement as a phenomenon primarily shaped
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by the state-building policies in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, the evolution
of Kurdish nationalism is principally explained as a function of these diverse political
environments in which the Kurds act, and whether or not Kurdish nationalist aspirations
become publicly salient is viewed largely in the context of the positive or negative
incentives offered by the central governments.
Although these analyses have extensive explanatory power in terms of
understanding the variations in the manifestation of Kurdish nationalism across space and
time, they fail to capture the changes in the Kurdish national movement during the
contemporary era because of the limitations imposed by framing the problem from the
perspective of the political structures of the states in which the Kurds live. Lately, the
works of Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (2010), Cengiz Güneş (2011) and Büşra
Ersanlı, Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Nesrin Uçarlar (2012) made important contributions
to the literature by clarifying how the demands of the Kurds were constituted in the
discourses of the Kurdish political elite, and then communicated to the state authorities
and society at large in the context of the pro-Kurdish actors’ attempts to transform their
respective polities. These studies have opened a greater space for Kurdish agency within
the policy-making processes.
Others such as Nicole Watts (2010), despite giving an account of the Kurdish
democratic and legal forms of engagement as a political oppositional force in Turkey,
analyzes the pro-Kurdish parties largely from the perspective of the official Turkish
discourse. Her study “does not include a discussion of the conception of democracy being
proposed by the pro-Kurdish movement, how it addresses questions of pluralism – both
within and outside the Kurdish community – and to what extent this discourse of
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democracy has challenged the notions of democracy and citizenship in Turkey.”93 Hence,
an in-depth study of the fluid and reciprocal relationship between the Kurds and their
respective central governments and the role that the Kurdish political actors play in
reshaping the legal and institutional structure and political alignments within their
respective polities remains a major gap scholars have not yet addressed.
The structural accounts of Kurdish nationalism often take the “political
opportunity structures” as their point of departure. Political opportunity structures are
explained on the basis of the premise that emphasis should be given to the interaction
between the movement and institutionalized politics and the importance of the broader
political system in structuring opportunities for collective action.94 A political
opportunities perspective seeks to show how changes in some aspect of a political system
create new opportunities or constraints for activist efforts in order to explain the
emergence of a particular movement or “cycle of protest.”95
Laying the foundation in this tradition, Charles Tilly, in his classic From
Mobilization to Revolution (1978), explains what he calls as the “polity model,” which
relates contenders to a government and to other contenders via coalitions and struggles
for power.96 The polity model deals with the surrounding world that is likely to affect the
contender’s well-being, that is, by considering incentives or opportunities to act. In other
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words, the strengths and weaknesses of the external actors comprise the contender’s
opportunities to act on its interests.97
Similarly, David Meyer suggests, “the primary point of the political opportunity
approach was that activists do not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum.
Rather the political context, conceptualized fairly broadly, sets the grievances around
which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others.”98 He
asserts “the wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists’ choices – their ‘agency’ – can
only be understood and evaluated by looking at the political context and the rules of the
games in which those choices are made – that is, “structure.”99
Political opportunity accounts of the Kurdish question by scholars such as Paul
White (2000), Hakan Yavuz (2001), Denise Natali (2005), Nader Entessar (2007) and
Nicole Watts (2007) generally focus on state policies as the determining factor in the
development of the Kurdish national movement, particularly the politicization of Kurdish
identity. In explaining the evolution of Kurdish nationalism, these accounts explain
Kurdish political action by referring to the opportunities and constraints facing the Kurds.
Within this framework, the political opportunity perspective enables scholars of Kurdish
Studies to address two questions: how the movement emerges on the one hand, and its
ongoing development, on the other. Nonetheless, while tracing the evolutionary trajectory
of the Kurdish movement, these accounts do not explore the encounters between the
Kurds and the state as a reciprocal process. During their confrontations with the political
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structure, the Kurds, as a challenging group, also affect legislative or other forms of
political change that serves to restructure the legal and institutional basis of the political
system.
Other studies such as Michael Gunter (2008) and Kerim Yıldız and Mark Muller
(2008) focus on external opportunity structures, namely, the U.S. intervention in Iraq in
2003, and Turkey’s EU accession process, as factors that explain the increasing salience
of Kurdish nationalism in twenty-first century. However, although they contribute greatly
to the literature in terms of addressing the role of external factors in providing new forms
of support for Kurdish nationalist projects, these accounts do not demonstrate how the
externally-based opportunity structures are reinterpreted by the Kurdish actors and
expressed within their political agendas attempting to make new opportunities in the
domestic realm.
Within the literature, there are also studies that analyze the mobilization strategies
and the cultural and social-psychological tools employed by the Kurdish political groups
in order to strengthen Kurdish collective action and organizational capacity. David
Romano (2006), besides providing a political opportunity account, examines various
vehicles of mobilization as well as social psychological and cultural factors that serve as
crucial inducements to Kurdish collective action in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, and does this
from a comparative perspective. Ali Kemal Özcan (2006) specifically analyzes the
discourse of the PKK from the 1970s to early 2000s and focuses on the views and ideas
of the organization as well as its political objectives and corresponding strategies for
action. Martin Van Bruinessen (2003) draws attention to the development of Kurmanci as
a modern literary language and its role in the emergence of Kurdish national awareness
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during the evolution of the Kurdish movement. Farideh Koohi-Kamali (2007) studies the
transition of Kurdish society in Iran from a traditional tribal community to a society with
market-based economic and social relationships, and discusses the impact of economic
developments in Kurdish society on the expression of political demands for
independence. Nicole Watts (2006) provides a discussion of the Kurdish participation in
electoral politics in Turkey as a form of social movement activism for surviving,
consolidating and advancing the Kurdish political agenda.
Although these accounts provide important reflections on the cognitive, ideational
and strategic dimensions of the Kurdish collective action and the roles they play in the
construction of Kurdish nationalist discourse, the scholarship does not offer a
comprehensive analysis of how this repertoire of collective action is used by the proKurdish contentious actors to create new opportunities and widen the cycle of contention
in order to challenge and transform existing political systems. In other words, although
they open a greater space for the role of agency in contentious politics, these studies do
not provide a discussion of the contentious actors’ dynamic relationship to the
opportunity structures and their potential to transform their given polity.
While it is true the institutionalized political systems and changes in the patterns
of political opportunities and constraints play a significant role in shaping the prospects
for collective action and the forms movements take, they are not an inevitable
prerequisite to action. Structural explanations suffer from a high level of determinacy by
assuming that the structural changes in government and society inevitably produce
changes in social movements. Such a stance does not leave room for unintended
movement-initiated change in the structure of political opportunities.
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William Gamson and David Meyer remind us that “opportunities open the way
for political action, but movements also make opportunities.”100 Nonetheless, the
observation of Gramson and Meyer is not widely reflected either in the field of Kurdish
studies or in the broader literature on social movements. As Doug McAdam underscores:
While lavishing attention on the impact of political opportunities on the
timing, form, and consequences of social movements, movement scholars
have spent comparatively little time and energy systematically studying
the role that movements have played in reshaping the institutional
structure and political alignments of a given polity.101
Given that the majority of the Kurdish studies scholars emphasize the increasing
importance of the Kurdish movement as a powerful force for change in society, their
collective failure to undertake any systematic and comprehensive accounting of the effect
of the Kurdish movement on the various dimensions of political opportunities is puzzling.
In this respect, the literature on the Kurds falls short of capturing the dynamic, reciprocal,
and crucially important relationship of the Kurdish actors to structures of political
opportunity. McAdam states:
Those structures simultaneously constrain and facilitate collective action
by a wide range of challenging groups. Those who temporarily benefit
from the structure are apt to act aggressively to take full advantage of the
opportunities accorded them. In doing so, they are likely to effect
legislative or other forms of change that serves to restructure – in both
intended and unintended ways – the legal and institutional or the relational
basis of the political system or both. Thus transformed, the structure of
political opportunities once more acts back to confront the population of
challenging groups with new constraint and possibilities for action.102
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Since the early 1990s, the Kurdish national movement can be said to acquire a
dual character: an ethno-cultural struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity and
demands, and a democratization movement for the prohibition of human rights violations
and the achievement of democratic reforms. In other words, Kurdish nationalism is no
longer defined solely by ethnic assertiveness but also by wider claims for expanded rights
and democratic governance for all the nationalities coexisting with the Kurds. Explaining
this discursive transformation merely as a change in political tactics and strategy or a
derivative of the structures of political opportunity leaves no room for considering the
Kurdish question outside the framework of the official state discourses.
The process by which the Kurdish question became intertwined with the question
of democratization transformed the relationship between the Kurds and their respective
central governments. The Kurdish parties and activists seek to challenge the political and
ideological authority of the state not only on the basis of identity politics, but also by
raising claims for a competing vision of culture, governance and political representation
to that espoused by the central governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
Restricting the study of the Kurdish question to a narrowly defined framework of
reactive nationalism unfavorably assigns a passive role to the Kurdish movement in its
encounters with the state. In other words, the Kurds’ capacity to engage in politics is
simply confined to the “right to react” which subordinates the movement to one which
derives solely from the actions and decisions of those in power. Such an approach not
only precludes the consideration of the Kurdish movement as an autonomous actor, but
invariably reproduces the narratives of victimhood, which allows governments to claim
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full agency in the processes at work in the definition, transformation and the eventual
solution of the Kurdish problem.
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CHAPTER III
KURDS IN IRAQ
Iraq is facing a serious crisis. We have tried our utmost to prevent Iraq
from descending into a sectarian conflict and we have consistently avoided
taking sides in this conflict. The Kurds have played a pivotal role in
bringing about the new Iraq, particularly two years ago when our initiative
resulted in the formation of the current government. Had it not been for
our role, one can only guess what an unknown fate would have beset Iraq.
It is very unfortunate that a small number of people in Baghdad have
imposed themselves and monopolized power.103
After the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s
regime, the southern and central governorates of Iraq became mired in civil war and
economic stagnation, while the Kurdish north experienced relative stability and certain
levels of development.104 In the context of the new power-sharing system established in
Iraq following the approval of 2005 constitution, this asymmetrical growth largely
influenced center-periphery relations by strengthening the Kurdistan region’s political
power in relation to the state and increasing its leverage on the central government to
accommodate Kurdish demands.105 This situation inevitably revitalized the long term
Kurdish-Arab animosity that lies at the intersection of fundamental questions about the
future of Iraq. These questions include the stability of the new regime, the process of
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democratic transition, and whether Iraq will become a truly federal state with an inclusive
vision towards its ethno-sectarian diversity.
Barzani’s statement on the Kurdish New Year in 2012 highlights the role of the
Kurdish movement not only in establishing a new political order in Iraq, but also in
ensuring the future stability of the regime in the context of the challenges facing the
newly-established power-sharing system. The relationship of the Kurds to the process of
democratization in Iraq is a complex one that raises the question of whether the Kurdistan
region is a stabilizing or a disintegrating force. Why has the Kurdish movement in Iraq
become so central to the questions of whether Iraq can be democratic or whether
federalism can stabilize Iraq, particularly in the post-Saddam era? In the same vein, why
has the Kurdish movement in Iraq gained greater prominence within its respective
political environment compared to its counterparts in Turkey, Iran and Syria?
One answer lies in the sheer demographic weight and territorial concentration of
Kurds within Iraq.106 Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan are, by and large, territorially
concentrated with the exception of Syrian Kurds who are geographically dispersed along
the northern Syrian line. The number of Kurds living in Iraq is less than those living in
Turkey and Iran. However, as far as the ethnic demography and comparative rates of
voter turnout are concerned, the Kurds have a more significant presence in Iraq,
particularly by comparison to their presence in Iran and Syria.
The second explanation for the relative strength of Iraqi Kurdistan is the sustained
continuity of the Kurds’ armed struggle against successive regimes in Iraq since the
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British mandate in Iraq. Organized Kurdish armed struggle against the state started in
Turkey only in the 1980s while armed struggle was never a mode of opposition for the
Syrian Kurds until the uprising of 2011. Armed struggle in Iranian Kurdistan, on the
other hand, proved to be effective in terms of placing the rights of ethnic and religious
minorities on to Iran’s political agenda, but it was never sufficient to force the
government into a political solution.
The crucial factor that affected the success or failure of Kurdish armed struggle in
each country is the relative military and bureaucratic capacity of the state. Until the rise
of the Baathists in 1968, Iraq was a fairly weak state whose military and bureaucratic
capacities were far less than those of republican Turkey or monarchical Iran. Whereas, in
Syria, armed struggle as a viable strategy of resistance was generally avoided due to the
limited size and organizational capacity of the Kurds. Even during the Baathist regime,
the Kurds in Iraq won concessions on language rights, constitutional recognition of their
identity, and promises of decentralization mainly as a result of the long struggle waged
by the Kurdish armed forces in the country’s north. The implementation usually remained
poor, but the idea of an “Iraqi Kurdistan” with distinct political and administrative
capacity was increasingly solidified.
The third reason Kurdish nationalism endured in Iraq lies with the peculiarities of
the British mandate in the early twentieth century. The British policy towards the Kurds
throughout the mandatory period was generally marked by the British dilemma of how to
reconcile its assertions for democracy in Iraq with its preference for a strong centralizing
authority necessary to maintain internal stability and ensure the preservation of Britain’s
political interests. In this context, the Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s were
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perceived by the British largely as disintegrative movements that should be suppressed in
order to ensure that the economically important Kurdish areas, particularly the oil-rich
Mosul, was attached to the emerging Iraqi state.
On the other hand, the British emphasis on representation and constitutionalism as
well as Britain’s commitments to both the League of Nations and to the Kurds to grant
official autonomy to Kurdistan constrained Britain’s ability to encourage a strong
government in Iraq. Through the mid-1940s, successive Kurdish revolts were constant
reminders of the Iraqi government’s failure to maintain order and fulfill its obligations to
its Kurdish citizens. The British, therefore, encouraged the official use of Kurdish
language, education in Kurdish and appointment of Kurdish officials in the Kurdish
areas. Although these policies were never more than half-heartedly carried out and did
not ensure the bureaucratic entrenchment of these cultural rights, they assisted in the
preservation of the constitutive elements of Kurdish culture and nationalism in Iraq. It is
fair to say that under the mandate and indeed until the high tide of Baathist ascendancy
(1975-1990), in contrast to the much more repressive situation in Iran or Turkey, the
Kurds’ separate identity was generally recognized to a greater or lesser extent, or at least
not denied, by all Iraqi governments.107
The fourth answer to the question of why Iraqi Kurdistan became so fundamental
to the future of Iraq and proved more effective in pressing its agenda for greater rights
and autonomy than its counterparts in Turkey, Iran and Syria is the sustained
organizational capacity of the Kurdish nationalist groups in the country. This situation
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has much to do with the internal instability of the Iraqi state itself as well as the military
capacity of the Kurdish movement. Until the establishment of the Baathist regime in
1968, Iraq was suffering severely from successive coups and intra-Arab conflicts. The
Kurds, in the meantime, continued to fight for the recognition of their language and
administrative control of Kurdistan. Both of these factors hindered full state penetration
of Kurdistan and gave the Kurdish leaders opportunities to advance their cultural,
administrative and territorial demands. The Kurds never fully controlled Kurdistan until
1991, but they consistently consolidated the governance and control of portions of
northern Iraq and maintained minimal state functions.
Finally, regarding intra-Kurdish politics, the power configuration of Iraqi
Kurdistan remained predominantly tribal after the establishment of Kurdish nationalism
in Iraq in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the tribal leaders’ pragmatic partnership with
the intellectual and urbanized Kurdish nationalists played a crucial role in the emergence
of a functioning Kurdistan in Iraq. While the tribal/modernist divide has been a major
source of disunity, so much so it led to crippling episodes of infighting, that disunity has
enabled the Iraqi Kurds to better organize in order to conduct armed and political
struggle. In sum, although the current status of the Iraqi Kurds has much to do with
outside intervention in Iraq, the emergence of Kurdistan as a de facto autonomous entity
after Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Kuwait war of 1991 was not an accident. Likewise,
the fundamental role of the Kurds within the debate on democracy and federalism in Iraq
in the post-Saddam era is not a coincidence. Both developments have their roots in the
past developments of the state of Iraq and the evolution of its relationship to Iraq’s Kurds.
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The Road to Autonomy: The Legacy of the Armed Struggle
Until the Kurds gained de facto autonomous status in 1991, Kurdish nationalism
in Iraq was for the most part a “reactive” nationalism. After the establishment of the
modern state of Iraq, the persistent focus of successive regimes on a unified sense of Iraqi
nationalism built around a distinctly Arab narrative led to the establishment of a
contentious relationship between the state and the Kurds, who form the second largest
ethnic group in the country after the Arabs. The warfare between the Kurds and the
governments of Baghdad from 1960 to 1980 created a strong motivation to react in unity
against oppression and significantly contributed to the consolidation of Kurdish
nationalism in Iraq. More than any other single event in the past half century of Kurdish
history in the country, the Anfal campaign of 1988, during which the Kurds were
subjected to outright massacre at the hands of the Baath regime, further reinforced the
common notion of suffering and provoked a galvanizing nationalism among the Kurds.108
After the Kurds gained full control over territory following Saddam Hussein’s
withdrawal from north in 1991, this element of reactive nationalism steadily gave way to
the emergence of the Kurdish movement as one that not only built up a political system in
the north for a flourishing region, but also shaped important debates on the future of
democracy in Iraq.
The British policy of Sunni “Arabizing” the government in Iraq during the
mandatory period was contested right from the beginning by both the Kurds and Shia
Arabs. The fact Arab nationalism was established as the primary pillar of the state’s
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ideological legitimacy meant the distinction between Kurds and Arabs emerged as more
intractable than the sectarian divide between the Sunnis and Shia. While the sectarian
question in Iraq was mainly a problem of underrepresentation of the Shia within the
organs of the state, the ethnic question created a more significant problem due to the
competing claims of the Kurds to a nation-state of their own. The Shia Arabs were
encouraged to subscribe to the notion of being “Iraqis” through the establishment of a
monarchy that was Arab in composition and orientation. The same cannot be said for the
Kurds whose grievance was the creation of the state of Iraq itself, which undermined
Kurdish attempts to secure autonomy or independence after the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire. In this respect, the main distinction between the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in
Iraq throughout the twentieth century is that while the aspirations of Shia Arabs were
mostly directed toward changing the power configuration within the state, the Kurds had
broader demands for a reorganization of the state of Iraq itself.
Throughout the early 1920s, there were constant armed uprisings in northern Iraq.
These revolts were, by and large, an expression of traditional Kurdish hostility to
imposition of any form of outside authority and a result of the Kurdish tribal chieftains’
desire to exploit the disintegration of former power centers to assert their own autonomy
in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.109 These early Kurdish revolts in Iraq
were quickly suppressed by the British. In the new post-World War I international order
stamped by the principle of self-determination, the uprisings made a strong case for
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Kurdish nationalism and posed significant challenges to the configuration of the Iraqi
state envisaged by the British authorities.
The 1930s marked the awakening of a national consciousness among the first
generation of secular educated and urban Kurds in Iraq who began to develop ideas of
how best to secure specifically Kurdish identity and interests within the framework of the
Iraqi state.110 The new urban and intellectual nationalists challenged the dominance of the
traditional notables of Kurdistan, yet were aware of the power of the tribal leaders in
Kurdish society. When the British and the Hashemite attempted to penetrate Kurdistan
with modern direct rule by replacing tribal governance with more bureaucratic yet
Arabized administration, some of the tribal notables, determined to defend their
privileges, made common cause with the new urbanized and professionalized Kurds who
had different grievances and agendas.111 This model led to the emergence of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), under the leadership of a traditional notable, Mulla
Mustafa Barzani, and a group of urban intellectuals, notably Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal
Talabani.
Throughout the monarchical rule and into the first years of the republican period,
the ethno-sectarian societal structure and the idea of democracy were bound to clash in
Iraq. The problem was that building the strong central government necessary to maintain
unity in a socially-fractured society conflicted with the goal of creating the representative
institutions vital for legitimatizing the order in the eyes of the existing communities, but
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that would, by definition, constrain governmental action.112 The Hashemite monarchical
government succeeded in building a strong central government, but largely failed in
achieving legitimacy because of the reluctance of the governing elite to cede power in a
truly meaningful way by assuring the diverse communities their identities and interests
were fully respected. Consequently, a general belief took hold that coercion was
necessary to achieve the discipline and unity required to manage Iraq’s ethnic and
sectarian diversity.
Iraq underwent several periods marked by democratic experiments designed to
break the stranglehold of authoritarianism on the country. Narrowing the dislocations
between the disparate communities of Iraq was a crucial aspect of this task. As the Kurds
have engaged in an almost constant rebellion against Baghdad since the establishment of
modern Iraq in 1921, the political, administrative and cultural gap between the north and
the rest of the country was a constant reminder of Iraq’s failure to establish an inclusive,
democratic order.
Iraqi rulers often had an inconsistent attitude toward democracy that was clearly
discernible in the country’s uneven march toward democratic ideals and practices, during
which democracy would go through an extended period of denial, and then suddenly
allowed to function, only to be denied yet again.113 It is no coincidence the relations
between the state and the Kurds have been marked by the same attitude, which led
successive regimes to recognize Kurdish nationalism and cultural rights for a time, then
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to deny Kurdish identity again and reinstate strategies of assimilation and control. In this
sense, there has always been a striking overlap between the cycles of political openings
for Kurds in Iraq and the emergence of political will to stop the armed rebellions in the
north through opening negotiations with the Kurds.
The first major political opening in Iraq took place after the coup of July 14,
1958, which put an end to the monarchical rule and marked the beginning of Iraq’s
transition to a republican state. Issues concerning the position of the Kurds within the
state of Iraq quickly became central to the program of action specified by the
revolutionaries led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim. The rapprochement between the
Kurds and the new regime was largely a result of the common interests shared by the
Kurdish movement and the Qasim government. For Qasim, Kurdish support for the new
regime was of great value in combatting attempts by the extreme Arab nationalists to
displace him.114 The Kurdish movement was viewed as a critical ally both by Qasim and
his left-wing supporters due to Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s distinguished record of armed
combat and revolt over several years against the British administration and the monarchy.
For the Kurds, Iraq’s transition to a republican regime created a political environment
conducive for the recognition of their demands for the establishment of democratic
freedoms and the realization of the Kurds’ political and cultural rights.
The general program drawn up by the new republican government called for the
establishment of a democratic regime and the adoption of a new constitution based on
freedoms, social justice and recognition of the rights of the minorities within Iraq’s
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national unity.115 Within this framework, Qasim legalized the KDP, welcomed Mullah
Mustafa Barzani on his return from the Soviet Union where he was in exile since 1945,
and removed some of the restrictions that had been placed on Kurdish publications under
the preceding regime. 116 Qasim and his leftist supporters promoted an Iraqi-first identity
and tried to create a sense of Iraqiness based on the Kurdish-Arab fraternity. The draft
constitution stated, “Arabs and Kurds are partners in the Iraqi homeland and their
national rights are recognized within the Iraqi state.”117 Nonetheless, the honeymoon
between Qasim and the Kurdish movement did not last long, not only because Qasim
shared the preconceptions of his predecessors regarding the Kurdish question, but also
because his administration did not manage to progress beyond the very limited elements
of representative government established by the preceding regime.
The Kurdish question has an important place in any analysis of the decline of
Qasim. The major flaws in Qasim’s administration such as his gradual concentration of
power and his failure to depart from the entrenched state traditions of authoritarianism
soon made it apparent the Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and the restoration of
democratic liberties were in fact representing demands which the government in Baghdad
was not yet willing to grant to Iraqi Arabs, and so they could hardly grant rights to the
Kurds.118 Under these conditions, relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi state rapidly
deteriorated. The fighting that broke out in 1961 was the start of a prolonged conflict that
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continued intermittently until 1975. The prolonged war in the north played a significant
role in the declining popularity of the Qasim regime and its eventual ouster by the
Baathists and Arab nationalist military figures on February 8, 1963.
The next major attempt at a democratic opening in Iraq emerged directly out of
the concerns over finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem. In 1966, Abd alRahman al-Bazzaz was appointed as the first civilian prime minister of Iraq since the
collapse of the monarchy in 1958. Iraq had been under military rule since 1963. The
appointment of Bazzaz appeared to be a move away from the military ruler regime
towards some civilian power, giving the impression a new era of a more open
government would be introduced.119 Bazzaz himself was an Arab nationalist ideologue,
but he recognized the centrality of the Kurdish question to the country’s progress and
attempted to initiate negotiations to end the war and effect a settlement in the north. On
June 29, 1966, he outlined a twelve-point offer to the Kurds that went further than ever
before in meeting most of the Kurdish demands. A full acknowledgement of Kurdish
nationality was the first of the twelve points followed by the acceptance of the Kurdish
language as an official language (along with Arabic) in the provinces that were
predominantly Kurdish. The declaration also promised decentralization with freelyelected administrative councils and proportional representation for Kurds in central
government. Finally, the government declared its intent to hold parliamentary elections
within the period fixed in the provisional constitution.120
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With the al-Bazzaz government came a valuable opportunity to consider the
Kurdish question in the context of a workable plan of reconciliation.121 More importantly,
al-Bazzaz’s efforts to end the war in the north went hand-in-hand with efforts to establish
a genuine representative government as he understood that democratic order cannot be
discussed without confronting the bi-national character of Iraq. In this respect, the Bazzaz
Declaration was a crucial initiative in that it addressed two requirements necessary to
resolve the Kurdish question in Iraq: autonomy for the Kurds and an electoral
parliamentary democracy for all Iraq.122 However, the al-Bazzaz government was short
lived because the military rulers rejected any concession to the Kurdish nationalist
demands. With his departure in August 1966, the best chance for both the Kurds and a
democratic republican Iraq disappeared.
Before 1991, the final episode of rapprochement between the Kurds and the state
took place under the most coercive regime in the modern history of Iraq. On assuming
power in 1968, the Baath regime launched a program intended to take over all of Iraq’s
social and political institutions and organizations, and used violence on a scale
unmatched in Iraq’s history in order to suppress all of its opponents.123 In this context, the
Kurdish war in the north was troublesome in light of both the Baath determination to take
“full” control of the country and the wish of the ruling civilian faction of the Baath to free
itself from its dependence on the army. In the meantime, as the efforts to suppress the
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revolt and isolate Barzani failed, the government in Baghdad decided, as Abd al-Rahman
al-Bazzaz had before them, that for Iraq to become strong the Kurds had to be
accommodated and decisively brought into the national fold.124
On March 11, 1970, the Baghdad government declared a far-ranging agreement
with the Kurds. The agreement recognized the Kurdish nationality and promised
linguistic rights, Kurdish participation in the government and appointment of Kurdish
governors in the mainly Kurdish areas.125 Most controversially, Article 14 of the
agreement stated that “appropriate measures will be taken to unify the mainly Kurdish
districts and administrative units, as established by official statistics drawn up for the
purpose.”126 In this way, the government promised self-government for the Kurds and
decided the territorial extent of the Kurdish autonomous area would be determined
through a population census. During the years following the agreement, Article 14
remained the main obstacle to the agreement’s implementation as Baghdad was
determined to ensure that the major oil-producing areas of Kirkuk and Mosul remained
outside Kurdish control. Thus, the period of Kurdish-Baath amity that emerged in the
early 1970s, withered away quickly given the sluggish pace of negotiations. However, the
legacy of the 1970 agreement continued until the 1990s, and laid the foundations of
decentralized government in Iraq.
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The relationship between the Kurds, the state and democracy in Iraq was never
straightforward. Successive regimes attempted to give concessions to the Kurds, not out
of genuine concerns for democracy, but mainly to accomplish their own political
interests. Although there was no formal link between the Kurdish issue and the question
of restoring representative government in Iraq, it was impossible to accommodate the
Kurdish demands for autonomy and cultural rights without opening up the system to
embrace diversity and dissent. Thus, the episodes of formal negotiations between the
Kurds and the governments in Baghdad always act as a catalyst in pushing successive
regimes to consider the broader question of democracy in Iraq.
Well aware democratization in Iraq was necessary to accomplish their goals, the
Kurds persistently emphasized the importance of democratic order in Iraq as the primary
precondition for the implementation of their identity demands. In this respect, they took
strategic advantage of Baghdad’s politicians’ need to broaden support for their
governments and pressed ahead the Kurdish agenda for greater rights and autonomy.
Maintenance of military discipline among contentious Kurds, which was mainly a
consequence of the tribal power configurations, enabled the Kurdish movement to
constantly challenge the central government and strengthen their political leverage and
negotiating power. The professional-intellectual wing within the movement, despite its
competing agendas, often acted in concert with the tribal leaders in the face of extreme
government coercion and played a significant role in building up the organizational
capacity of the movement. The Kurdish movement in Iraq suffered severely from intraKurdish conflict, but often the opposing party organizations cooperated to protect the
interests of the Kurds of Iraq. When the opportunity manifested itself in 1991, both the
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KDP and the PUK, despite their limitations, were ready to govern Kurdistan with their
established social bases, and administrative and military capabilities.
Autonomous Kurdistan: An Opportunity for Democracy
From 1991 until the United States-led coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, the
Kurdish region of Iraq remained largely insulated from the rest of the country
economically and politically. Until 1991, the cycles of Kurdish rebellion in the north
paradoxically encouraged both a central government with strong coercive powers and an
open government responsive to the demands of its citizens. Given the entrenched role of
the military in Iraqi political life and the powerful tendency for politics to be seen as a
way of disciplining the population, democratic experiments in Iraq never culminated in
genuine political change. Nevertheless, the rulers’ commitment to ensure conformity with
their visions of social order was constantly interrupted by successive revolts in the north,
which occasionally gave way to the emergence of leaders willing to open up the political
system and make deals with the Kurds. The establishment of a de facto autonomous zone
in the north practically eliminated this dynamic in the relationship between the Kurds and
the state.
The 1991 Gulf War virtually put an end to the Kurdish armed struggle in Iraq,
which had defined the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi state more than half a
century. Following the defeat of 1991, as testimony to the resilience of the system he has
constructed, Saddam Hussein’s regime and much of his ruling circle remained largely
intact. The power of the regime in Baghdad was not much affected by the emergence of

80

an autonomous Kurdish entity in the north.127 For the Kurds, on the other hand, state
repression ceased to be a major threat in the virtually independent area under Kurdish
control, which was protected from interference by the central government through a
sterile U.S. containment policy against Saddam Hussein. Over the years following the
Gulf War, the Kurdish region, historically one of Iraq’s most conflict-ridden and
underdeveloped areas, has emerged as the most stable, secure and prosperous region by
far. While the creation of a safe haven and subsequent development processes widened
the social, political and economic gap between the north and the center, and were seen as
a precursor to Kurdish statehood, the same processes became the very reason why the
fate of the Kurds became tied to the future of Iraq and the establishment of a stable
democracy in the country.
The emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous entity in 1991 was not an
unintended consequence of the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. The
intermittent guerilla war that the Kurds themselves conducted against the central
government, as well as the political cohesion and organizational capacity they built over
the decades, shaped the turn in fate for the Kurds of Iraq as much as the major wars that
were fought in the region. At the end of 1991, Saddam Hussein, content that the
international community, particularly the US and Turkey, would never support Kurdish
secessionism, withdrew the Iraqi army from Kurdistan. Saddam was right in anticipating
the international reaction to the possible establishment of a Kurdish state, but his decision
to pull out of Kurdistan was based on two erroneous assumptions. First, he believed the
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Kurds would not be able to survive without the services of the central government and
would rush quickly back to the control of the Baathist state. Second, he thought the world
would remain indifferent to the fate of the Kurds, as had been the case after the Anfal
campaign in 1988.128 Saddam was wrong on both counts. Kurdistan managed to survive
economically and politically as a result of the combined effects of a number of factors.
The emergence of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq was a direct outcome of the
enhanced international humanitarian awareness of the Kurdish plight. The subsequent
economic survival and sustainability of Kurdistan was also made possible through the
vast amount of international aid flowing into the region, which encouraged relative
stability, economic recovery and rehabilitation under the difficult post-war conditions.
The external support for Kurdish autonomy has been tied largely to the international
commitment to keep Iraq “as a whole.” However, humanitarian relief to the Kurds was
also linked to larger transformations in international politics in the post-Cold War era that
challenged the notion of state sovereignty and focused on protecting local populations on
human rights principles and demands for post-conflict recovery.129 The installation of a
no-fly zone and the subsequent economic support to the Kurds derived in large part from
the strategic interests of the US and foreign governments to protect world petroleum
markets and contain the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, it was also a result of the
international attention and recognition won by the Kurdish cause, compounded by the
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emergence of a “new humanitarianism” in the 1990s based on the promotion of programs
of support for democracy and human rights in conflict-ridden societies.130
Saddam expected his regime would return to Kurdistan soon after the end of the
war. In early 1992, he imposed a complete economic blockade on the Kurdish region
leading to a double embargo for the Kurds as Iraq was already subject to the United
Nations sanctions. Under those conditions, humanitarian aid became the most important
source of the region’s external finances. Over time, the UN’s difficulties in operating
freely in Saddam-controlled regions of central and southern Iraq as well as the doubts
concerning the proper monitoring or accountability for aid given for projects in
government-controlled areas led to the emergence of development differentials across
regions of the country.131 While the Saddam-controlled, aid-restricted regions
experienced spiraling inflation, political instability, and socioeconomic decline, the
Kurdistan region enjoyed certain levels of economic revival and assured some basic
needs for the local population.132 During the regime’s last decade, the status-quo in Iraq
remained largely unchanged, but the economic and political progress made by the
Kurdistan region since 1991 came back to haunt the post-Saddam era, providing the
Kurds with strong leverage over the debates on building a more inclusive political system
in Iraq.
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If international financial support played a major role in Kurdistan’s economic
survival, it is the power of Kurdish nationalism as an ideological force that ensured the
endurance of Kurdistan politically. After Baghdad pulled out of the Kurdish region,
Saddam informed the legion of Kurdish civil servants they had to relocate to Iraqi
government territory or lose their salaries.133 But the Kurds stayed. The government
withdrew its administrative units and personnel from Kurdistan, cut off the salaries to
Kurdish employees, and imposed an internal embargo on the region, creating a unique
administrative and legislative vacuum that paralyzed civil operations in Kurdistan. The
Kurds, however, were determined to take up this challenge because the “Kurdish
ethnicity” had become a deeply entrenched valued good in Kurdish society after the
decades-long struggle against the central government. This is why the commitment to
Kurdish self-rule was no longer up for compromise, however costly the pursuit of its
realization.
Indigenous Kurdish political and administrative systems were established
immediately after the events of 1991. The Kurdish political leadership, dominated by the
KDP and the PUK, quickly took the initiative to fill the political vacuum created by the
withdrawal of the Iraqi central government’s presence in the north. Multi-party elections
occurred on May 19, 1992, resulting in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional
Government and a power sharing system between the KDP and PUK. In the years
following the April 1992 elections, serious problems remained in Kurdistan, notably the
internecine fighting between the two main parties, but the Kurds’ point of comparison –
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as Iraq was severely damaged by the authoritarian rule of Saddam Hussein since 1979 –
set a very low standard. For all their problems of divided government and internal
mistrust, the Kurdish progress over governing an area that was almost completely
destroyed by war with a population numbering as many as 5 million, was noteworthy.134
The April 1992 election was one of the most democratic to be held in the Middle East
and had a significant turnout, which was both an unambiguous sign of the population’s
awareness of the importance of democratic principles and a protest against Saddam’s
regime.135
The economic and political development in the Kurdish region after 1991, and
notably since the end of Kurdish infighting in 1997, has been held up as a demonstration
that establishing an open and plural politics in Iraq is possible.136 In this respect,
particularly after the American invasion of Iraq, the question of whether the de facto
autonomous region in the north could provide a model for future democratic state of Iraq
gained prominence. The answer to this question is tied to two distinct but interlocked
processes: democracy in Kurdistan and the relations between the Kurds and Baghdad in
the post-Saddam era.
Political Development and Emergent Democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan
The prospects of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime were weak until the
emergence of a possible confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq in 2002. In this context,
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and in the face of the still powerful status quo in Baghdad and weak and fragmented Iraqi
opposition, the Kurds focused on establishing a self-governing region in the north with a
functioning democracy and decent living standards. With the changes taking place in the
region and the growing possibility of a change of regime in Baghdad in 2003, the fears
and ambitions regarding the future of Kurdistan grew as well. Considering the economic
and political progress made since 1991 as well as the opportunities offered by major
military action against Baghdad by the U.S., the Kurdistan Regional Government raised
the political stakes in post-Saddam negotiations, moving from limited local autonomy to
a more ambitious federal system of government. Besides the intersection of U.S. interests
with those of the Kurds, it was the claims over the success of the “Kurdish democratic
experiment” that led the Kurdish leaders to be more assertive regarding the Kurdish
demands in the post-Saddam era. While those claims have merit, their validity cannot be
confirmed unless the questions of how successful the experiment was and how
sustainable it is are answered.
In 1992, the Kurds declared the establishment of a federal democracy in Iraq to be
their goal. When a de facto autonomous region emerged in the north in 1991, the two
biggest challenges facing the Kurds were, first, Kurdish unity, specifically, dissolution of
the rivalry between the KDP and PUK, and second, the concerns of the neighboring
countries (Turkey and Iran in particular) over the emergence of an independent Kurdish
state in northern Iraq. Kurdish unity, which was fundamental to the empowerment of the
autonomous Kurdish entity, was ironically frightening the surrounding countries and
provoking their intervention. The way to overcome this dilemma was determined to be
the Kurdish adherence to the idea of a democratic, federal and unified Iraq, which would
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both mitigate the concerns over territorial integrity of Iraq and preserve the Kurdish
entity within a democratic framework.
In October 1992, the Kurdistan National Assembly announced the unanimous
commitment of Iraqi Kurdistan “to determine its fate and define its legal relationship with
the central authority at this stage of history on the basis of a federation within a
democratic parliamentary Iraq.”137 The October 1992 resolution recognized both the
Kurds’ right to self-determination and the territorial integrity of Iraq, fulfilling the two
main requirements for ensuring the economic and political success of Kurdistan.
Nevertheless, the deep-seated problems within the Kurdish political scene soon sprang up
to militate against the chances of ultimate success, the most serious of which was a
crippling episode of internal fighting.
Democracy in Kurdistan is primarily related to the multi-party politics as the
political position in the region results largely from the way in which the two major
political parties evolved. Successive rounds of civil war between the KDP and PUK
created a significant obstacle to the establishment of a coherent democratic structure and
led to major problems in the region including the use of violence in pursuit of political
ends, corruption, the division of society along established political cleavages and external
intervention. This situation inevitably highlights a question about the extent to which a
system characterized by a fundamental divide can truly provide a model for the rest of
Iraq, which already suffered from severe social, political, ethnic and sectarian divisions.
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Faced with the necessity of having to form an administration in the aftermath of
the withdrawal of government forces in 1991, the political parties of the Kurdistan region
struggled to come to terms with their newfound territorial authority.138 For decades, the
Kurds were against law and order, and fought against the state. Changing from guerilla
fighters to statesmen was not an easy task. Still, in 1992, Kurdistan’s voters showed they
had both the desire and the ability to govern themselves by electing a National Assembly.
However, the power sharing system devised to both provide an administration for the
region and satisfy the KDP and PUK simply did not solve the historical enmity deriving
from deep-rooted political grievances and mutual mistrust between the two parties.
Until 1997, neither party displayed the ability to manage their rivalries in a
peaceful manner, and resorted to military options that made the possibility of any stable
joint government extremely unlikely.139 Moreover, the use of arms inevitably made the
parties look beyond the Kurdish region for support, which paved the way for external
intervention. The KDP established working relations with Turkey, which needed the
KDP in order to destroy the PKK bases in northern Iraq. Meanwhile, the PUK turned to
Iran for military support, which led the KDP to ask military assistance from the Iraqi
government. American concern about the re-establishment of Saddam Hussein’s control
in the north as well as the intervention of Iran into Iraqi territories eventually resulted in
the U.S.-mediated Washington Agreement of September 1998, which ended the fighting
between the KDP and the PUK.
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The situation in Kurdistan until 1997 clearly revealed the difficulties associated
with the Kurdish parties’ ability to “govern” due to their roots as armed opposition
groups. Rather than viewing the first half the 1990s as an “incompetency” brought about
by the evolution of the Kurdish movement as a predominantly military struggle, it is
perhaps more correct to see it as a period of development toward the maturity of the Iraqi
Kurdish political system and parties. Following the Washington Agreement, Kurdistan
was divided into two executive jurisdictions controlled by the KDP and the PUK,
respectively. The divided political system, despite casting a shadow of apprehension over
the future of a unified Kurdistan government, paradoxically allowed the parties to
manage their differences while gaining the experience, knowledge, and skills necessary
to turn Kurdistan around.140 As awkward and cumbersome as the divided government
appeared to be, the stability achieved by the division of power enabled both parties to
manage the domestic affairs of their respective regions more efficiently and develop their
administrative capacities. Since 1997, there has been an increasing trend toward
reconciliation and cooperation as the two parties focus on being governments rather than
parties.
Despite the political turmoil of the mid-1990s and the subsequent territorial
division of Kurdistan, one might still argue that a more democratic and pluralistic system
prevailed in the north as compared to the one-party totalitarian state in Baghdad whose
pervasive apparatus of surveillance and repression remained largely intact even during
the 1990s. The Washington Agreement explicitly recognized the multi-ethnic
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composition of the Kurdish region and thus of Iraq as a whole, placing the aspirations of
such groupings as the Turkmen, Assyrians and the Chaldeans on an equal footing with
those of the Kurds.141 Since 1991, all the cabinets of Kurdistan included the members of
ethnic and religious minorities through the enforcement of certain minority quotas. The
more open and liberal atmosphere has allowed the entry of new political forces, including
the formation of parties representing other ethnic and religious groups in the region such
as three separate Turkmen parties, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and its more
radical Islamist offshoots, as well as Assyrian and other Christian parties.142
Since 1997, the experiences Kurdistan offer proof that Iraqis, who had been
deprived of any meaningful democratic experience for decades, can embrace democratic
principles and norms. The process of reconciliation in Kurdistan gained pace particularly
after the U.S.-invasion of Iraq, which galvanized the Kurdish leaders to plan carefully
their future course of action and coordinate their efforts both in their political
negotiations with Baghdad and in how they govern Kurdistan. These efforts brought
about major accomplishments for the Kurds, the most notable of which was the formal
recognition of the Kurdistan Region as a legitimate entity of the state.143 The Kurdistan
Regional Government Unification Agreement of January 21, 2006 further strengthened
the legitimacy of the Kurdish politicians and consolidated the Kurdistan Region as an
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institutionalized reality in the Middle East. It was also a major step towards putting an
end to the exploitation of differences between the KDP and PUK by the regional powers.
Iraqi Kurdistan has come a long way for the last two decades, but it would be a
mistake to exaggerate the levels of development that occurred in the region. Even though
the KRG became a mixed cabinet following the unification agreement, the political
power in the region remained divided between two poles. Both the PUK and the KDP
have been exposed to criticisms on the grounds that they continue to put their separate
party interests before the interests of the KRG and that even the opposition parties are
actually on the payroll of the two main parties in the region.144 The establishment of a
joint government provided hope that the disputes between the KDP and PUK would be
solved, and the KRG would better serve the collective and public interest. However, the
new unified arrangement generated concern among the smaller parties that the PUK and
KDP might have absolute power in Kurdistan and narrow the democratic process by
hindering the establishment of any opposition in the region.145
Despite its distinct course of development, Iraqi Kurdistan shares many structural
features with the country as a whole. While the region has enjoyed enhanced economic
prosperity over the past two decades, the regional elites have maintained their patronclient networks by relying on the same structures that materialized during their resistance
to the Baath rule.146 The PUK and the KDP negotiated successful development programs
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with the United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations through their
share of the “Oil-for-food” program, which played an important role in the economic
development of the region throughout the 1990s. However, this situation created
important challenges for Iraqi Kurdistan similar to those facing many authoritarian
societies based on wealth through oil. Despite the achievement of a great deal of
economic progress, this growth remained vulnerable given the increasing dependency on
oil and gas, particularly after the realization that the region cannot continue to count on
international aid to maintain its economic growth.
Contemporary Iraqi Kurdistan is not quite a rentier state (or quasi-state) in the
classical dependency-theoretical sense of the word. Nevertheless, the growing oil sector,
combined with Kurdistan’s position as a “post-civil war society,” resulted in certain
structural problems whereby the heritage of domestic conflict strengthened, and even
institutionalized, the patronage relations in the region.147 Instead of the KRG, the control
over important sectors such as oil, gas, telecommunications, construction and trade
remained in the hands of the PUK and KDP or other allied political groups.148 The wealth
acquired through international aid and oil has not been distributed among the Kurdish
cities equally due to the two major parties’ tendency to spend most of the funds for the
benefit of their respective spheres of influence. Thus, economic inequality remains a
major problem as not all people have been able to profit from Kurdistan’s newlyachieved prosperity. Smaller political parties, independent civil society organizations and
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the media have largely failed to act as checks over the larger parties due to the
institutionalized patronage and policies of cooptation that cut across the state-society
relations. This situation significantly weakened the chances for genuine democracy in the
region and instead, consolidated the perception of the KRG as “Barzani-stan” and
“Talabani-stan.”
This institutionalized patronage gradually increased the mistrust of the KRG and
its institutions among the Iraqi Kurdish populations. The PUK and the KDP have been
able to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the Kurdish public in large part because of
their leadership role within the resistance against decades of totalitarian rule and violent
repression in the north. Since Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, however, it has
become increasingly apparent the people of Kurdistan are not satisfied with the
authorities in power and now demand for the elimination of institutionalized clientelism
and corruption.
The first popular expression of dissatisfaction with the ruling parties appeared in
March 2006 when hundreds of protestors took to the streets on the anniversary of Halabja
gas attack, expressing anger at what they view as corruption, nepotism, and a lack of
transparency within the KRG, and particularly within the two predominant political
parties.149 March 2006 protests were the most serious popular challenge to the political
parties that have ruled Kurdistan for the past fifteen years and conspicuously highlighted
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the growing tension between the local Kurdish communities and the KRG.150 Likewise, a
series of demonstrations and riots against the KRG occurred in 2011 in the city of
Suleymaniyah, demanding an end to corruption and social injustice, and asking for the
resignation of the cabinet and the disbanding of the KRG. The protests were inspired by
the pro-democracy uprisings sweeping the Arab world and organized by the Goran
(Change) Movement, a major opposition party founded in 2009. After more than two
months of daily protests, the demonstrations were crushed by the security forces, which
opened fire and detained protesters, actions that received heavy criticism from Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch.151
The problem that has prevailed in Kurdistan since 1991, is that the creation of a
functioning government in the region remained a top-down process involving the elites of
the two major political parties and external actors, particularly the United States.
Ordinary people living in the Kurdistan region exercise very little influence over the form
or substance of the government.152 Although the people of Kurdistan in principle from
1991 to 2003 largely supported this undertaking, the fact that the regional authorities held
significantly more power than ordinary citizens gradually created a clear set of local
grievances and demands for renegotiating the terms of the relationship between the
authorities and local people.
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Kurdistan holds promise for the future. Although the major political parties of the
KDP and PUK focused primarily on preserving their own power base within the region,
they also acknowledged the necessity of embedding more democratic procedures in order
to ensure both internal legitimacy and external support for the Kurdish cause. After the
2006 protests in Halabja, increasing government responsiveness to the demands of the
citizens created an expanded political space with more active civil society involvement.
During the post-protest mobilization process, many of the people associated with the
opposition media and NGOs became important players within the new Goran Party,
which formed in 2009 as a break away from the PUK over issues about transparency in
government, accountability, and corruption.153 Following the 2011 protests organized by
Goran, both the KDP and PUK leaderships declared their recognition of the people’s
right to protest and the legitimacy of their demands.154 Goran won nearly a quarter of the
votes in the Iraqi Kurdistan parliamentary elections of July 2009, and mounted a serious
challenge to the monopoly of power of the two main parties. In the 2013 parliamentary
elections, Goran gained even more votes and won the second-most seats in the parliament
after the KDP, bumping the PUK in the third place. After the elections, the PUK
announced that it respected the results and “denying the people’s will would be
shameful.”155
Increasing competition between the KDP and PUK and the emergence of a new,
more vigorous Kurdish opposition, definitely presents challenges for stability in
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Kurdistan. On the other hand, a growing understanding among the parties regarding the
rules of political competition looks promising in terms of effective promotion of
democracy and expansion of multi-party involvement in the region. It is important to note
that many of the difficulties facing post-Saddam Iraq are similar to those facing Iraqi
Kurdistan since 1991. If there is one clear lesson to be learned from the experience of the
Kurds, it would be that embarking on a competitive multi-party democracy without
considering the multiple fault lines in political, ideological, ethnic and sectarian terms in
divided societies is potentially disastrous. This lesson proved pertinent for the whole of
Iraq in the post-Saddam era, confirming that the development of political framework
underpinned by consensus regarding the rules of political competition is not possible
without political reconciliation between various ethno-sectarian groups in Iraqi society.
Relations between the KRG and Baghdad in the Post-Saddam Era
Besides the shortcomings of the model of governance and democracy in Iraqi
Kurdistan, the question of whether Iraqi Kurdistan can become a model for the rest of
Iraq is important especially when one considers the Kurdish movement is the most
influential component of the Iraqi opposition. Until 1991, the Kurds’ position in Iraq’s
internal opposition took the form of armed struggle, which played an important role in
forcing successive Iraqi regimes to make concessions on issues regarding democracy,
governance, and political participation. However, those concessions never turned into
permanent measures or spurred real political change in Iraq because of the deeply
entrenched authoritarian structure of the state.
When regime change became imminent in Baghdad in the aftermath of the
American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraqi Kurdistan had been without any direct link to
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the central government for more than a decade. After the removal of Saddam Hussein’s
regime, the Kurdish leaders “returned” to Iraq to participate in the negotiations
concerning the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) after more than a decade of de
facto sovereignty. However, this time, Iraq’s diverse ethnic and religious groups had a
unique opportunity to redefine, negotiate and reshape the state on new bases of legal
plurality and decentralization. It was in this context the Kurds once again took up their
role as the core element of the internal opposition in Iraq and their role became central to
the questions of democracy and federalism in the country in the post-Saddam period.
The emergence of Iraq as a federal state after the regime change was in part a
consequence of the American views of the larger question over Iraqi identities. However,
the form federalism took in Iraq as it was accepted in the 2005 constitution was mainly
the outcome of dedication and active participation by the Kurds in both the Iraqi
Governing Council and the transitional Iraqi government, which lasted from June 2004 to
the January 30, 2005 elections.156 Given their accumulated power and experience with
administration and organization over a decade, the Kurdish parties operated with
increased leverage over the Arabs in shaping the constitutional negotiations.
The Kurds were never seen as a strategic asset by the U.S. despite the important
role they played in ousting Saddam Hussein from power. After the victory of the U.S. it
soon became apparent that this role was a transient one. The fact the U.S. refrained from
publicly supporting the planned federation pushed the Kurdish officials to intensify their
efforts to fine-tune the concept of federalism, which they envisioned in 1992 for the new
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Iraq and reiterated during the Iraqi opposition conference in London in 2002.157 The
TAL, and later on, the permanent constitution of Iraq acknowledged the legal status of
the KRG and recognized the Kurdistan region as one of the federal units in Iraq.
Nevertheless, the nature of the federation, but more precisely, the question of whether
federalism will strengthen the state and national unity in Iraq or continue to be a source of
division, remained to be the main cause of tension and negotiation after the ratification of
the permanent constitution in October 2005.
The Arab-Kurdish Divide: Challenges and Prospects
Much of the contention between the Kurds and Arabs in the post-2005 period
arises from the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed territories in Nineveh and Diyala
provinces, and the KRG’s desire to be autonomous in managing its own internal affairs,
particularly, its oil resources. The 2005 constitution lays out a process of resolving the
status of Kirkuk and the other disputed areas, but it has remained dysfunctional to date
because of profound differences over interpretation and the lack of political will.158 A
referendum in Kirkuk was supposed to have been held in 2007 in accordance with the
Article 140 of the constitution, but has been put off indefinitely by Baghdad. From the
perspective of the Kurds, this is an indication of the central government’s antidemocratic, sectarian, centralizing and unconstitutional behavior, which threatens the
fragile democracy in Iraq and opens the way for inter-communal conflict.159
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The prosperous, autonomous Kurdish oil market is the greatest factor in
instigating political feuds and complicates the status of Kirkuk. In this regard, the
Kurdish attempts to make separate oil deals with foreign governments and international
oil companies plays the role of both stabilizing and spoiling the political process in
Iraq.160 On the one hand, the Kurdistan’s region’s economic empowerment through oil
exports may force the Prime Minister to engage in serious negotiation regarding the
disputed territories and Iraq’s oil policy, which would strengthen the commitment to
power sharing and the creation of a more inclusive political dialogue. In addition, the
economic opportunities offered by the growth of Kurdistan’s oil and gas industry have
greatly encouraged economic and political cooperation with regional states, particularly
Iran and Turkey. These alliances helped stabilize the KRG’s shared borders, which have
been historically conflict-ridden areas because of the Kurdish problems in the
neighboring states.
On the other hand, the KRG’s nationalist ambitions and efforts to strengthen the
autonomy of the Kurdistan region makes it a potential political spoiler because of the
challenge the KRG poses upon the Iraqi government’s own state-building efforts to
consolidate its authority and territorial integrity.161 In this regard, the decisions annexing
Kirkuk to Kurdistan and permitting the KRG to be autonomous in managing its own oil
resources were viewed by the Iraqi government as Kurdish political overreaching, and as
increasingly maximalist demands.
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The authoritarian policies of the Baghdad government, headed by the Prime
Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, were slowly unfolding since the beginning his first term in the
office in 2006, particularly given his attempts to fill the ranks of the security and
intelligence services with loyalists and to create constitutionally unregulated structures to
by-pass the parliamentary approval requirements for the selection of top officers. The
Kurds supported Al-Maliki during his first term in order to achieve stability for the
fragile coalition government and they helped him survive several political challenges in
2006 and 2007, not only from Sunni Arab factions, but also from within his own Shia
community.162 Yet, the Kurds began to break with Maliki as the Prime Minister’s efforts
to stamp his authority on the Iraqi government and to bring Iraq’s security and
intelligence services under his direct control reached its peak by the end of 2008. When
the Sunni-Shia tensions led to nine months of political gridlock over the formation of the
new Iraqi government following the March 2010 parliamentary elections, it was the
critical role played by the Kurdish parties that resolved the impasse and ensured a second
term for Maliki.
Although the Shia bloc in Iraq is more willing to play along with the emphasis on
consensus and power sharing in the new political order as compared to the Sunnis, both
the Shia and the Sunni political groupings disfavor the federal structure in Iraq which
limits the power of the central government and provides the Kurds with greater say in
Iraqi politics. The Kurdish parties, therefore, refrained from embracing a specific party or
candidate from among either the Shia or Sunni-backed contenders to lead the new
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government in 2010. While Maliki’s growing power and authoritarianism was definitely
alarming if he were reappointed, a potential Sunni-dominated government was equally
worrisome for the Kurds given the Sunni Arabs’ decisive advocacy for a strong,
centralized government that could lead to the unraveling of the political settlement
reached in 2003. Eventually, the Kurds threw their support behind Maliki on three
conditions: the governing coalition would be a government of national unity, comprising
all the major political blocs in Iraq; the prime minister’s authority would be diluted to
prevent accumulation of disproportionate power; and negotiations would be resumed, in
accordance with the 2005 constitution, on the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed
territories, and the long-stalled hydrocarbons and revenue-sharing law.
Maliki accepted the demands of the Kurds by signing a pledge that spelled out
key agreements and the terms designed to limit his power. However, once the new
government finally coalesced, it became apparent the measures taken to constrain
Maliki’s grip on power would remain on paper. Maliki tightened his control over the
Iraqi state and its security forces by increasing his efforts to centralize power by
controlling the strategic ministries, the military, the electoral commission and the
economy.163 He also implemented a harsh bureaucratic cleansing campaign against
Kurdish and Sunni figures, which undermined the power-sharing system implemented in
Iraq after the U.S. invasion.
The Kurdish-Arab relations further deteriorated after the withdrawal of the U.S.
forces from Iraq at the end of 2011. The US withdrawal greatly weakened the safety
valve that helped manage Arab-Kurdish relations in Iraq since 2003 and left highly
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sensitive and significant issues that have not been resolved on the table, such as the
reconciliation between politicized communities, the disagreements over disputed
territories, the scope of Kurdish autonomy, oil policy, and the overall nature of the
national project. Following the US departure, Maliki’s calls for a rewritten constitution
that would increase the executive authority of the prime minister’s office over regions
reflected the growing discrepancy between the centralization policies of Baghdad and the
autonomy aspirations of the Kurdistan region. The main driving force behind the attack
against the constitution was the view that the Kurds are an existential threat to the
territorial integrity of Iraq and that the Kurds’ attempts to implement article 140 of the
constitution and negotiate an oil law for Iraq illustrate their ultimate aim to secede from
the state.
The suspicion about the ultimate Kurdish goals is a consequence of the prevalence
of ethno-sectarian-based analysis of Iraqi politics that has existed since the establishment
of the modern state of Iraq. As the post-Saddam era paved the way for the furthering of
Kurdish autonomy, the possible secession of the Kurds from Iraq became more
frequently pronounced by Baghdad and the neighboring governments as well as by
academics, journalists and media commentators. Repeated emphasis on this option
derived partially from the desire of both the Sunni and Shia Arabs to return to an Iraq
dominated by a strong state narrative founded on Arabism, and partially from the failure
to think outside the dominant paradigm that national self-determination has only one
meaning, a sovereign and independent state.
Since the mandatory period, none of the major Kurdish political forces in Iraq
presented independent statehood as an organized political demand. The Kurds had
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founded their political and military struggle on the argument that self-determination does
not necessarily entail only one option. As a demonstration of their commitment to new
forms of national affirmation beyond statehood, the Kurds developed a perspective in
which Iraq was viewed as a state where the devolution of some state competences go
hand-in-hand with a meaningful recognition of the Kurds as a distinct national
community within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Iraq.164 From this perspective, the
2005 constitution was not a document that set the stage for the eventual Kurdish
secession, but a compromise by the Kurds undertaken for the interests of the “new Iraq”
and as evidence of the Kurds’ commitment to the integrity of the state.165 In the same
vein, and when viewed from the Kurdish perspective, the actions of the KRG regarding
the disputed territories and oil revenues, which are perceived as indications of Kurdish
secessionist aims, are simply reactions of the Kurds to Baghdad’s refusal to negotiate the
territories, revenue sharing and national hydrocarbon law through constitutional means.
The Debate on Federalism
The adoption of a federal system of government, whereby power is
constitutionally divided among different levels of government, is among the most
frequently advocated solutions to the problem of managing conflict in divided
societies.166 However, the challenge lies in the question of how to structure a federation
that can alleviate, rather than exacerbate, ethnic and religious divisions. The concerns
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regarding the design of federal system and the future of democracy in Iraq bear a
substantial resemblance to the concerns raised during the British mandate over how to
amalgamate Iraq’s diverse peoples into a coherent whole within a representative
governance framework. Since the mandatory period, successive regimes in Iraq saw the
Arab-Kurdish divide as carrying the greatest potential for undermining Iraq’s social and
political unity.167 The post-Saddam era is no exception.
During the 1920s, the British opted for supporting Arab nationalism in Iraq in
order to integrate the peoples of the new state, which only exacerbated the ethnic gap in
society and left Iraq’s north in a constant state of war until 1991. The American policy
towards post-Saddam Iraq, while supporting the creation of a federal government that
represents the right of all peoples of Iraq, is fixated on the international commitment to
Iraq’s territorial integrity, which propels the U.S. policy makers toward favoring
recentralization. Thus, in both cases, the external powers’ commitment to maintain a
strong central government in Baghdad encourages the promotion of the idea of “oneness
of Iraq,” which eases the sectarian divisions by appeasing pan-Arab opinion, but does not
relieve the conflict potential rooted in the ethnic divide.
The Shia grievances in Iraq until the 2003 war and the Sunni grievances in the
country in the post-Saddam era are, by and large, similar in nature and have more to do
with the distribution of power within the state than the form of governance. The political
and economic balance in Iraq, which has been heavily in favor of the minority Sunnis,
shifted dramatically after the demise of Saddam’s regime and provided the Shia Arabs
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with increased access to power due to their demographic majority. Although the Sunnis
reacted harshly to their reduced political status, they made common cause with the Shia
Arabs in calling for a tight-knit Arab Iraq with a strong central government, as opposed to
the Kurdish desire for a loose federation. Iraq’s new constitution recognized the majority
of the demands by the Kurds. However, the post-2005 political process in Iraq simply
transformed the ethnic struggle between the Arabs and the Kurds into a struggle between
“centralists” and “regionalists,” thus, leaving the problem of Arab-Kurdish divide largely
unresolved.
The standard approach to the question of democracy and federalism in Iraq among
both the academic and policy communities is that in order for democracy to take root, the
federal system in Iraq has to be territorially, not ethnically, based.168 In other words, it is
argued that a federal system based on ethno-sectarian divisions will entrench communitybased loyalties and lead to civil breakdown by encouraging the citizens’ commitment to
the “good” of the narrower community rather than to the “general good.” The best
alternative for Iraq is seen as deemphasizing the particularistic attachments to sect or
ethnicity, and establishing a federal system that is decentralized on the basis of territory,
and promotes citizenship and constitutional patriotism. Within this framework, the Kurds
and their efforts to protect the autonomy of Kurdistan are automatically denounced as a
threat to the unity of Iraq.
Iraq’s communal divisions might indeed undermine political stability and
democratization. However, what threatens the future of democracy in Iraq is not Iraq’s
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communal diversity per se, but how it is managed. The political process in Iraq has long
been a scene of life-and-death struggles that formed the texture of a violent and
communal politics across the country.169 For democracy to flourish in Iraq, the new
political order must first address the fear of each community that one group might come
to power and impose its interests and goals on the other groups. If Iraq’s ethnic and
sectarian diversity is managed as matter of pluralism and democratic participation rather
than as a divisive factor, then the motivation of each group to limit the power of the other
might in fact provide the checks and balances essential to the establishment of a workable
and equitable power sharing system. Therefore, the main task is to transform the
country’s communal diversity from a disintegrating force to an agent for democratic
change. For those advocating for a territorial federalism in Iraq, this task can be achieved
by emphasizing the “Iraqi” character of the state above all considerations of ethnic or
religious affiliation. According to this argument, there is but one “people” in Iraq, the
“Iraqi people,” which refers to the citizens of the state of Iraq regardless of race,
ethnicity, or religion.170
This view, while finding resonance among the majority Arab community, invites
suspicion among the Kurds as it means relinquishment of their formal status as a separate
nationality and the loss of Kurdish identity, distinctiveness and existing rights. There is
no doubt the promotion and reinforcement of a shared Iraqi citizenship and identity is
crucial for establishing a sustainable democracy in Iraq. However, this approach does not
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capture the complexities and historical particularities of modern Iraq. Throughout the
twentieth century, the barrier to democracy in Iraq was not its ethno-sectarian diversity,
but the absence of any meaningful political space for the expression of ethnic and
religious identities. Given the long history of ethnic expulsion, coercive assimilation and
genocidal action against the Kurds, it is politically unrealistic to expect the Kurds to
abandon their long struggle to be recognized as a nationality in exchange for reintegrating
into Iraq on the terms of Iraq-first patriotism. A shared “Iraqi” identity can be
reconstructed only if it is articulated on the basis of explicit recognition of multiple
identities, be they national, religious, or linguistic.
The notion of shared Iraqi citizenship stems primarily from an effort to encourage
commitment to “civic nationalism” and “constitutional patriotism,” as opposed ethnic
nationalism. Nevertheless, it is hard for Iraq to develop into a Western-style liberal
democracy as such, given that it does not correspond to the ethnographic realities of the
country. There is not just “one” Iraqi people. The Iraqi people are made up of more than
one nationality, including Arabs and Kurds, which was recognized even by the Baathists
in their March 1970 accord with the KDP, as well as by the provisional constitution of
1958. Both in 1958 and 1970, however, the recognition of multiple nationalities in Iraq
and the promise of democracy remained on paper due to the ideological pressure of Arab
nationalism. These failed attempts at creating a more open government and finding a
peaceful solution to the Kurdish question only resulted in the deepening of Arab-Kurdish
divide and consolidation of the authoritarian rule in the country. The route taken by the
TAL rightfully serves to manage this division by creating a durable set of political
compromises so that Iraq could evolve into a sustainable democracy. Nonetheless, the
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post-December 2005 election era showed that Iraq is still facing the threat of
recentralization and sliding back to authoritarian rule.
The constitution adopted in Iraq in 2005 set up a decentralized federation and put
forward a very progressive framework of democratic governance, civil rights and
freedoms. Apart from the Kurds’ strong assertion of federalism, little has been discussed
in the country at large about the composition of the new government, particularly the
degree of devolution of central power and the definition of the boundaries of the federal
units. While the Sunni Arabs were primarily concerned about their marginalized status in
the new order, the Shia were eager to claim the political power they believe their majority
deserves and was denied for so long under Saddam’s Sunni-dominated government.171 In
this context, the Kurdish parties emerged as the critical “third” players in the postSaddam era, concerned mainly with the troubling possibility of Shia plans to replace an
iron-fisted minority with the tyranny of the majority. That was the main reason behind
the Kurdish parties’ insistence on a power-sharing system that would recognize Kurdistan
as one geographic and political entity and prevent future discrimination by the central
state apparatus.
Democracy and Power-Sharing in Iraq: Towards an Alternative Model
The issues of hydrocarbons legislation, disputed territories and federalism clearly
pitch the KRG and the Iraqi government against each other. Nevertheless, rather than a
disintegrating factor, this situation needs to be understood in the context of the ethnosectarian political dynamic, which implicitly denounces Kurdistan as an ethnic entity.
Despite shared anti-Maliki sentiments with many other Iraqi Arab groups, the Kurdistan
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region has no significant support from other Iraqi populations for its key demands
regarding the implementation of the constitution because of the still-powerful ethnic fault
lines in Iraqi society. As the borders of the Kurdistan region are perceived to be
ethnically defined, the disputes over autonomy, management of oil resources, and the
status of Kirkuk and other oil-rich areas continue to derail the post-Saddam
democratization process in the country.
It is true that Kurdistan certainly pertains to the homeland of the Kurds as a
distinct ethnic group. In that sense, the Kurdishness of Kurdistan is undeniable. However,
the Kurdistan region is not ethnically homogeneous and some of the other governorates
of Iraq, most notably Baghdad, Nineveh, Diyala and Kirkuk, have highly heterogeneous
populations. The 2005 constitution provides a legal framework to define federal sub-units
that transcend ethnic boundaries and focus on regional identity, with varying degrees of
ethnic and religious homogeneity and heterogeneity.172 Article 117 of the constitution
recognizes Kurdistan as one of the federal regions and according to article 124, the
Baghdad, with its administrative borders, constitutes the governorate of Baghdad and
may not merge with a region. Regulations regarding the formation of new regions are
specified in article 119, which states that the remaining governorates shall have the right
to organize into a region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum. The
constitution, thus, allows the Iraqis themselves rather than the political elites to determine
the nature of their federation and whether it will be defined by ethnicity or regional
172
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identity. From this perspective, Iraq has a chance to evolve naturally into a hybrid
ethnic/territorial federation that will both ensure the dominant ethnic and religious
populations their rights will not be compromised, and provide political consensus that
regional administrations will be based on respect for diversity.
Iraq’s dilemma is that an ethnic federation in which the political parties, electoral
politics and power in the central government are organized around ethnic groups would
most likely exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the ethno-sectarian nature of politics in the
country. A territorial federation, on the other hand, which deliberately draws lines to
divide ethnic concentrations would equally reinforce the ethnic divisions, at least in the
short term, given the fact ethnicity is already one of the powerful defining features of
Iraq’s political life. What the advocates of territorial federalism fail to realize is that
territorial federalism offers benefits once the system is already in place, but it does not
provide a solution to the dilemmas of creating territorial federalism in deeply-divided
societies composed of geographically concentrated ethnic groups in the first place.
Currently, any attempt to divide Kurdistan territorially would certainly be forcibly
resisted by the Kurds and might spark violent reactions that would unravel the fragile
political consensus underpinning Iraq’s nascent political order. Hence, what Iraq needs is
a more fluid option that would prevent the imposition of either of these two extremes, and
instead enable a smooth transition from ethno-sectarian politics to pluralist democracy.
The option of regional federalism, where the sub-units will be defined not by
ethnicity but on the basis of distinct historical and cultural identities, has the potential to
offer a viable solution to the controversies regarding the design of Iraq’s federal
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system.173 Under this model, in terms of population, the regional sub-units will still be
dominated by certain ethnic or religious groups, but communal identities will not be their
defining feature. Since the late 1990s, the Kurdish political leadership of Iraq has
attempted to build a civic nationalist project that promotes the idea of a “Kurdistani”
identity to which Arabs, Turkmens, Assyrians as well as the Kurds living in Kurdistan
region could subscribe. In doing so, the Kurdish leaders have sought to promote the idea
that the “Kurdistan Region” is a geographic construct and an institutionalized entity
based on the recognition of the distinct ethnic and cultural identities of its component
peoples under an all-encompassing “Kurdistani” vision.
Although it has yet to be voted on in a referendum and thereby enter into force,
the KRG approved the draft constitution of the Kurdistan region on June 24, 2009, which
lodges significant protections for the non-Kurdish groups in the region. The equality
clause of article 20 lays the groundwork for this by stating that all forms of
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, language, social background, nationality,
origin, religion, belief, thought, age, social, political or economic status, or handicap are
prohibited.174 Article 5 of the draft constitution recognizes the ethnically and religiously
diverse structure of Kurdistan by stating that the people of the region are composed of
Kurds, Arabs, Chaldo-Assyrian-Syriacs, Armenians and others who are citizens of
Kurdistan. The religious rights of the Christians, Yazidis and other non-Muslim groups
are recognized under article 6. The draft constitution accepts Kurdish and Arabic as the
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two official languages of the Kurdistan region, but also guarantees the right of the
region’s citizens to educate their children in their mother tongue and recognizes that
along with Kurdish and Arabic, Turkmen and Assyrian shall be official languages in
administrative districts populated by the speakers of these languages.
The draft constitution as well as the electoral law of the Iraqi Kurdistan National
Assembly recognizes the election system shall take into consideration the fair
representation of all geographic localities, ethnic and religious groups and that a member
of the parliament shall represent all the groups that make up the people of Iraqi
Kurdistan, regardless of their political, ethnic and religious affiliation. According to
article 22 of the electoral law, every group or ethnic minority (Turkmen, Arab or others)
have the right to forward its own roster that includes the names of their nominees for the
Iraqi Kurdistan region.175
Although they gained some support from Turkmens and Assyrians, it is hard to
claim the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have succeeded in their efforts to promote a regional
vision of Kurdistan as home to diverse identity groups living in the north of the country.
The overwhelming sentiment among the Assyrian community is to preserve their
distinctiveness rather than subscribing to the wider “Kurdistani” identity, which is still
considered as representing the dominance of the Kurds in the region.176 The strategy to
gain Turkmens’ support for the Kurdistani initiative also failed due to the problems
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created between the communities by the situation in Kirkuk. The KRG’s demand for the
inclusion of Kirkuk into the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and the insistence on its Kurdish
origins has put the Kurds in conflict with the Turkmens who accused the Kurdish
leadership of attempting to “Kurdify” Kirkuk just as Saddam “Arabized” it.177 Similar to
Arabs, for the Turkmens, both inside and outside of Kirkuk, incorporation of Kirkuk into
the Kurdistan region would accelerate Kurdish independence and, thus, Iraq’s breakup.178
The policy of promoting the notion of “being Kurdistani” has failed for two
reasons. The first reason is the continued dominance of ethno-sectarian divisions in
defining Iraqi political life and the accompanying political pressures that exist in the
country, particularly over the controversial issues of federalism and disputed territories.
Latent suspicion continues to exist between Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmens. The
second reason is the fact that the traditional understanding of Kurdistan, that is the idea of
a greater Kurdistan entity as the homeland of all Kurds, grew stronger among the Iraqi
Kurds mainly due to the heightened expectations following the survival of Kurdistan
region in Iraq since 1991. The consolidation of this idea has happened perhaps even
against the wishes of the leaderships KDP and PUK, who now face the challenging task
of balancing the political realities of post-Saddam Iraq with the expectations of the Kurds
in the north.
The reluctance of the Turkmen and Assyrian communities to accept the wider
“Kurdistani” identity, as well as the growing Kurdish nationalist sentiment in the north,
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suggests the attempts to distance the Kurdistan region from being viewed to be overtly
Kurdish will remain futile. However, the Kurdish politicians are keen to continue to
follow this strategy. Why this is the case is not difficult to comprehend: Kurdish leaders
are fully aware of the fact their geography and power bases are strongly against them in
case they opt for independence. The option of independence also means military
confrontation not only with Iraq but also with the neighboring states and a possible US
involvement. It is hard to imagine the Iraqi Kurdish leaders would sacrifice the economic
and political gains as well as the international legitimacy they have worked so hard to
achieve since the establishment of the KRG in 1991 to throw themselves into another
wave of violence. Under these circumstances, the Kurdish leadership has followed the
strategy of gradually changing the image of Kurdistan, perceived as an ethno-nationalist
movement, which works against the KRG’s relationship with both the Iraqi government
and the regional powers.
Concerning the debate on federalism and democracy, the problem facing Iraq is
not the domination of federal regions by certain ethnic or religious groups, as the
advocates of territorial federalism argue. The problem is the possibility that ethnicity or
religion would be the defining feature of the federal sub-units. In other words, there is a
crucial difference between a federal region in which majority of the population identifies
itself by a certain ethnic or religious identity, and a federal region in which local
authorities govern according to ethnic or religious loyalties. Because Iraqi politics is still
defined in terms of communal divisions, it is assumed that regional ethnic and religious
demographics would automatically reflect on governance. Rather than the ethnic versus
territorial federalism dichotomy, the debate on federalism and democracy in Iraq should
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focus on two main issues: whether local governments act responsibly toward all their
citizens within their areas, and not just for ethnic or sectarian co-nationals, and how to
reach a broadly-accepted accommodation over the role of the central government.
Within this framework, the efforts of the Kurdish leaders to establish a pluralist
local government that recognizes the ethnic and religious diversity of Kurdistan is very
important in terms of the implementation of regional model of federalism. The same
model is applicable to southern Iraq as well, where two non-sectarian ideological currents
have historically been far more important than the idea of Shia consolidation in a
territorial bloc: the “far south” which is composed of the triangle of Basra, Nasiriyya and
Amara, and the “Middle Euphrates” which represents the regionalism of the urban
centers and the tribes.179 Similar to Kurdistan, both of these sub-units will be dominated
by Shia Arabs in terms of population, but, critically, the Arab ethnicity or the Shia
religious identity will not be their defining feature. In this way, the proposed regional
model will both ensure a sense of security among Iraq’s major identity groups by
avoiding risky attempts at dividing up the geographic concentrations of ethnicities, but
also alleviate the impact of ethno-sectarian divisions on politics by encouraging the
expression of regional diversity on a non-communal basis.
Even if the Kurdish leaders’ efforts to promote a civic model of nationalism in
Kurdistan can be viewed as part the strategic objectives of the KRG, promotion of
pluralism and the legal recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure of
Kurdistan is itself very significant. This approach may set a useful example for the rest of
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Iraq and play a crucial role in resolving many controversial issues regarding federalism.
For example, rather than viewing Kirkuk as an intractable problem, predetermined by its
contentious history and current politics, the Iraqi leaders may approach Kirkuk as an
opportunity to build a compromise around legally entrenched governing arrangements
which involve power-sharing mechanisms based on the promotion of local “Kirkuki”
identity alongside the region’s component peoples – Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen.
The Road Ahead
Iraq’s history is filled with instances of discrimination and violence against
certain sections of society on the basis of ethnicity, including attempts at genocide. For
this reason, any attempt at imposing a solution on Iraq that does not take past communal
traumas into consideration risks violent reaction, which, in turn, would threaten the very
territorial integrity of the country. The model of a strong centralized government with a
powerful controller was tried in Iraq and went horribly wrong, as was witnessed during
Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, federalism has barely been given time to take root.
Since the 2005 parliamentary elections, what is seen in Iraq has only been a half-hearted
attempt at decentralization, which resulted in a dysfunctional democracy. The idea of true
federalism is still regarded with suspicion in Iraq because of the popular assumption that
a federal Iraq means empowerment of communal loyalties, thus, a weaker Iraq. In this
regard, the management of the Kurdish-Arab divide is central to Iraq’s successful
transition to a stable federal democracy.
Opting for independence is a decision that lies with the Kurdish people and their
political representatives. Given the regional political dynamics, this option, at least for
now, is quite unlikely. The reality on the ground, on the other hand, strongly indicates
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that an Iraq without Kurdistan has a significantly lower chance of becoming a true
democracy than an Iraq where Kurdistan is an integral part of Iraq within a federal
framework. The role of the KRG is critical in Iraqi politics in terms of the consolidation
of power-sharing mechanisms as the Kurdish movement is the only organized actor in the
country who has the capacity to act as a pressure group and force the central government
to negotiate regarding on decentralization and the creation of a more inclusive political
framework in Iraq. Without Kurdistan, it is quite likely Iraq could slide back to a strong
centralized state built around a distinctly Arab narrative with possible sporadic outbreaks
of sectarian conflict and the use of coercion to maintain unity and stability.
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CHAPTER IV
KURDS IN TURKEY
A great responsibility falls on all of us to create an equal, free and
democratic country of all peoples and cultures, befitting the history of
Kurdistan and Anatolia. On this occasion of Newroz, I call on the
Armenians, Turkomans, Assyrians, Arabs and all other peoples just as
much as on the Kurds to behold the flame of freedom and equality – the
fire that is lit here today – and embrace it as their own.180
Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
made a call, described by many political analysts as “historic,” on March 21, 2013, the
Kurdish new year (Newroz). Obtained by the leader of the pro-Kurdish Peace and
Democracy Party (BDP) during his visit to Öcalan’s prison cell, the statement was the
result of meetings held by Öcalan with the Turkish government since October 2012. The
statement was broadly viewed as a declaration of a ceasefire and an end to the conflict
that has riven Turkey for the past three decades.
The struggle of the Kurds in Turkey did not start with the PKK, which was
formally founded in 1978 and launched its first attack in Turkey in August 1984. Nor was
the statement of March 2013, the PKK’s first ceasefire declaration. However, Öcalan’s
letter from jail marked the beginning of a new era for the Kurdish question in Turkey for
a number of reasons. First, compared with the majority of other Kurdish parties in
Kurdistan, the PKK is a relatively recent actor in the broader Kurdish struggle in the
Middle East. It has become one of the most influential actors in the region since the early
1990s by mobilizing the Kurdish masses not only in Turkey, but also in Iran, Iraq and
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Syria. Secret talks between the Turkish government and Öcalan took place several times
in the 1990s and 2000s, but they were never made public because of the classification of
the PKK as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, those negotiations largely reflected the
Turkish government’s prime motive to end the armed insurgency of the PKK rather than
a genuine will to establish peace in Turkey. In this context, the March 2013 declaration
was viewed as “historic” by many given it was the first time Öcalan was publicly
acknowledged by the Turkish government not only as a legitimate political actor
representing the Kurds in Turkey, but as a chief negotiator within the peace process.
Second, since 1993, the PKK had declared numerous unilateral ceasefires with the
stated intention of opening peace negotiations. In most cases, these initiatives were
ignored by successive governments and portrayed instead a sign of the PKK’s weakness
and imminent defeat. It is important to note that although the March 2013 statement was
largely interpreted by the international media as a ceasefire declaration, Öcalan’s letter in
fact did not even once include the words “ceasefire” or “truce.” The most appropriate
definition would be “a call for the cessation of hostilities,” but Öcalan’s assessment and
appeal was far ahead of even that.181 Öcalan’s main purpose was to move the Kurdish
struggle from the military realm to the world of democratic politics in Turkey. Silencing
the guns, which implies “cease-fire,” was an inseparable component of this process, but
only as a logical starting point to pave the way for achieving the broader goal of
establishing a democratic Turkey not only for the Kurds, but for all peoples and cultures.
The founding manifesto of the PKK, which was published in 1978, sets the
party’s goal as the establishment of an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan and
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states that other forms of solutions such as autonomy or federalism are “reformist,” and
consequently “reactionary” views for they do not tend to disturb the existing state
borders.182 The manifesto stresses the indispensability of the use of force against the
“colonial” forces183 and embraces that all-in-one use of ideological, political, and military
forms of struggle are necessary for the success of the national liberation of Kurdistan. It
emphasizes that the PKK’s primary focus is on the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, but that
national liberation will be achieved through the destruction of not only Turkish
colonialism, but also the colonialism of the other occupying state-forces in Kurdistan and
the subsequent construction of a democratic and united Kurdish state.
Until the early 1990s, independent statehood, armed struggle and the idea of
united and democratic Kurdistan were the three major pillars of the PKK movement. The
Newroz message of Öcalan, which strongly emphasized ending the armed struggle and
finding a solution to the Kurdish question within the democratic politics of Turkey,
remarkably reflects the dramatic alterations in the PKK’s political and ideological
outlook on the Kurdish question as it gradually unfolded over two decades. Throughout
this process, the major changes the PKK underwent with regard to its programmatic
development can be categorized into three areas: an ideological transformation from
state-seeking nationalism to one centered on “radical democracy,” which is based on the
rejection of the concept of nation-state; the political transformation from the ideal of
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separate statehood to the ideal of democratic confederalism, which represents a new
specification of Kurdish independence; and strategic transformation from armed struggle
to political struggle aimed at negotiation and peaceful settlement.
The evolution of the PKK shows how Turkey’s Kurdish question has been
translated into a quest for democracy that concerns all peoples living within the borders
of Turkey. “Radical democracy” is a term that thoroughly captures the emergent
discourse of the PKK in the 1990s, given that it provides a new understanding of politics
in Turkey on the basis of a critique of the nation state. This approach differentiates the
Kurdish movement in Turkey from its counterparts in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as it views the
nation state as the main obstacle to the liberation of people, be they Kurdish or other.
While the Kurdish movements in Iran, Iraq and Syria are equally critical of the nation
state and its implications for democracy, their criticisms concentrate solely on the
exclusionary character of Arab and Shia Islamist Iranian nationalisms. The discourse of
the PKK, on the other hand, derives from a critical evaluation of the theoretical
foundations of the concept of nation state and underscores its antagonistic relationship
with democracy. Accordingly, the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the
context of the PKK’s discourse would only further consolidate the existing system of
nation states in the Middle East, which are seen by the PKK as the main obstacles to
democratization in the region throughout the twentieth century. The solution, therefore,
lies in transforming the existing system, not in consolidating it.
The Ideological Foundations of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey
It is not possible to understand the evolution of the Kurdish movement in Turkey
from the 1990s onwards without comprehending its relationship with the Turkish left,
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which provided the Kurds with an important avenue to express their grievances
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Kurdish movements in the Middle East came into
close contact with the leftist movements in all parts of Kurdistan throughout the twentieth
century. This association sometimes took place sometimes through the politicized Kurds’
tendency to view the communist parties as the best places for the expression of their
militancy in the absence of Kurdish nationalist parties, as in Syria, and sometimes
through the reliance of Kurdish parties on leftist forces to maintain their presence under
suppressive political conditions, as in Iran. In Iraq, where Kurdish parties managed to
maintain a strong presence in the political arena despite suppression, the left-wing forces
saw the Kurds as critical allies in their struggle against their political rivals. However, it
is only in Turkey that the organized, mass-based Kurdish movement was born directly
from the leftist movement with an equally strong emphasis placed on both socialist and
Kurdish nationalist goals. The alliance between the Kurds and the Turkish left resulted in
separation mainly because of the failure of leftist forces to accommodate ethnic demands.
Nevertheless, once again, only in Turkey, this process of dissociation resulted in major
political and ideological transformations within the Kurdish movement.
The 1960s is usually considered as “rebirth” or “reawakening” of Kurdish
nationalism in Turkey184 after the Kurdish revolts of 1920s and 1930s in the early years
of the Republic. Although it is not entirely wrong to use the term “reawakening” to
describe Kurdish nationalism during this period, it is important to note the underlying
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causes of Kurdish activism and show that the element of “Kurdishness” as defined in the
1960s and 1970s differs greatly from the 1920s and 1930s.
The view that the Turkish state’s discriminatory, violent and exclusive policies
have had a decisive influence in shaping contemporary Kurdish nationalism has
substantial explanatory power in accounting for the emergence of political mobilization
among the Kurds after the First World War. The most significant result of WWI in terms
of its repercussions on the future trajectory of Turkish nationalism was the replacement
of the decentralized multi-ethnic Ottoman heritage with a centralized nation-state,
defined as the Kemalist model, which does not recognize any nation other than the
Turks.185 The problem of “minorities” was solved in the Turkish constitutional scheme
without ever addressing it186 and all the “now-citizens” of the Turkish Republic were
invited to become Turks through article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, which states,
“Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.”
The shift from the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of Ottoman Empire to the
nation-state model was considerably problematic from the standpoint of the Kurds not
only because of the loss of regional autonomy they had under the decentralized Ottoman
system, but also because the new state denied the ethnic heterogeneity of society in legal
terms. The growing Kurdish discontent following the foundation of the Republic was
shaped by both the concerns of the traditional Kurdish elites over the loss of their
185
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privileges under the Ottoman rule, and an increasing emphasis on “Kurdishness” as an
ethno-political cause.
Since the concept of nation was defined within an essentially Islamic framework
under the Ottoman Empire, although aware of their ethnic identity, the Kurdish
traditional dignitaries and the Kurdish intelligentsia did not conceive “Kurdishness” as a
decisive element in determining their social and “national” status.187 It would be
misleading to exaggerate the nationalist essence of the revolts of the 1920s and 1930s as
they did not take place around a clear Kurdish nationalist agenda. However, it is
important to note that the logic of the nation-state embraced by the new Republic played
a significant role in increasing the emphasis of the Kurds on “Kurdishness” as their
primary identity marker. These growing ethnic sentiments in the early years of the
Republic provided the social, cultural and political resources for later Kurdish nationformation in Turkey.
Within this framework, rather than a period of “reawakening,” it is more
appropriate to view the 1960s and 1970s as a period of maturity of the Kurdish nationalist
consciousness in Turkey. Kurdish activism for the first time appeared in Turkey’s
political arena as an organized movement with a specific structure, program and strategy.
It was no longer possible to reduce political mobilization among Kurds to a reaction to
ethnic Turkish nationalism and discriminatory state policies. By the 1960s, a young
generation of Kurdish counter elites seized control of the movement from traditional
Kurdish leaders, defined Kurds in radical new ways, and engaged in new types of
187
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political activism with clearly defined nationalist goals aimed at challenging the basic
principles of the republican state.188 This new generation was composed mostly of
educated intelligentsia using legal, non-violent repertoire to promote a class-based
interpretation of the Kurdish question with the goal of creating a socialist state. While
earlier generations of Kurdish activism failed to create mass action due to tribal, religious
and sectarian divides, this new generation not only brought diverse Kurds together in
protest, but did so across ethnic boundaries in coordination with the Turkish left.189
The 1940s and 1950s were largely experienced as “decades of silence”190 for the
Kurds in Turkey given the Turkish state’s policy of denying the very existence of ethnic
communities other than Turks, and the militarization and systematic surveillance of
Kurdish territories from the 1930s, which had an intimidating effect on the population.
By the 1960s, the “decades of silence” ended when Kurdish unrest resumed as a segment
of the rising left-wing opposition in Turkey. A broad stratum of educated Kurds, who
were mostly university students, discovered in leftist ideas – more specifically, in
Marxism-Leninism – a universalistic syntax that allowed them to establish a link between
the “oppressed Kurdish nation” and “oppressed classes” of Turkey.191 In this regard, they
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began to appropriate a socialist discourse stressing national oppression and economic
exploitation of the Kurdish peasant masses, which gradually culminated in the conception
of Kurdistan as a “colony” and Kurds as a colonized people.192 This framing of the
Kurdish issue gained widespread acceptance among Kurdish activists, yet laid the
groundwork for the organizational and ideological separation of the Kurdish struggle
from the struggle of the revolutionary left in Turkey in the 1970s.
Until 1968, the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) played a major role in organizing
and leading the socialist struggle in Turkey and served as an incubator for Kurdish
mobilization by incorporating many Kurdish activists into the Turkish political system.
TIP drew attention to both the problem of economic underdevelopment in the Kurdish
inhabited regions of Turkey and the political and cultural problems encountered by the
Kurds due to state discrimination. The party played a particularly important role in
organizing the 1967 “Eastern Meetings,” which were a series of protest meetings and
demonstrations held in several towns in Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast. Framed as a
protest campaign against economic underdevelopment and lack of democracy, they
constituted the first peaceful mass Kurdish protests in republican history and significantly
contributed to the public debate on the Kurdish question and demands of the Kurdish
people.193 The fact that the Kurdish rights agenda was adopted not only by the Kurdish
socialists, but also by the Turkish leftists, led to the integration of Kurdish resistance as a
political practice at the heart of Turkish politics. This came as a major challenge to the
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Kemalist project, which was mainly based upon isolating the Kurdish resistance in
geographical and ideological terms.194
The interpenetration of Kurdish and Turkish politics proved remarkably durable
until the late 1960s. However, the signs of splintering of the Turkish socialist and
Kurdish political agendas began to appear when, as elsewhere in the world, the left in
Turkey started to become severely handicapped by divisions and internal struggles in the
1970s. Very basically, two main currents of thought and action in the revolutionary left
emerged. “Socialist revolutionaries” claimed capitalism had advanced in Turkey, and a
transition to socialism was possible. “National democratic revolutionaries,” on the other
hand, envisaged a two-phase revolution, the first phase being the national democratic
revolution and the second being socialist revolution. This theorization characterized
Turkey as a semi-colony of Western imperialism and concluded that, for Turkey to have
its economic and political independence, workers, peasants and progressive forces within
the bourgeoisie needed to enter into an alliance to achieve a national democratic
revolution, which would be followed by a socialist revolution.195
TIP was the main representative of the socialist revolution thesis. It was also the
first legal political party to openly acknowledge the existence of the Kurdish people in
Turkey and draw attention to their national oppression under the republican rule.
However, the factional struggles and disagreements over the revolutionary strategy
gradually plunged the party into crisis and marginalized its position within the leftist
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movement in the late 1960s. In the meantime, as the national democratic revolution thesis
became more dominant in the Turkish socialist movement in the early 1970s, the
relationship between the Kurdish activists and the Turkish left wing began to unravel.
After the military coup of March 1971 was a period of collapse for the left in
Turkey given the ban on left wing organizations and publications, the arrest of its
militants and the killing of its main leaders. It was during this period that the idea of
organizing a separate Kurdish struggle around the thesis of Kurdistan as a “colony” was
born. As the left started to organize again in the mid-1970s, the division between the
Turkish socialists and Kurdish activists increasingly came to the surface. Turkish leftists
were exposed to criticism by the Kurdish groups on the grounds they had left their
challenging position and had become parties of the regime. The national democratic
revolution thesis’ definition of the Turkish state as a semi-colony of Western imperialism
inevitably led to a tendency on the part of the left to reconcile the revolutionary
movement with the Kemalist ideology.196 The motto “Fully Independent Turkey” became
one of the most widely used slogans by the left in the 1970s. By defining Turkey’s status
as a semi-colony, this approach turned a blind eye to Turkey’s own role as a colonizing
force vis-à-vis Kurdistan. According to the Kurds, the Turkish left not only became statist
and lost its capacity to act as a genuine opposition force in Turkey, but it also failed to
approach the Kurdish question from an emancipatory perspective.
Turkish socialists remained generally unreceptive to Kurdish rights and demands
because they perceived the ethnic and national demands as a threat to the unity of the
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socialist movement and the working class in Turkey.197 In addition, increasing
government repression and paramilitary activity against the Kurds in southeast Turkey in
the late 1960s and 1970s, gradually increased the gap between the socialist agenda and
the Kurdish rights agenda because of the growing “separatist” stigma attached to the
Kurdish movement. In this context, the Turkish socialists increasingly viewed the
Kurdish question as a problem only to be considered once a socialist Turkey was
established. The Kurdish movement, on the other hand, differentiated itself from the
Turkish left by reframing the socialist ideology in the context of the national question and
portraying the national liberation of the “peoples” as a core requirement of the
revolutionary and socialist ideology. This approach increasingly manifested itself in the
Kurdish activists’ emphasis on the distinction between the nationalism of the “oppressed
nations” and that of the “oppressor nations,” and the promotion of the idea that unless the
reality of Kurdistan was recognized in Turkey, it would be impossible to pursue and
implement a truly socialist ideology.
The rise of the Turkish left and the emerging schisms within the Turkish ruling
elite in early 1960s are often referred to as important political opportunity structures that
enabled the Kurdish movement to reassert its influence in Turkey’s political arena. The
Turkish left’s real impact on Kurdish politics in Turkey lies in the way it helped construct
Kurdish identity by providing Kurdish nationalism with an ideological framework
through which the Kurdish activists found collective answers to questions about “who
they are” and “what kind of world they want to live in.” Nevertheless, the developments
from the late 1960s on showed that the Kurdish groups, despite the still relatively
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influential position of the Turkish left, decided to pursue a separate agenda shaped by a
reinterpretation of socialist ideology on the basis of Kurdish national struggle. This was
certainly not a politically pragmatic move for the Kurds because of the high costs of
pursuing identity politics in Turkey at a time when just being a leftist was a dangerous
path to follow. The Kurds, however, were determined to take up this challenge given the
growing power of Kurdish nationalism as an ideological force in its own right. Kurdish
national demands were no longer up for compromise, however costly the pursuit of their
realization might be.
Enter the PKK
Although the signs of separation between the Turkish left and Kurdish
nationalism became clear in the late 1960s, Kurdish activism was already evolving
towards a more organized form. The Kurdish uprising led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani in
1961 had a direct bearing on this process. In 1965, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of
Turkey (TKDP) was established as the ideological equivalent of Mustafa Barzani’s KDP
in Iraq. TKDP advocated for a similar autonomist plan and demanded the recognition of
social, political and cultural rights of the Kurds within the territorial integrity of Turkey.
TKDP was the first specifically Kurdish party of Turkey, but it never managed to have a
strong hold among the Kurds because of its very conservative ideology. The founders of
the party, Faik Bucak and Sait Elçi, had previously subscribed to the mainstream rightist
Turkish politics. Consequently, they appealed to a conservative society, one that is loyal
to the aghas and tribal structures organically tied to the government for the protection of
their interests. Given its ideological link with the existing political system, TKDP had
little to offer. Many of the party’s leaders were arrested in January 1968, and internal
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divisions in 1969 further weakened the party.198 The party revived briefly during the
second half of the 1970s, but failed to put down strong roots.
On the leftist front, as the factional infighting within TIP made clear the fact it
was unable to formulate and maintain a coherent policy on the Kurdish issue, the
discontented Kurds intensified their attempts to establish Kurdish socialist organizations
which resulted in the establishment of Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO)
in 1969. DDKO brought together university students and youth in Turkey’s urban centers
who shared common goals revolving around the recognition of the political, social and
economic rights of the Kurds, developing Kurdish culture and language, and combatting
the official policies of the Turkish state that deny the existence of the Kurds in Turkey.199
The DDKO, like TIP and other leftist organizations, was closed following the 1971 coup.
They were reorganized in mid-1974 as the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Associations
(DDKD) and remained one of the most important organizations among the left wing
Kurdish nationalist groups in the 1970s.
The main legacy of the DDKO is that they represent the first attempts on the part
of the Kurdish activists to break away from Turkish socialists and form autonomous
Kurdish organizations on the basis of the discourse of “national oppression” of the Kurds.
Throughout the 1970s, the number of legal and underground left-wing Kurdish
organizations proliferated rapidly. Some of these groups such as the Rizgari (Liberation)
movement and its break away, Ala Rizgari, traced their origins to the DDKO. Another
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group, the Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party (TKSP), was established by the TIP’s
Kurdish members and became one of strongest Kurdish socialist groups in the 1970s. The
popularity of socialist ideas among the Kurdish activists also affected the ideological
evolution of the formerly conservative TKDP. The defeat that the Iraqi Kurdish
movement suffered in 1975 played a significant role in discrediting the conservative
autonomist brand of Kurdish nationalism represented by the TKDP in Turkey. TKDP
began its revival in 1975 and its left wing dominated the DDKD. Later, three groups,
Kawa, the KIP/DDKD and the KUK (National Liberationists of Kurdistan) emerged from
the DDKD movement and became influential in Kurdish politics throughout the second
half of the 1970s. Finally, there was the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which had its
roots in the illegal revolutionary left in Turkey.200
The 1970s witnessed a virtual explosion of Kurdish nationalist organizations in
Turkey. However, none of these groups were able to survive the effects of the 1980
military coup, which targeted the political left, both Turkish and Kurdish variants, in an
attempt to eradicate it.201 According to İsmet İmset, there were twelve Marxist-Leninist
Kurdish groups active in the 1970s, among which only the PKK (Kurdistan Workers
Party) managed to achieve a steady rise and growing effectiveness throughout the 1980s
and 1990s.202 The endurance of the PKK movement in the post-1980 period is a
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benchmark for the evolution of the Kurdish movement in Turkey in terms of
understanding not only the transformations within the Kurdish society itself, but also the
significant shifts the relationship between the Kurds and the Turkish state underwent
from the early 1990s onwards.
The organizational development of the Kurdish movement in the 1960s and 1970s
made important contributions to the public discussion of the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
Particularly in the second half of the 1970s, the Kurdish socialists became considerably
assertive and influential in stressing the notions of “national oppression,” “colonialism”
and “national liberation,” which were disseminated widely in the political magazines of
the Kurdish political groups and clandestine parties.203 Although this process provided an
important platform for the expression of the views of Kurdish activists and consolidation
of their political position, the Turkish state’s perception of the Kurdish question and the
security-oriented policy making, which had dominated the state’s dealings with the
politically active Kurds since the early years of the republican rule, remained largely
unchanged.
The Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s were considered by the state as an
artificial question originating simply from the resistance of the pre-modern tribal
structures and adherences towards the dissemination of modern state power into the
Kurdish-inhabited regions. Likewise, the Kurdish unrest of the 1960s and 1970s was
believed to be simply an outcome of communist incitement. In other words, the Turkish
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state consistently avoided recognizing the “Kurdishness” of the Kurdish question.204 This
situation did not change after the emergence of the PKK as a guerilla organization in the
1980s, during which the discourse of “terrorism” and military solutions dominated the
state’s approach towards the Kurds. By the early 1990s, however, both the state’s
perception of the Kurdish question and its methods of addressing the issue started to
undergo significant shifts. The endurance of the PKK both as a military and political
organization was a major causal factor in effecting this transformation. The PKK’s own
ideological transformation in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union formed
another important aspect of this process. It is the combination of these factors that
eventually resulted in the interpenetration of the Kurdish question with the problem of
democratization in Turkey.
The question of why the PKK emerged as the only socialist and Kurdish
nationalist group that survived the widespread suppression following the 1980 coup is
significant in terms of understanding the long-term consequences of the Kurdish armed
struggle in Turkey. It is common in the literature to establish a direct causal link between
the rise of the PKK in the post-1980 period and its use of violence against the state.205
The torture and other degrading and humiliating treatment the Kurdish activists were
exposed to in Diyarbakir Prison after the coup is seen as a turning point in the
radicalization of the Kurdish movement and its abandonment of peaceful opposition
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tactics. These approaches, however, have very limited explanatory power in accounting
for the evolution of the Kurdish movement in Turkey since the 1980s, particularly for the
transformations that took place both within the Kurdish movement itself and its relations
with the state since the early 1990s.
The argument that explains the emergence of the PKK as a reaction against the
extreme state repression following the 1980 coup denies the very “continuity” of the
Kurdish question in Turkey since the 1920s. This perspective explains the Kurdish
movement on the basis of a narrowly defined causality confined to the state-PKK conflict
in the post-1980 period and essentially seeks to construct an alternative “Kurdish reality,”
disconnected from its historical dynamics, internal controversies and organizational
processes, and instead draws on the 1980 coup as a convenient tool to justify its
arguments.206
Turkey’s Kurdish question did not emerge in 1980 with the rise of the PKK, nor
did the PKK emerge as a reaction to state brutality against the Kurdish activists in
Diyarbakir Prison. More importantly, the rapid growth of the PKK’s influence among the
Kurdish masses in the 1980s cannot be reduced to a reaction against the oppressive
political environment following the 1980 coup, but can be traced back to the early
beginnings of the movement in the 1970s. At best, the impact of the 1980 coup on the
Kurdish movement can be explained by the fact that the discriminatory and draconian
measures adopted by the military regime between 1980 and 1983, such as banning the
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Kurdish language altogether and the widespread torture in Diyarbakir Prison, provided
the recruits that the PKK needed.207
Although the PKK launched its first attack in 1984, armed struggle was accepted
by the organization in principle since the early 1970s. Until 1977, the PKK defended
armed struggle ideologically, but without any serious attempt to engage in it. By the late
1970s, serious preparations to organize a guerilla war started and continued until the first
attack against Turkish military targets in 1984. Therefore, establishing a direct causal link
between the 1980 coup and the emergence of a Kurdish armed struggle is both
misleading and reductionist. Furthermore, of the various Kurdish parties that emerged in
Turkey in the 1970s, the PKK was the first to openly strive for “liberating” every chunk
of Kurdistani territory and ultimately reunify them in “Greater Kurdistan” by using
“armed struggle.” It was, however, not the “only” Kurdish party to embrace the strategy
of use of arms to achieve the goal of full independence for a united Kurdistan. Several
other Kurdish parties, such as Ala Rizgari, KUK and Kawa, also openly declared their
goal to establish an independent united Kurdish state and their belief in armed struggle as
the best path to the liberation of Kurdistan.
The Rise of Political Violence
It is important to answer several vital questions regarding the evolution of the
Kurdish movement after the 1980s. Why did the PKK emerge as the only Kurdish party
to survive the repressive political environment of the early 1980s? How did it manage to
consistently expand its social base among the Kurdish masses while other Kurdish parties
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were largely marginalized in the post-1980 period? Is there a causal link between the
endurance of the PKK-led armed struggle and the transformation of the Kurdish question
from an ethnic issue defined in the context of “terrorism” and “separatism” to a political
problem defined in the context of democratization in Turkey?
Given the low probability of victory and the high costs of participation, armed
struggle is certainly the most risky path a political movement can pursue particularly if it
is conducted against a state. When the 1980 coup almost completely destroyed both the
Kurdish and Turkish leftist organizations, one of the main factors that distinguished the
PKK from other Kurdish parties and enabled it to survive was its social base, which
included a sizable portion of workers and peasants. Contrary to its popular perception,
PKK is primarily a political party rather than a military organization, but it uses military
means to achieve political ends.208 In this sense, what distinguished the PKK from the
other Kurdish parties, as well as from the Turkish leftist groups that took up arms for
achieving socialist aims, was that the party leadership put a particular emphasis on
reaching political and ideological maturity and having a strong support base as
preconditions to engaging in military action. The signs of this strategy can be clearly seen
throughout the history of the PKK.
PKK’s military struggle began after twelve years of preparation. From the first
meeting of the organization’s founders in 1972, to the official proclamation of the PKK
in 1978, the group carefully avoided expressing itself through any legal means; rather it
formed a tightly organized and well-disciplined but open network, engaging mainly in
theoretical and ideological discussions. During the second half of the 1970s, almost all
208
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the Turkish and Kurdish leftist groups established legal platforms for political action in
the form of journals, magazines and associations. Kawa, Rizgari and Ala Rizgari
published their own journals and the TKSP was widely known for its legal monthly
journal, Özgürlük Yolu (Path of Freedom).209 Other illegal political parties organized
legal fronts in the form of associations among which the DDKD was the most important.
The original group, which later became the PKK, did not use any specific name for a long
time, refrained carefully from producing any written material that would document the
group’s political views or organizational structure, and focused only on verbal
propaganda, ideological discussions and mass communications to expand its social
base.210 The reasons behind this strategy lie mainly in Öcalan’s leadership skills and his
cautious personality.
Öcalan was well aware of the state’s relentless approach to the Kurdish issue and
its violent suppression of any type of political organization involving partially or
completely, the Kurds. Therefore, he concluded the group could never become a massbased influential force if it exposed itself through legal platforms. Furthermore, Öcalan
himself closely experienced the years following the 1971 coup during which the cadre
and leadership of the then-prominent Turkish socialist groups were killed immediately
after they started rural guerilla warfare against the state. Based on the lessons from this
experience, Öcalan argued that the dramatic failure of these groups derived from hasty
organization and immediate, poorly-thought out and under-planned actions. With this
knowledge, the group around Öcalan decided to organize itself thoroughly before
209
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entering into a direct confrontation with the state. Throughout the 1970s, the group had a
slow but steady growth by avoiding the risk of standing out too much in the eyes of the
official authorities. That is why the PKK’s first attack in 1984 was quite shocking for the
Turkish government, which was of the opinion that it had all illegal groups under control
after the military coup. The survival of the PKK in the post-1980 period cannot be
explained without referring to this organizational strategy.
Muzaffer Ayata, who is a founding cadre of the PKK, points out how the
organizational capacity of the PKK differentiated the party from other Kurdish
organizations after the 1980 coup:
After the 1980 military coup, Turkey became a place dominated by fear,
repression, torture and violence. Turkish left and the Kurdish opposition
were violently suppressed, while the political arena was left to be
dominated by nationalist, conservative and sectarian forces. In this
political environment, only the PKK managed to resist. During the 1970s,
almost all the Kurdish organizations, such as KUK, Rizgari, Ala Rizgari,
DDKD, were ideologically on the same page. Everybody was defending
socialism. The emergent political atmosphere of the 1980s, which was
overtaken by torture and violence, revealed the differences between these
parties. Strong ones survived. The PKK resisted at the risk of getting
wiped out of the Turkish political scene. Its members continued to resist at
the cost of their lives both in prisons and in Kurdistan. No other party
could reach this threshold. That’s why they were marginalized.211
The reasons behind how the PKK managed to consistently increase its influence
over the Kurdish masses while other Kurdish groups became marginalized in the 1980s
can also be traced back to the 1970s. Although the PKK proclaimed the creation of a
unified and independent Kurdistan as its primary objective, it did not identify that as its
sole goal, but also desired a radical transformation of the social and political structure of
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Kurdish society.212 After the group led by Öcalan formed their party clandestinely in the
city of Diyarbakir in 1978, the PKK directed its armed struggle first against the Kurdish
notables and the tribal heads. Thus, the PKK’s political actions first began as an intraKurdish class struggle rather than being directed against the Turkish government.213 This
reveals much about the PKK’s philosophy and modus operandi. PKK announced its
existence in 1978 not as an ethnic movement, but as an actor that challenges the
patronage-based tribal system in Turkey’s southeast. From a strategic perspective, the
elimination of landlords was intended by the PKK to weaken the grip of feudal
institutions over the land and people, restrict the state’s indirect rule over Kurdistan
through cooptation, and create room to maneuver in the countryside in preparation for
rural guerilla warfare.214 At the same time, this strategy allowed the PKK to show the
diffident peasantry that the PKK protects their rights and freedoms by fighting against the
tribes and landowners in the region. Consequently, the PKK’s image as the voice of the
oppressed grew rapidly, and the party drew its leaders, members and militants largely
from the disenfranchised and marginalized.
Remzi Kartal, a former member of the Turkish Parliament, explains the
relationship between the PKK and the Kurdish masses as follows:
The problem in Kurdistan originates from oppression. The PKK rightfully
identified this problem and gained Kurdish people’s trust. Even before the
PKK was established, different groups and parties engaged in propaganda
in the region and told the Kurdish people about the vitality of advocating
for their political rights and organizing civic action and protests. However,
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what people needed was security. Kurdish people were ready to fight, but
they were also aware of the state violence they had to confront if they take
action. It is only the PKK who responded to Kurdish people’s need for
security. It is only the PKK who assured the Kurdish people that it would
protect them if they stand up for their rights and the PKK successfully
fulfilled that responsibility. That’s why no other movement, but only the
PKK, managed to earn people’s trust and that’s why the masses followed
the PKK while the other Kurdish parties remained marginal.215
The Turkish state refused to consider the Kurdish aspirations or enter into
political discussions on the matter and used constant threat of violence to maintain its
dominance over the Kurds. However, the control of the Turkish state was seriously
threatened when the PKK succeeded in gaining mass support and presenting itself as a
viable alternative.216 The violence perpetrated by the PKK, it has been argued, was
rational and instrumental in the sense it created political space for public debate on the
Kurdish question and tried to change the social and political status of the Kurds in
circumstances where there was no alternative avenue for the expression of grievances.217
The threat posed by the PKK to the political system in Turkey and the influence it had
among the masses in Turkey’s southeast has been recognized as the most serious
challenge faced by the Turkish Republic since its establishment in 1923.218
Whether the armed opposition of the PKK led to political gains for the Kurds and
paved the way for the implementation of policy changes from the Turkish state is a
significant question. Mahmut Şakar, who was one of the lawyers of Öcalan, drew
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attention to the fact that in cases where the violence of power blocks all avenues for selfexpression, violence of the opposition becomes instrumental in forcing those in power to
negotiate for a political solution:
Nobody defends violence, which is an issue that directly affects human
life. However, I don’t accept the understanding which views everyday
violence of the state legitimate and denounces the armed resistance against
state violence as terrorism. The existence of the Turkish state in Kurdistan
has always been based on use or threat of force. The Kurdish movement
came to the conclusion that armed struggle is imperative after decades of
oppression and denial. The 1980 coup and the inhumane treatments that
the Kurds were exposed to were the last straw. It was no longer possible to
organize resistance through parties or associations. There is still much
progress to be made for the settlement of the Kurdish question within a
genuinely democratic framework. The current political conditions are
different than the conditions which necessitated armed struggle in the
1980s. The PKK is aware of this reality and seeks to engage in
negotiations with the state. Today, nobody denies that there are avenues
available to the Kurds to express themselves politically. Nonetheless, it is
also undeniable that this is a consequence of the armed struggle.219
Hatice Çoban, who is the representative of pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy
Party in Brussels, expresses similar views:
We, as a party, accept that the PKK is not a cause but an effect of
Turkey’s Kurdish question. This is not about supporting or opposing the
use of arms. Because we all wish that the painful process of armed
struggle, which led to the loss of a lot of lives in Turkey, was never
experienced and that the Kurds gained their rights through peaceful
methods. This is about recognizing a reality. The reality is that the Kurdish
question defined as “the Kurds’ demands for rights” entered the Turkish
state’s agenda as a result of the PKK’s armed struggle. This is undeniable.
What would have happened if the Kurds never took up arms? I think we
will always ask this question.220
By the early 1990s, both the Kurdish movement and its relations with the state
started to undergo important transformations. Significant shifts took place not only within
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the PKK’s outlook on the solution to the Kurdish question, but also the Turkish state’s
perception of the Kurdish problem. The entrance of pro-Kurdish parties on to the Turkish
political scene in the early 1990s marked the beginning of a crucial process in which the
Kurds’ armed struggle and political struggle began to go hand in hand, affecting each
other as well as the larger democratic problems of Turkey in critical ways. Nevertheless,
it is important to note that the PKK, particularly its leader Öcalan, continued to be the
most influential actor in terms of defining the Kurdish question in Turkey and shaping the
public debate on the demands of the Kurds. This process gradually expanded the
boundaries of the Kurdish movement to affect not only the status of the Kurds, but also
the broader political problems that concern the rights and freedoms of all citizens of
Turkey. The Kurdish movement had become a force capable of influencing the political
agenda of the whole country.
Transformation of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey
The PKK’s political activities throughout the 1980s and 1990s led to the
mobilization of large number of Kurds in Turkey. The increase in political violence
during this period caused a corresponding increase in Kurdish political mobilization in
the form of popularly attended demonstrations and protests.221 From the early 1990s, the
Kurdish activists also started to work within electoral politics, creating alternative
channels to armed struggle to articulate Kurdish demands.
Participation of the Kurds in formal political arenas, which started with the
establishment of People’s Labor Party (HEP) in 1991, was a significant development in
the expression of demands by the Kurds within the realm of legal democratic politics.
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However, it is important to highlight the cause and effect relationship between the armed
struggle and the entry of Kurdish activists into the Turkish political arena. These newlyemerging pro-Kurdish parties were able to find a space in formal politics largely due to
the resilience of the PKK movement. One of the main consequences of the PKK’s
guerilla warfare was the emergence of the discourse of “terrorism” in Turkey as a novel
way to delegitimize the Kurdish demands. Ironically, it is the PKK’s struggle that cleared
the way and opened political space for the emergence of legal, pro-Kurdish parties that
could consolidate the Kurds’ engagement with democratic politics and further the
Kurdish movement in ways that armed struggle could not. Therefore, the mainstream proKurdish parties that have acted within the formal political arena in Turkey from the early
1990s, have always maintained a strong commitment to the articulation of the Kurdish
question as originally set forth by the PKK in the 1970s.
There are fundamental questions to consider regarding the changes the Kurdish
movement experienced in the early 1990s. If the main objective of the PKK-led Kurdish
movement was the establishment of an independent united Kurdish state, why did the
Kurdish activists increasingly turn to the formal political arena and opt for acting
“within” the system? Why did the PKK take this approach when it would have been in its
interests to incorporate these activists into its own ranks as recruits? The answer to these
questions lies in the political and ideological transformations of the PKK since the early
1990s. Instead of viewing these transformations as a break from its initial goals, it is
more appropriate to view them in the context of both the PKK’s evolutionary trajectory
and the changing political conditions in which it operated.
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Although the PKK specified liberation of Kurdistan as its main objective, it never
depicted its struggle as an ethnic one. This was a crucial distinction between the PKK and
the other Kurdish organizations in the 1970s. Although relations with the revolutionary
left were common to all Kurdish groups in that period, the approach of the PKK was very
distinctive. After the separation between the Turkish and Kurdish socialists, most of the
Kurdish organizations turned to Kurdish nationalism as their defining ideology with the
goal of leading a proletarian revolution of their own. The PKK envisaged the revolution
in Turkey and Kurdistan as an intertwined process in which the center of gravity rested in
Kurdistan.222 In PKK’s ideology, the liberation of the Turkish people was seen as an
objective that could never be accomplished without the achievement of the liberation of
the Kurds. Accordingly, the Kurdish struggle was depicted not as an assignment for
Kurdish nationalists, but for socialists, Kurds, and Turks alike. This was the main
criticism posed by the PKK against the Turkish left. Öcalan makes this point by stating,
“I turned to the Kurdish cause not because I am a Kurd, but because I am a socialist.”223
The PKK has always had a strong orientation to Turkey and weak linkages with other
Kurdish parties because of its tendency to position itself at a distance from narrowly
defined anti-Turk ethnic nationalism.
The Turkish left’s failure to rid itself of the influence of Kemalism and the
tendency to disregard the revolutionary potential of Kurdistan eventually prompted the
group led by Öcalan to organize separately. However, the PKK never lost interest in
Turkey’s revolutionary organizations and their agendas. It is important to recognize this
222

Jongerden, Akkaya (2012). 13.

223

Yüce, 230.

145

distinctive approach embraced by the founding cadre of the PKK in order to understand
the transformations in the PKK’s objectives in the 1990s. The PKK’s success at
becoming a resilient movement lies not only in its ability to transform itself according to
changing political conditions, but also in its ability to maintain a mass support base even
after it underwent radical transformations with regard to its objectives.
During the 1970s, the PKK followed the strategy of mobilizing the masses by
emphasizing the emancipatory nature of socialist ideology and promoting socialism as a
path to achieve independence and defeat colonialism in Kurdistan. Addressing the
feelings of “Kurdishness” was seen as a second step.224 This approach derived
specifically from Öcalan’s personal outlook on the Kurdish question which, for him,
could not be confined to the narrow limits of ethnic nationalism. That is why the
transformation of the feudal nature of Kurdish society was seen as significant to the
establishment of an independent united Kurdish state.225 From this perspective, Kurdish
statehood was never depicted in the PKK’s ideology as an end in itself, but as a means for
the emancipation of Kurdish society. This approach gave the PKK the flexibility to
redefine Kurdish “independence” according to changing political circumstances. This is
exactly the reason why the Kurdish masses continued to follow the PKK despite its
dramatic shift in the party’s political objectives in the early 1990s, from the goal of
independent statehood to finding solutions within the borders of Turkey.

224

Yüce, 285.

225

Öcalan, for example, has always been critical of the Kurdish parties of Iraqi Kurdistan. Many times, in
his statements, he asserted that the KDP and PUK cannot liberate the people of Iraqi Kurdistan unless they
transform the tribal structure of the society and political life. Accordingly, Öcalan emphasizes that even if
the Kurds in Iraq secede and establish a separate state, this would not bring “independence”.

146

It is common in the literature on Kurdish nationalism in Turkey to explain the
transformations within the PKK’s objectives in the context of Öcalan’s capture by
Turkish security forces in 1999. The PKK’s abandonment of the ideal of an independent
Kurdistan is interpreted largely as a sign of its moderation of its goals due to the arrest of
the party’s leader and its declining capacity to act. This view is largely in line with the
official approach of the Turkish state towards the Kurdish question in the 2000s, which
portrayed the changes in the PKK’s goals as a sign of weakness and a result of the PKK’s
defeat by the Turkish army. Although the PKK experienced severe difficulties and
suffered from organizational instability from 1999 to 2004, the fact the party managed to
reorganize itself and once again emerge as a serious challenge to the state after 2004
onwards proved these approaches wrong.
In fact, the PKK has neither abandoned the idea of “independence” nor its efforts
to achieve the ideal of “united Kurdistan.” Rather, what the PKK abandoned was only its
“statist” approach towards the Kurdish question. In other words, the party still maintains
the goal of an independent united Kurdistan, but tries to accomplish this goal in new
ways. In this respect, the shift in the PKK’s approach to the Kurdish question can be
explained as a transformation of the “state-building” project to one that is centered on
“society-building,” which focuses not only on Kurdish society, but also on accomplishing
radical political change in the whole of Turkey. Tracing the origins of the changes in the
PKK’s objectives to Öcalan’s capture in 1999 is misleading as it does not provide a true
understanding of this transformation process, which dates back to the early years of the
1990s.
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Throughout the 1990s, Öcalan’s leadership was largely focused on recognizing
the changing political circumstances both in Turkey and in the international arena, and
explaining the need to modify its goals to both PKK members and the party’s support
base. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc in 1989 was one of the
main reasons behind the PKK’s transformation. The definition of “Kurdishness” made by
the PKK in the 1970s was based on not only “national demands,” but also “socialist
demands.” In this respect, the party’s goals were considerably affected by the Cold War
conditions and the Marxist-Leninist attitude towards the national question, which was
defined as the nations’ right to self-determination. The dominance of this approach is
clear in the PKK’s founding manifesto, which rejects the solutions such as “regional
autonomy,” “federalism” or “linguistic and cultural autonomy” on the grounds they are
against the “independent state” thesis, which is the only true interpretation of the nation’s
right to self-determination.”226 According to Mahmut Şakar, the goals of the PKK during
the 1970s and 1980s were reflected the political conditions of the period in which the
PKK was born:
The PKK was born in a world where independent statehood was seen as
the only solution to the problems of oppressed nations. The primary goal
of the PKK was to end oppression which was originating from the denial
of the identity of Kurdish community. If your goal is to mobilize this
community, you have to focus on this discourse of denial. During the
1970s and 1980s, if the PKK emerged with the goal of autonomy or
federalism, that would not mean much to the masses. There was need for a
much stronger formulation to respond to the Turkish state violence.
Turkish state was where the Kurds were denied, a Kurdish state would be
the place where the Kurds would be free. It was “independent Kurdistan”
which we didn’t have and what we needed to hear. It sounded so good.227
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By promoting the discourse of independent statehood and embracing the use of
violence, the PKK aimed to directly address this policy of denial and open avenues for
the Kurds to express their identity and mobilize their political energy. These two
strategies enabled the PKK to not only challenge the core principles of the Turkish
Kemalist project, but also introduce the Kurdish question as a legitimate problem on the
Turkish state’s agenda. In the early 1990s, however, the PKK was facing a number of
dislocations. The social, political and economic conditions that necessitated armed
struggle were still in place in Turkey. However, the armed struggle had already served
some of the important objectives of the PKK such as the creation of a mass movement
and to bring the Kurdish question to the attention of the Turkish state. By the 1990s,
guerilla warfare was no longer sufficient because the movement was growing at a rapid
pace and the masses were in dire need of opportunities to consolidate the political
struggle. The collapse of the Soviet Union further complicated this environment by
making it imperative for the PKK to build a new political/ideological perspective and an
organizational structure. To address these dislocations, the PKK started to construct a
comprehensive democratic discourse, which significantly altered the movement’s longterm objectives and political demands for the Kurds.
Öcalan places emphasis on the importance of political struggle in the early 1990s
and talks of the relationship between “independence” and “statehood”:
Right now, armed struggle is escalating because we don’t see any
transformation in the Turkish state’s approach towards the Kurdish
question. However, we pay attention to political struggle too. This is not a
contradiction. We engage in armed struggle not to block political avenues,
but to open space for political struggle. Independence should not be
understood only in the form for separatism. You cannot claim that you are
independent only because you have a state. Independence represents a
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mental and moral existence. If nations are not independent ideologically
and morally, regardless of whether they have a state or not, they are slaves
and dependent. Nations that search for recognition from America and the
United Nations worship statism. This approach enslaves people. The
notion of independence that the PKK tries to provide for the Kurdish
people, as well as for the other peoples – Turks, Arabs and Persians – is
not merely related to the concept of state. Statehood is within our
understanding of independence, but we don’t want to narrow our
movement down to that.228
In another interview, Öcalan places emphasis on the coexistence of the Kurds and
Turks in the context of the PKK’s understanding of “independence”:
I focus on the concepts of “independence,” “freedom” and “unity” rather
than the concept of “separation.” Independence can be claimed by
different people living together. We are not talking about an independent
state. We are talking about a political unity in which people can think, act
and develop policies on the basis of equality. The problem is that the
political tradition in Turkey is not compatible with such an understanding
of independence. We believe that Turks need independence too. The
Turkish state tries to solve all problems only through coercion and control.
What the Turkish state understands from national unity is to wipe out the
popular will of the Kurds. This approach does nothing but further
complicates the problems.229
Öcalan emphasizes how peaceful and democratic coexistence of the Kurds and
Turks is fundamental to the liberation of not only the Kurdish and Turkish people, but all
the peoples of the Middle East. He introduces the term “Middle Eastern Federation” and
claims for the Kurdish movement a central role in the accomplishment of this ideal:
Achievement of unity between Turks and Kurds will pave the way for
unity among all the peoples of the Middle East. This is the international
aspect of our quest for independence. For us, achieving unity with the
Turks on the basis of freedom and equality is much easier than achieving
unity with the Kurds of Iran or Iraq. This is because of objective reasons.
Other parts of Kurdistan have their own movements, class interests and
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political structures. It is not realistic to claim unity for the Kurds without
considering these dynamics. Unity with the Persians and Arabs will be a
more difficult process. However, these relations will form the core
components of the eventual goal of forming a Middle Eastern federation
which will bring emancipation for all the peoples of the Middle East.230
The concepts of “autonomy” or “federation” did not become part of the PKK’s
party program for the solution to the Kurdish question until after the capture of Öcalan in
1999. A closer reading of Öcalan’s statements and the meeting reports of the PKK
throughout the 1990s, however, clearly indicates that the party questioned the classical
statist approach to the national question and contemplated other possible solutions and
their continued dependence on armed struggle. In the Political Report submitted to the
Fifth Congress of the PKK, Öcalan significantly highlights these issues:
How do we define the concept of “political solution” and considering the
military situation, when can it be possible? Is it realistic to impose
federation in Turkey as a phase in the solution process? What would be
the characteristics of such a federal system and what would be its
relationship with Turkey’s democracy and struggle for democratization?
How can we incorporate the Turkish left and revolutionary forces of
Turkey into this process? What could be the best strategy to develop a
political solution which would be based on establishing relations with
Turkey, other regional states and the United States without sacrificing our
independence and freedom?231
Öcalan’s attempts to connect the solution to the Kurdish question to the
democratization process in Turkey is a clear indication of the PKK’s search for a new
political and ideological perspective that would respond to the changing political
conditions of the post-Cold War world. As his questions in the Fifth Political Report
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suggest, the PKK remained loyal to the emancipatory ideals of socialism and maintained
its interest in acting in concert with the revolutionary forces of Turkey. The main critique
of the Soviet Revolution by the PKK was that it was a victim of vulgar materialism as it
exhausted all the energy of socialism for the growth of the economy, party and state.232
According to the PKK, the state should have been dissolved in the people, but the
experience of socialism showed the process occurred the other way around; the people
were dissolved to the state and the party.233 Thus, for the PKK, establishing a free
individual and society was more vital than establishing a state and party. Accordingly,
socialism in Kurdistan is defined as a great human revolution that does not recognize
borders.
Until the late 1990s, discursive changes within the PKK did not follow a clear
pattern. The party did not abandon its commitment to the construction of a socialist
society, but its critique of the nation-state encouraged an increasing quest for alternative
solutions based on the peaceful coexistence of nationalities without changing existing
borders. In this respect, the global turn towards democracy after the collapse of the
communist regimes played a significant role in the emergence of a “democratic
discourse” as the most appropriate alternative for the PKK as a new strategy that would
respond to the realities of the age and resonate with the growing demands for the
expansion of political struggle.
The clearest indications of change were seen when the PKK declared a unilateral
ceasefire in 1993 in an attempt to promote reconciliation and open the way for dialogue
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and negotiations in order to solve the conflict through political means. Two more
unilateral ceasefires followed in 1995 and 1998. These attempts at reconciliation evolved
into, after 1999, a strategic transformation that truly radicalized the PKK-led Kurdish
movement in Turkey. Contrary to the conventional view that armed struggle radicalized
the Kurdish movement in Turkey, it is, in fact, the PKK’s appropriation of the
“democratic discourse” in the 2000s that represents true radicalization. What makes the
movement “radical” after 1999 is that the PKK no longer sought to simply transform the
Kurdish society, but asked the Turkish state and the other regional states to face their own
democratic deficits. This is a considerably radical demand, particularly in a region where
the primacy of the state over the individual has always been a major barrier to the
establishment of genuine democracy.
The PKK’s Turn to Democratic Discourse
After Öcalan’s capture in 1999, the PKK entered into a comprehensive process of
ideological and organizational reorganization. This process could be characterized as the
implementation phase of the intense theoretical and ideological deliberations of the
1990s. Until the late 1990s, the PKK retained core socialist values, but kept its distance
from “experienced” socialism represented by the Soviet regime. This provided the PKK
with an opportunity to focus on the concepts of “freedom” and “emancipation” as
opposed to socialism cast as a particular political regime. The focus on the individual and
society, and not the state, laid the groundwork for the party’s ultimate turn to democratic
discourse in the 2000s. It was not Öcalan’s arrest that initiated this process, but it
certainly accelerated it by putting pressure on the PKK to reformulate its ideology and
organizational structure.
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The evolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey in the 2000s has three defining
elements that require an in-depth assessment: 1) the political and ideological change
within the PKK, which was shaped largely by Öcalan’s defense texts and prison notes; 2)
the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power, which marked the beginning of
a new phase in the Turkish state’s approach to the Kurdish question; and 3) the increased
influence and visibility of Kurdish parties in the formal political arena, notably the
Democratic Society Party (DTP) and its successor, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
After Öcalan’s capture, the PKK declared a permanent ceasefire in September
1999, in order to open up space for dialogue. This was followed by an extraordinary party
congress in January 2000 in which the PKK’s party program underwent a complete
renewal. The extraordinary congress resulted in the approval of a new program (Program
of 2000), which was a systemized edition of Öcalan’s defenses and included substantial
changes in the party’s national undertakings. In the Program of 2000, “Democratic
Transformation” replaced the concept of “Kurdistan Revolution” and the prime objective
was defined as “bringing the sovereign power of Turkey’s oligarchic structure and its
extensions on the Turkish and Kurdish peoples to an end.”234 The solution to the
“national question” was described as “developing a democratic political system on the
base of Turkey’s political wholeness and constitutional citizenship in which the free
participation of Turkish and Kurdish peoples is realized.”235
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As the Program of 2000 indicates, the change within the PKK was more than a
transformation. According to the structure of the new program, the PKK essentially
declared itself as a party of not only Kurdistan but also Turkey. Nevertheless, it is evident
from Öcalan’s main defense that transformation of the party’s national standpoint did not
mean the abandonment of the Kurdish national cause. Rather, in parallel with the
theoretical discussions of the 1990s, Öcalan saw the role of the PKK and the Kurdish
movement as fundamental to the goal of furthering the solution of the national question
within the framework of democratic transformation. The first sentence of the introduction
to his main defense makes this point clear:
My defense is not so much based on detailed replies to the charges in the
indictment prepared by the Chief Prosecutor [of the State Security Court],
as it is about what I see as a more important topic: how to reach an historic
reconciliation from a revolt under the leadership of the PKK, and increase
the possibility of a solution to the Kurdish issue.236
After 2000, the PKK’s ideological framework was established on the basis of
Öcalan’s defense texts, which were published and accepted in the PKK congresses as the
official party line. Within the defense texts he submitted to the Turkish courts and the
European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan highlighted two concepts: “Democratic
Republic” and “Democratic Confederalism.” Öcalan outlines an historical analysis of
civilization, starting in the Middle East, and concludes it is the state that is the “original
sin” of humanity.237 The democratic civilization that Öcalan’s defenses aspire to
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construct in the region aims for a radical transformation of the entire Middle East through
the development of pluralist democracy and civil society.238
Öcalan’s proposed solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey is conceived in the
light of his decentralized and democratized vision of the Middle East, in which he
considers the PKK as the locus of the process of transformation. Öcalan sees the
development and deepening of democracy as the key to the establishment of a
Democratic Republic of Turkey, which will provide a lasting solution to the Kurdish
question. The main mechanism for the unification of the Kurds, according to Öcalan, is
the establishment of a democratic confederalism, which refers to the formation of selfgoverning bodies throughout Kurdistan. The mechanism will offer a way out of the
current stalemate characterized by the highly centralized states in the region and pave the
way for the establishment of a Democratic Middle Eastern Union in the long run.
In order to complement this ideological transformation, the PKK also underwent a
process of organizational change and renewal. In its seventh extraordinary congress, the
PKK first reorganized its guerilla forces, which resulted in the abolition of the old army
front structure and replaced it with a new body, HPG (People’s Defense Forces). Not
merely a technical adjustment, the new organization introduced the PKK’s new military
strategy, which was designed according to the party’s new programmatic focus on
“democratic transformation” and political struggle rather than armed struggle. The
concept of “legitimate defense” was introduced to characterize the new military strategy,
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which maintained the PKK’s capacity to carry out an armed campaign should the
democratic political solution fail or the movement come under attack.239
In the eighth congress of the PKK, which was held in 2002, the PKK converted
itself from a party to a congress under the name KADEK (The Kurdistan Freedom and
Democracy Congress). It declared the conversion from “party” to “congress” better
captured the movement’s aspiration to become a non-power-envisaging entity. KADEK’s
mission was explained as one of coordinating the various new organizations necessary to
the democratic transformation project in Kurdistan. Within this framework, the Congress’
program conceptualized as a long-term objective the democratization of state and society
across the countries in the Middle East with a Kurdish population and the construction of
a Democratic Middle Eastern Union. In line with this objective, different parties were
founded in other parts of Kurdistan in 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively: the Kurdistan
Democratic Solution Party (PÇDK) in Iraq, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria
and the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran.
KADEK was replaced by Kongra-Gel in November 2003, and was renamed as the
PKK in 2005. Another body called the Council of Associations of Kurdistan (KKK) was
established in 2005, which later took the name the Council of Communities of Kurdistan
(KCK). The KCK was founded to put into practice the idea of democratic confederalism
proposed by Öcalan in his defense to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in
2004, and as an alternative institutional framework to the nation-state system in the
Middle East. As a loosely united confederal entity, the proposed political structure would
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neither challenge the established and internationally recognized boundaries nor resort to
nationalism or attempt to establish a nation-state.240
Since his arrest in 1999 until 2005, Öcalan came under much criticism on grounds
that the changes he proposed were no more than tactical moves. In response to these
criticisms, Öcalan defined himself as pursuing a realistic policy by adopting alternative
perspectives beyond the idealized solutions of “unlimited autonomy” or a “perfect state.”
He asserts that the alternative options serve the purpose of maintaining the movement and
provide for the development of a political solution without sacrificing the goal of
independent Kurdistan:
We need not abandon our principles in order to pursue a realistic policy.
Herein we find the reason that prevents a solution to the Kurdish question:
Dogmatism is confused with principle; compromise with surrender.241
From 1999 to 2005, the PKK faced various difficulties including opposition from
within the organization, which resulted in a serious split in 2005, and growing frustration
among the party’s supporters due to lack of progress despite the permanent cease-fire and
dramatic transformations with regard to the movement’s goals. The PKK’s strategic
transformation did not fully lead to its acceptance as a democratic movement advocating
for political change through non-violent means, at least on the part of the Turkish state
and public in general. However, it gradually lessened the antagonistic state of relations in
Turkey and put increasing pressure on the government to pursue a democratic solution.
Through intensive theoretical and ideological deliberation, Öcalan and the PKK managed
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to get the movement in order by 2005. Despite sporadic flare-ups, armed conflict did not
return to the levels of the 1980s and 1990s.
The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish Question
After Öcalan’s capture, Turkey was at a vulnerable crossroad. Benefiting from the
nationalist pride Öcalan’s capture had elicited among many Turks, ultra-nationalist
parties made a strong showing in Turkey’s parliamentary elections held on April 18,
1999.242 On the other hand, against the backdrop of Turkish nationalist pride, Öcalan’s
capture led to a spasm of Kurdish violence in Turkey and Europe. Instead of issuing a
hard-line appeal for renewed struggle during his trial for treason that ended on June 29,
1999 with a sentence of death, Öcalan issued his call for the implementation of true
democracy to solve the Kurdish problem within the existing borders of Turkey.243
Öcalan’s call for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem played a significant role in
preventing the outbreak of a zero-sum game that would bring Turkish and Kurdish
nationalists into a violent confrontation. It is significant that both the implicit and explicit
negotiations that took place between the state and the PKK since 1999, have been built on
this emergent opportunity to solve the Kurdish issue within a democratic framework,
which would result in a win-win situation for both sides.
The Turkish state’s ability to take up Öcalan’s offer in 1999 followed an unsteady
path. The decision of the government on January 12, 2000, to comply with the request of
the ECHR for a stay of Öcalan’s execution was a clear indication of the government’s
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recognition of Öcalan’s role in preventing the revival of armed conflict, which was
essential to the development and deepening of democratization. Furthermore, a process of
implicit bargaining began between the state and the PKK shortly after the capture of
Öcalan, which led to several steps taken both by sides. The PKK decided to withdraw its
guerilla forces out of Turkey upon Öcalan’s order to end armed conflict shortly after his
conviction. In August 1999, President Süleyman Demirel met with mayors from the proKurdish People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) in order to engage in broad discussions,
which was a clear signal the state was willing to recognize openly the legitimacy of
certain forms of Kurdish political activity.244
The process of implicit bargaining between the state and the PKK remained
dominated by uncertain policy responses within the Turkish political system, which can
be attributed to the continued influence of Turkey’s military establishment in the political
arena as well as the concerns of the fragile coalition government in maintaining stability
by avoiding open negotiation with either Öcalan or the PKK. The sudden arrest of three
HADEP majors in February 2000, the reluctance to permit Öcalan to make statements to
the press and restrictions put on his access to his lawyers, the continued emergency rule
in several southeastern provinces despite the PKK’s abandonment of guerilla struggle,
and finally, the Turkish military attack on the PKK units in northern Iraq in April 2000
were evidence that the Turkish government would continue to pursue its own agenda.
Nevertheless, although the progress towards a political solution was slow, Turkish public
opinion regarding the Kurdish question changed dramatically in the wake of Öcalan’s
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trial, which promised hope for the future establishment of peace and democracy in
Turkey.245
The rise of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in
November 2002 opened a new chapter regarding the approach of the state towards the
Kurdish question for several reasons. The main barrier to finding a political solution to
the Kurdish question in Turkey has always been the fact that there was a major conflict
between the state and the Kurdish actors over the conceptualization of the Kurdish
question and the foundations of the Turkish Republic. The leaders of Turkish political
establishment were all from secular parties, the products of education and political
experience imbued with nationalist and Kemalist beliefs, which represented the very
ideologies the Kurdish movement struggled against.246 Until the early 1990s, the official
approach of the state towards the Kurdish question was defined by its complete rejection
of the problem. By the early 1990s, however, the government authorities started to make
statements suggesting they recognized the “Kurdish reality” in Turkey.247 However, these
rhetorical changes never translated into concrete practices in the political realm because
of the failure to develop policies outside the Kemalist framework.
The pro-Islamic AKP came to power in 2002 with a commitment to address the
Kurdish question. The main difference between the AKP and its predecessors was that
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the AKP represented an ideology that shares common faith with Kurdish nationalism in
that Islamism, like Kurdish nationalism, was defined as an existential threat to Kemalism
since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. At its launching in 2001, the AKP’s party
program was skillfully crafted around universal themes of democracy and justice,
expressed in a litany of phrases designed to resonate favorably with a wide cross-section
of voters.248 In this context, there had been high expectations that the AKP government
would address the Kurdish question from a democratic perspective. During the AKP’s
eleven-year rule, Turkey witnessed a number of important developments regarding both
the solution of the Kurdish question and democratization in Turkey. However, the
question of whether these developments established real political change or followed the
same general direction of their predecessors, but within an Islamic framework, remained
questionable. More importantly, the question the extent to which these developments
were viewed as “change” from the perspective of the Kurds requires analysis.
Islamist discourse views the Kurds as fellow victims of the secular Kemalist
republic and acknowledges them as people with a language and identity of their own.249
As a party that seeks to appeal to a wide cross-section of voters, AKP chose to present
itself as a “democratic conservative” party which can be defined as a pragmatic mix of a
general commitment to Islamic values with universal themes of justice, democracy and
human rights. Regarding the Kurdish question, AKP’s program put emphasis on “respect
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for cultural diversities within the framework of the democratic state of law,”250 but did
not put forward any concrete proposals. This strategy of avoiding specific policy
commitments combined with moderate/conservative ideology allowed the AKP to appeal
to various political groups that shared the common goal of a change of government,
including the Kurds who saw the AKP as a potential challenger to the Kemalist
establishment. However, after the AKP’s transition from opposition to power in
November 2002, it became difficult for the party’s leaders to confine themselves to
generalities. With no guidance to be found in their party’s Program and having not
previously held office, AKP had two options: either continue in the same general policy
direction as its predecessors or head in some new and untried direction.251 AKP opted for
the status-quo.
Throughout the AKP’s administration, the Kurdish question remained one of the
top items on Turkey’s political agenda, particularly during the AKP’s second and third
terms in office. Nevertheless, despite periods of both implicit and explicit negotiations
between the state and the PKK, the AKP failed to develop any coherent policy on this
most critical issue. The reason for this failure lies in the defining characteristics of the
AKP’s approach to the Kurdish question, which can be summarized in the following way:
the Kurdish problem is not about nationalism but rather forced secularism and Turkish
nationalism of the type enforced by Kemalist ideology.252 Different from its predecessors,
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AKP recognizes the “Kurdishness” of the Kurdish question, but calls for the
subordination of such an identity to an Islamic one. In other words, from the perspective
of the AKP, if Kurdishness is transformed and defined within an Islamic framework, then
there will be no Kurdish question left to ponder. Thus, compared to its predecessors,
AKP takes a different track with a similar bent, adopting an Islamist discourse but
remaining loyal to the same statist framework as Kemalism, which was founded on the
very exclusion of the Kurds. AKP’s strategy can be best described as “inclusion through
exclusion,” which is based on the popularization of an alternative conception of
Kurdishness aimed at discrediting the PKK-led Kurdish movement and presenting the
AKP as the only genuine representative of the Kurds in Turkey.
Why, then, did the AKP consistently seek dialogue and negotiate with the leaders
of the PKK, especially after 2007, which marks the beginning of its second term in
office? This can be explained by two important dynamics: 1) the emergence of a new
wave of political mobilization led by the PKK that has effectively used both armed
struggle and peaceful protest since 2005; and 2) the AKP government’s commitment to
control the field of Kurdish politics in order to prevent possible PKK-led instabilities that
would undermine its political power, particularly in the context of its fierce fight with the
Kemalists to control state power.253
The eleven-year rule of the AKP witnessed a fierce competition of power between
the AKP-led moderate Islamists and Turkey’s Kemalist establishment, represented
mainly by the Turkish military, which resulted in the clear victory of the former in 2010.
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All engagements of the AKP, both with the PKK and the Kurdish parties in the formal
political arena until the 2011 parliamentary elections, need to be understood within the
context of this power struggle. During the five-year unilateral ceasefire declared by the
PKK following Öcalan’s capture, the cessation of political violence was portrayed by the
Turkish military simply as an indication of the PKK’s weakened military capabilities.
The power of the AKP, on the other hand, was considerably fragile during its first term
and the party’s primary concern was possible threats from the Turkish military.
In this context, the PKK did not pose a major challenge to the AKP government
until the completion of its ideological and organizational transformation in 2005. During
this early period, AKP’s attention to the Kurdish question revolved mainly around
building on the reforms that had already been enacted by the previous government within
the framework of Turkey’s EU accession requirements. These measures were generally
well received by the Kurds who saw them as a sign the Turkish state was finally
beginning to fix past wrongs. Nevertheless, while removing some of the restrictions on
Kurdish cultural expression, AKP carefully avoided engaging in any discussion about
more politically sensitive demands such as the right to education in the mother tongue
and administrative decentralization, which would risk unleashing a fierce national debate
and put the government into conflict with Turkish nationalists and the Kemalist
establishment.
The AKP’s tentativeness gradually created skepticism among the Kurds that the
AKP government was not genuine in its dealings with the Kurdish question. The PKK’s
decision to call off the five-year cease-fire in June 2004, further complicated the AKP’s
Kurdish policy. Confrontations between the PKK and the Turkish military proved that the
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PKK had maintained its capacity for armed resistance, while on the political; the Kurdish
movement displayed growing success in successive elections from 2004 to 2011,
increasing both the representatives in the Turkish parliament and winning the majority of
municipalities in the Kurdish areas. These positive developments for the Kurds created an
urgency on the part of the AKP to refine its policies to manage the growing Kurdish
challenge.
The Democratic Opening and the Oslo Process
Since the end of its first term in office in 2007, the AKP followed a two-fold
strategy in its approach to the Kurdish question. The first strategy was to engage in
negotiations with the leaders of the PKK at the Oslo talks, which started with preliminary
contacts in 2006, continued with face-to-face negotiations from 2008 to 2010, and came
to a halt in 2011. The unilateral ceasefire declared by the PKK in October 2006 needs to
be seen in this light. The Oslo talks took place between the PKK and Turkish officials
from the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in complete secrecy and were aimed
at negotiating confidence-building measures, controlling the armed conflicts and possibly
reaching a final settlement on the issue.254 As part of the confidence-building efforts the
two sides agreed in October 2009 on an initial return of thirty-four PKK fighters and
refugees through the Habur post on Iraq’s border. Nevertheless, Habur process collapsed
when the Kurds went to the border to celebrate the return of the guerillas and refugees,
which was immediately depicted by the Turkish nationalists and the media as the PKK’s
proclamation of “victory” and an insult to the Turkish national identity. The government
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came under heavy pressure by the hard-line nationalists and the Kemalist opposition, and
the process failed to serve its purpose when the returnees were later charged in Turkish
courts, many of fled back to Iraq, and a planned return of diaspora exiles in Europe was
cancelled.255 Öcalan’s lawyers explain the Habur incident as follows:
Thousands of Kurds went to Habur to celebrate the return of guerillas.
There was a reason for that. For the first time, their children were back
home alive and not in coffins. For the first time, there was hope for peace.
This was the reason for all the joy and happiness. However, upon reactions
from the media and opposition parties, the government instantly stepped
back. The idea of peace groups was negotiated between the government
and Öcalan. They knew that the groups would come to Turkey. If the
government was brave enough to stand by the Habur process and declared
its support for the return of other peace groups, today we might have been
at a completely different point within the peace process.256
What is wrong with people cheering for peace? The reactions of the
government and society are completely psychological and a result of
sovereign mentality. It was thought that the whole idea of peace groups is
turning into a demonstration of the PKK’s victory and the defeat of the
government and Turkish army. Turkish society lost thousands of its
children in this conflict. So, it was hard for a lot of people to put up with
those scenes. It could have worked if the government was able to
administer the process properly. The peace process could have continued
if the government declared that those demonstrations were about peace
and not victory. There are no winners and losers in a peace process. Peace
is a win-win situation for all parties.257
The second strategy of the AKP towards the Kurdish question in the post-2007
period is the so-called “Kurdish opening,” which was initiated in July 2009 with the
purpose of finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question. Although it was
depicted as a genuine attempt by the government to settle the Kurdish question, the
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initiative was not a “spontaneous” act of democratization. There were ongoing lowintensity confrontations between the Turkish military and the PKK in northern Iraq from
early 2008. In order to break the stalemate, in early 2009, Öcalan declared that he would
announce a “road map for the resolution of the Kurdish question” by August. Öcalan’s
declaration created a momentum within the government to pre-empt his plan and
announce a counter “Kurdish initiative” that would render Öcalan’s plan useless.258
Furthermore, in the municipal elections of March 2009, AKP lost against the pro-Kurdish
Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the predominantly Kurdish towns in southeastern
Turkey. Thus, the AKP’s Kurdish opening was indeed a response to Öcalan’s road map
and its decreasing electoral popularity among the Kurds.
After the initiation of the opening, AKP made a substantial effort to make sure it
was pursuing all possible options without Öcalan’s involvement. To this end, when
Öcalan finally gave his ‘road map’ document to his lawyers in August, it was confiscated
by the İmrali prison administration.259 The credibility of the Kurdish opening, however,
soon became questionable. First, the opening was born into an environment dominated by
a repressive campaign against the Kurdish politicians and activists called “the KCK
operations,” which started two weeks after the victory of the Kurdish movement in
municipal elections in March 2009. Systematic waves of repression continued throughout
the opening and led to the arrest of more than 1500 politicians, human rights activists,
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writers, artisans, and leaders of civil society organizations.260 Consequently, in the eyes
of the Kurds, the credibility of both the AKP and its Kurdish initiative was considerably
damaged due to the fact that the opening went hand-in-hand with an official strategy
aimed at paralyzing the legal Kurdish movement by closing the political system to it.
Second, AKP failed to engage the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP),
one of the three opposition parties in the Turkish parliament, because of the DTP’s
refusal to condemn the PKK, as demanded by the government as a precondition for
negotiations. The other two opposition parties in the parliament, the Kemalist CHP
(Republication People’s Party) and ultra-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party)
also rejected the initiative as it soon became evident the AKP did not have any specific
proposals regarding the opening. In addition, shortly after the Chief of General Staff İlker
Başbuğ’s statement on August 25, 2009, regarding the military’s commitment to unitary
and Turkish character of the republic, the “Kurdish” part of the initiative disappeared
from the AKP’s discourse and the title of the plan became “democratic opening.”
In late October 2009, the Habur incident brought the stalling democratic opening
to a full halt. The Constitutional Court’s decision to ban the DTP for its alleged
association with the PKK only made matters worse. The Peace and Democracy Party
(BDP) quickly succeeded the DTP, but mass arrests and detentions against the BDP party
members continued within the framework of the KCK operations. The democratic
initiative news gradually disappeared from the media agenda only to be revived by the
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AKP in January 2010, this time titled “National Unity and Brotherhood Project,” which
was more of a move to save face rather than a direct contribution to the process.
The Limits of the AKP’s Kurdish Policy
The main problem with the AKP’s Kurdish opening was that it was not designed
as a genuine attempt to solve the Kurdish question in dialogue with the Kurdish political
actors. Rather, it was initiated as part of the AKP’s “containment” strategy towards the
Kurdish movement, particularly in formal politics, in order to strengthen the claim that
the AKP was the only true representative of the Kurds in Turkey.261 While the legal
Kurdish movement was suppressed through the KCK operations, Öcalan was specifically
kept out of the democratic opening process in order to consolidate the position of the
AKP as the sole agent of the solution. Nevertheless, secretive talks with Öcalan and
leaders of the PKK were already occurring through the Oslo process. The AKP did not
succeed in administrating these parallel processes in a coherent way mainly because of its
greater commitment to win the fight against the Kemalist establishment over providing a
genuine solution to the Kurdish question.
From early 2010 until the June 2011 parliamentary elections, the process of
finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question was stalled. The Kurdish actors
continued to put forward proposals for negotiation, but did not receive any concrete
responses from the government. On the political front, the pro-Kurdish non-governmental
organization, Democratic Society Congress (DTK), and the BDP were voicing a solution
titled “Democratic Autonomy,” which was an attempt to forge a new political paradigm
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based on the direct exercise of people’s power through village, town and city councils.262
Instead of autonomy based on “ethnicity” or “territory,” it suggested regional and local
structures that would allow for the expression of cultural differences.263 In this respect,
the democratic autonomy project is built on the idea of developing the autonomous
capacities of people, through a more direct, less representative form of political structure
that could be applied not only to the Kurdish region, but to the whole of Turkey.
The democratic autonomy model is in line with the guidelines already listed in the
European Charter of Local Self-Government adopted in 1985, and was ratified by fortyone countries, including Turkey (with numerous reservations). The removal of the
reservations and full implementation of the Charter has been part of Turkey’s EU
accession requirements since 2005. In that sense, one might argue that the democratic
autonomy model as well as the BDP’s and Öcalan’s earlier calls for local autonomy
would bring Turkey into conformity with the EU guidelines. Although the democratic
autonomy proposal did not receive any concrete policy responses from the government, it
started a heated debate in Turkey regarding strengthening of local administrations. In
2010 and 2011, the debate on democratic autonomy and local administrations also
initiated a renewed phase of rapprochement between the Kurds and the Turkish left
around the common theme of deepening the process of democratization in Turkey. This
process paved the way for a wider political realignment in the June 2011 parliamentary
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elections when the BDP formed a coalition with some twenty socialist parties and
movements, which won thirty-six parliamentary seats.
On the part of the PKK and Öcalan, the Oslo talks continued until the June 2011
elections. Öcalan prepared three protocols on the principles to be followed and actions to
be taken for ultimate peace. Some of the specific suggestions were the formation of a
peace council, truth commissions, a democratic constitution, mutual forgiveness, political
decentralization and recognition of Kurdish collective rights.264 Nevertheless, although
Turkish authorities repeatedly stated the government would deliver its decision regarding
the protocols after the parliamentary elections, the expected meeting did not take place,
which practically ended the Oslo process. In the meantime, the AKP succeeded in taking
the army and other elements of Kemalist bureaucracy under its tight control in 2011, and
won its third election victory in June 2011 by getting fifty percent of the votes. Remzi
Kartal explains how these developments were interpreted by the PKK:
Democratic opening was not an initiative planned by the AKP. It was the
AKP’s response to its defeat in southeastern Turkey in the 2009 municipal
elections and to the public discussion which started as a result of Öcalan’s
proposed road map. AKP started this initiative but it had no preparation or
a specific project. That’s why it failed. That’s also the reason why the
Habur process collapsed. In order to overcome the stalemate, once again,
Öcalan made a call and the PKK declared “no-action period” until the
2011 general elections. The PKK supported the AKP against the Turkish
military with the expectation that the government will take the necessary
steps for the solution of the Kurdish question after the elections. In the
meantime, however, the AKP eliminated the power of the military and we
saw that nothing changed after the elections. For us, the AKP government
no longer has any credibility. From now on, progress on the solution of the
Kurdish issue can be achieved only through mutual effort.265
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From the perspective of the PKK, both the democratic opening and the Oslo
negotiations were designed by the government as tactical diversions in order to both win
the fight against the Kemalist establishment and implement a successful election
campaign during the PKK’s “no-action period.” As the AKP lost its credibility in the
eyes of the PKK, armed conflict resumed in 2011, shortly after the parliamentary
elections and increasingly continued in 2012, until the historic Newroz statement of
Öcalan. The statement renewed hope for peace and marked the beginning of yet another
process of negotiation between the state and the Kurdish actors, this time openly
including the PKK, Öcalan and the legal Kurdish parties.
The AKP’s victory against the Kemalists was a positive step towards Turkey’s
democratization, particularly in terms of eliminating the influence of the military in
politics. However, marginalization of Kemalism in Turkey during the AKP’s rule was
largely a consequence of the steps taken by the AKP to solve of the Kurdish question.
Since the beginning of the AKP’s first term in office, it was mainly the Kurdish issue,
particularly the PKK, that shaped the course of power struggles between the AKP and the
Kemalists. In this context, political violence pursued by the PKK was the biggest
challenge facing the AKP in its struggle against the military. The AKP-PKK negotiations
should be understood in this light. The democratic opening and the Oslo process were
essentially part of the AKP’s containment policy towards the Kurdish movement. The
unintended consequence of this process was that it encouraged a shift in the “way of
looking” at politics in Turkey, particularly regarding some important domestic issues
which have long been considered as taboo.
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When a tape recording of the Oslo meetings was leaked to the media in
September 2011, the incident did not lead to a public indignation, which was a major
indication of strong public support for peace through negotiations with not only the legal
Kurdish parties, but also with the Kurdish actors that have long been considered as
“terrorists” and “separatists.” It is important to recognize the role of the Kurdish
movement in encouraging this shift in the mindset of Turkish society, which has made it
possible for the AKP to carry out open negotiations with all the actors of the Kurdish
movement, legal and illegal, since March 2013.
The Road Ahead
The AKP’s engagement with the Kurdish question has not brought sustainable
results mainly because the AKP replaced the power of Kemalism in Turkey not with the
power of people, but with its own party establishment. Therefore, the conflict between
the state and the Kurdish movement over the conceptualization of the Kurdish question,
which has been the fundamental barrier to any meaningful solution, still prevails. The
risky nature of “peace,” which requires transformation of Turkey’s ideological and
political structures that have long been based on specific ethno-national hierarchies, is
still largely in contradiction to the AKP’s pragmatic, cautious and risk-averse approach to
the Kurdish question.
Nevertheless, alongside the debate over whether the negotiations between the
state and the Kurdish movement were a “success” or a “failure,” it should also be
recognized that the democratization discourse has gained considerable strength in Turkey
since 2007. In their quest for a new definition of governance and citizenship in Turkey,
the Kurdish actors saw the AKP’s rise to power as an opportunity for establishing
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genuine peace and democracy in Turkey. Given the fifty percent voter support behind the
AKP, the political environment in Turkey from 2007 to 2011 offered an opportunity to
solve a number of important political problems, including the Kurdish question, through
public consensus. The opportunity was missed, but the increased democratic
consciousness in the country came back to haunt the AKP government in 2013 when the
government faced mass-based protests known as the “Gezi Movement.”
The Gezi movement started as a protest against the implementation of an urban
management project in Istanbul in June 2013, but quickly gained momentum and spread
to other cities. In a matter of days, the Gezi movement became a broad-based civilian
resistance and expanded beyond its environmentalist focus to include subjects such as the
restrictions on freedom of expression and the crackdown on opposition in Turkey. The
AKP survived the Gezi protests, but its hold on power was severely shaken. By the end of
2013, the AKP was also shaken by serious corruption charges, which put the legitimacy
of the party at further risk.
What makes this picture even more complicated is the slow pace of negotiations
with the Kurds since March 2013, and the approaching local and general elections in
Turkey in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Under these conditions, the AKP has once again
turned to the Kurdish movement in order to maintain its power. As part of its preparation
strategy for the elections, the AKP is increasingly using the Kurdish question and the
nascent negotiation process with the PKK and Öcalan in order to strengthen its political
leverage. The main manifestation of this strategy so far is the AKP’s efforts to establish a
direct connection between the fate of the solution process and the continuation of the
AKP’s majority power in the parliament. Considering the lessons of the past, it is
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unlikely the Kurdish movement will continue to support the ongoing peace process unless
genuine steps are taken by the AKP.266 First and foremost, these steps must include the
necessary constitutional changes to provide all ethno-national groups in Turkey with
equal rights as well as the dismantling of centralized political structures.
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CHAPTER V
KURDS IN SYRIA
We demand a fundamental change to the oppressive system. There are
some who hold up the slogan: the fall of the regime. In contrast we
demand the fall of the oppressive authoritarian system. Our problems are
not problems of powers. The ruling powers in Damascus come and go. For
us Kurds, this isn't so important. What is important is that we Kurds assert
our existence. The current regime does not accept us, nor do those who
will potentially come into power. Our politics differ from a politics that
seeks power. That needs to be clear.267
Syria is the last destination of the wave of uprisings in the Arab world that started
in Tunisia in early 2011, and gradually spread to a large number of countries in the
Middle East. Although the outcome of the Syrian revolution remains unforeseeable given
the violent handling of protestors by the Syrian regime, and a heterogeneous and
fragmented protest movement, there is an increasing demand for the fall of the regime.
Nonetheless, as the statement made by the chairman of the Democratic Union Party
(PYD), one of the most influential Kurdish parties in Syria, indicates, the Kurdish
position concerning the recent political developments in Syria differs fundamentally from
the position of the Syrian opposition regarding the issues of regime change and
democratization in the country.
As the political events in Syria unfolded since March 2011, the relationship of the
Kurdish parties to the Syrian opposition has become one of the most controversial
matters in Syrian politics. Although they share the Arab oppositional groups’ discontent
with the current regime, the Kurds’ participation in the Syrian uprising was limited and
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their regions remained have relatively calm. Since the beginning of the protest
movement, the Kurds in Syria followed the strategy of becoming part of the revolution in
order to further strengthen their case and criticize the dominant positions of both the
regime and the opposition from a specific political position. In this regard, they
demonstrated less for “toppling the regime” than for the Kurdish right to selfdetermination and “changing the entire system.”
Until the Qamishli revolt of 2004, and particularly the Syrian uprising of 2011,
the Kurdish question in Syria was overlooked both by the academic and policymaking
communities, while attention has been lavished mainly on the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq,
and more modestly on the Kurds of Iran. This situation is often explained by the fact that
the Kurds of Syria are less numerous than those of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, and more
geographically dispersed, which accounts for their weaker mobilization in challenging
the government in demand of their rights.268 Moreover, a major factor that distinguishes
the Syrian Kurdish movement from its counterparts in Turkey, Iran and Iraq is that the
Syrian Kurds have never taken up arms against the government of Damascus, while
armed struggle has represented the primary mode of opposition for the Kurdish
movements elsewhere. Therefore, the process through which the Syrian Kurdish parties
were able to promote the “Kurdish issue” as a political problem to be resolved in Syria –
a situation which normally emerged after a period of armed conflict in other parts of
Kurdistan – was slower compared to Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
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The Kurds constitute the largest ethnic minority in Syria, making up almost ten
percent of the population, a not-inconsiderable proportion of Syrian society, and they
have their own distinct language, culture and ethnic identity.269 Although the Kurdish
movement in Syria was not as effective as it was in Turkey, Iran and Iraq in terms of
influencing the movement for change, it played a significant role in linking the ethnic
question to political goals in the country throughout the 1950s, and later during the
Baathist regime.
The growth of a national consciousness among the Syrian Kurds was affected
largely by the arrival of Kurdish immigrants in Syria from Turkey where they faced
persecution following the Kemalist rule’s brutal suppression of the Shaykh Said revolt of
1926. In the long term, the Kurdish movement in Syria became an autonomous struggle
in an environment promoting the growth and affirmation of Arab nationalism, a powerful
antagonist to the aspirations of the Kurds. Since the 1990s, the steady increase in Kurdish
outspokenness in articulating their demands in Syria, combined with dramatic changes in
the Kurdish political landscape at the regional level, resulted in renewed efforts by the
Syrian Kurds to assert themselves as important political players in their own right. These
efforts gradually expanded the boundaries of the “Kurdish problem” in Syria beyond the
narrow limits of an “identity movement” to encompass the broader role of a
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“democratization” movement and respect for the human rights of all, a theme to which
various groups could relate.
Institutionalization of Kurdish Nationalism in Syria
The Kurdish struggle to present their grievances by mobilizing through political
parties dates back to the establishment of Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS) in
1957. In fact, there have been many Kurds in positions of power and influence in Syria
since the beginning of the French mandatory period through employment in the military
and as deputies in the Syrian Parliament. Nevertheless, the Kurdish members of the
parliament never presented themselves under the banner of a nationalist discourse,
proclaimed their Kurdish background or promoted specifically Kurdish interests. They
were considered “independents” who did not seek to create a political apparatus around
their ethnic origin. Therefore, for the better part of the 1950s, the militancy of the
politicized Kurds was associated with the Syrian Communist Party (SCP).270
Towards the end of the French mandate in Syria, the political engagement of the
Kurds could be classified into three camps: Arab nationalism, Communism, and Kurdish
nationalism.271 Some of the Kurdish tribes supported the Syrian independence movement
in 1946 alongside Arab tribes. In the absence of any well-defined Kurdish groups or
political parties with a Kurdish nationalist agenda, some of the politically engaged Kurds
sympathized with the SCP in late 1940s. During that time, there was a widely held
perception among minorities of the Middle East that communism might be their only
bulwark against the pan-Arabist plan. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the SCP largely
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influenced the development of Kurdish nationalist politics, the conflict between
nationalism and communism soon resulted in the dilution of the Kurdish identity of the
party. The reluctance of the SCP to support Kurdish nationalist aspirations made it
necessary for the Kurds to create an organization that was both left wing and nationalist.
The foundation of the KDPS addressed this demand by introducing the first
popular Kurdish national party on the Syrian political scene. Syrian-Arab official
discrimination against the Kurds, which became prominent after Syria gained
independence from France in 1946, was the major impetus behind the rise of Kurdish
nationalist activity in Syria. The struggle for Syrian independence was primarily fought
not in terms of a “Syrian” nationalist discourse, but as one of “Arab” nationalism, which
established pan-Arabism as the official ideology of the new state.272 The creation of the
KDPS was a reaction to the ascending Arab nationalism in Syria in the 1950s and the
exclusionary character of the emerging Syrian national identity, which denied the multiethnic and multi-religious make-up of the country.
The KDPS embraced the Syrian state as the institutional framework within which
the rights of the Kurds would be sought, yet the party program explicitly promoted a
nationalist discourse with a strong ethnic tone. Paragraph one of the program states that
the party was founded in order to “protect the Kurds from mistakes, oppression, and from
disappearing.”273 Paragraph four defines the goal of the party with regard to the Kurdish
question by stating that “ . . . the KDPS demands special status for the four hundred
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thousand Kurds in the Jazirah, in ‘Ayn al-‘Arab, and Çiyayê Kurmênc (Afrin region), in
order to ensure their political, social, and cultural rights within the Syrian state.”274
Paragraph two of the program not only takes a position on the form of
government sought, but also sets forth the understanding that it is only through
democracy that Kurdish rights can be secured: “Because the Syrian Democratic Kurds’
Party is a peace-loving and progressive party, it champions a people’s democracy in its
homeland Syria.”275 Along with Kurdish nationalist positions, the program also reflects
leftist principles and ideas. Paragraph five states: “The KDPS welcomes the Kurdish fight
in Turkey, in Iran, and in Iraq, as well as the fight of all oppressed peoples for the
liberation of their states from the imperialists. The KDPS will lend them a hand so that
they secure their freedom.”276 Here it becomes clear the party had a regional approach to
the Kurdish issue and adopted a broad conception of liberation that pertains not only to
the Kurds but to all the oppressed people in the region.
From its foundation in 1957 to the 1990s, the KDPS suffered heavily from splits
deriving from internal divisions and ideological differences. Factionalism and
fragmentation took a serious toll on Syrian Kurdish politics and created constant
frustration on the part of ordinary Kurds who hoped for political strength. Nevertheless,
the KDPS laid the foundations for the institutionalization of the Syrian Kurdish political
scene and provided Kurdish nationalism in Syria with an organizational framework. The
party was influenced greatly by regional events, particularly the evolution of the Kurdish
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problem in Iraq. The leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq played a decisive
role in the building of the KDPS program, which later served as a platform for the Iraqi
Kurdish parties to influence Kurdish politics in Syria.
Anti-Kurdish sentiment increased in Syria particularly after the union between
Syria and Egypt in 1958. The newly created United Arab Republic (UAR) adopted a
fiercely Arab nationalist rhetoric, which intensified anti-Kurdish propaganda and a
campaign of arrest and detention against Kurdish political activists. In 1960, Gamal
Abdul Nasser’s rule imposed a heavy crackdown on the nascent Kurdish political
movement in Syria and arrested large numbers of members and associates of the KDPS.
Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s uprising in Iraq in 1961 further fueled fears of a similar
uprising in Syria and reinforced the perception that the Kurds posed a threat to Syria’s
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity. In the provisional constitution drafted after
the collapse of the UAR in 1961, Syria was formally described for the first time as the
“Syrian Arab Republic,” which marked the denial of non-Arabs in the official ideology.
This was followed by an extraordinary census in 1962 in al-Hasaka province, which
arbitrarily stripped 120,000 to 150,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship, leaving them without
basic civil rights, and condemned to poverty and discrimination.277 The census allowed
Syrian Kurds to pitch deeply into the discourse of victimhood, which continued to define
Kurdish nationalism in Syria over the subsequent decades under the Baath rule.
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Hafez Al-Assad’s Game
Kurdish nationalism in Syria was largely dormant during the 1970s and 1980s
because of the weight of official suppression. Nevertheless, the reawakening of Kurdish
political activity in the 1990s, which eventually culminated in the events of 2004, has its
roots in the Baath era under the presidency of Hafiz Al-Assad. After the Syrian Baathists
came to power in 1963, the KDPS was banned and the party leaders were thrown into
prison. The Baathists attached great importance to the consolidation of the status of Arab
nationalism as the central element of Syrian political culture, started a relentless
Arabization campaign in the Kurdish inhabited areas of Syria278 and increased coercion
on the cultural, economic, and political life of the Kurds.
While the Baath policy towards the Kurds from 1963 to 1970 was marked by
coercion as a method of managing the Kurdish problem, after Hafiz Al-Assad came to
power in 1970, the regime adopted a more pragmatic approach by pursuing a policy of
cooptation towards the Kurdish groups both within and outside of Syria. In Syria, besides
the policy of repressing Kurdish political and cultural activity, Hafiz Al-Assad
encouraged Kurdish participation in the Baath system. The Kurds were given positions in
the military and the parliament only on the condition they would not embrace any
particular consciousness with regard to Kurdish identity. Outside the borders of Syria, the
regime provided the Kurdish groups fighting against Turkey and Iraq with relative
freedom of action in Syria from the 1970s until the late 1990s, as part of its strategy to
displace “its” Kurdish problem to the neighboring countries. This policy of cooptation
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towards the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq not only served to facilitate the achievement of
Assad’s regional ambitions, but also enabled him to keep the Kurdish movement in Syria
under control by encouraging the polarization of Syrian Kurds between the partisans of
the Kurdish movements in Turkey and Iraq.
Assad’s game initiated the long-term Syrian strategy known as the “playing the
Kurdish card,” which remained a crucial aspect of the Kurdish question as a regional
phenomenon. Tension between Syria and Iraq, which manifested itself primarily in the
struggle for Baathist ideological legitimacy in the 1960s, continued into the 1990s, and
gave rise to increasing regional competition between the two countries, particularly after
the 1991 Gulf War. During the 1970s, the conflict between the two major Kurdish parties
in Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP), was the primary obstacle to any serious attempt by Syria to play the Kurdish card
against Iraq. However, after the reconciliation between the PUK and the KDP in 1987,
the ties between the Iraqi Kurdish parties and Damascus grew stronger. The weakening of
the Baathist regime and the emergence of a Kurdish zone in northern Iraq following the
Gulf War reduced Damascus’ interest in an alliance with the Iraqi Kurdish parties.
However, both the PUK and the KDP kept offices in Damascus until 2003.
The strategic alliance between Damascus and the Iraqi Kurdish parties ended after
the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. The political gains made by the Iraqi Kurds
after Saddam Hussein’s fall led to a shift in the Iraqi Kurdish parties’ approach toward
the Kurdish issue in Syria. As a result of increased security, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership
became more confident promoting the Kurdish cause in other countries. The implications
of this change in the Iraqi Kurdish perspective were seen during the events of March
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2004 in Syria and later during the Syrian uprising in which Masoud Barzani played an
active role in uniting the Syrian Kurdish opposition.
The conflict between Turkey and Syria dates back to the mandatory period when
France transferred the Sanjak of Alexandretta from Syrian to Turkish control in 1939.
The dispute over sharing the Euphrates River and Turkey’s water projects, which
threatened Syria’s water supplies, further exacerbated already existing problems between
the two states. In an effort to put pressure on Turkey, Assad took an interest in the
Kurdish movement in Turkey in the 1980s, and allowed the Kurdish insurgent group, the
PKK, to establish bases on Syrian territory from which the PKK militants were able to
launch military operations against the Turkish army. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah
Öcalan, who fled to Damascus before the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, caused major
friction between Damascus and Ankara until Öcalan’s expulsion from Syria in 1998.
Although the tensions between Turkey and Syria slowly began to cool after the
capture of Öcalan in 1999, the efforts to establish closer commercial and military ties
between the two countries broke down as a result of the eruption of the Syrian uprising in
2011. Turkish-Syrian relations once again became strained due to Turkey’s support of the
Syrian opposition’s efforts to overthrow the regime as well as the alleged support of
Bashar Al-Assad for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria, which has close links
with the PKK.
Kurds in Syria served heavily in the armed struggles of the Kurdish movements in
Iraq and Turkey, mainly in Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s insurgency in Iraq in 1961-1975 and
in the PKK’s struggle in Turkey from the early 1980s to the present. Throughout the
1980s and 1990s, northern Syria became the primary breeding ground for the PKK. As
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emphasized by Ismet Sharif Vanly, the cooperation between the PKK and the Syrian
regime was of mutual interest to both parties: the PKK had a rear base in Syria for its
military activities against the Turkish government and Hafiz Al-Assad had in the Kurds
of Syria a shield against its internal and external enemies.279 Support from Damascus for
the Kurdish parties of both Turkey and Iraq was available only on the condition that they
would avoid any attempt at mobilizing the Syrian Kurds against Hafiz Al-Assad’s
regime. Thus, until the late 1990s, Kurdish elements in Syria acted largely as President
Assad’s personal guard against internal threats.
Assad’s policy of cooptation of the Kurdish groups both within and outside of
Syria had two conflicting consequences. On the one hand, the freedom of action enjoyed
by the Iraqi Kurdish parties and the PKK came at the expense of the development of a
Kurdish movement in Syria. The more dramatic struggles of the Kurds in Iraq and
Turkey attracted the Syrian Kurds in great numbers to support the Kurdish cause in these
countries. Nevertheless, the strategy of the Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish groups to avoid
antagonizing their host and supporter resulted in denying the legitimacy of any Kurdish
demands in Syria, a position that fit nicely with Assad’s desire to channel Syrian Kurdish
nationalist discontent towards Turkey and Iraq.
On the other hand, Assad’s desire to minimize Kurdish mobilization in Syria by
supporting the Kurdish movements of neighboring countries led to the unintended
consequence of strengthening Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalist sentiments among
the Syrian Kurds. The Kurdish population in Syria gradually became more conscious of

279

Vanly, 132.

187

ethnic distinctions because of the weight of official suppression and the influential
struggles of Kurdish groups across Syria’s borders. As Kurdish cultural and political
activity was continuously restricted in Syria, membership in the Iraqi Kurdish parties and
the PKK were the only spaces left for the Syrian Kurds for ethnic expression and
militancy. While the Kurdish movement in Syria pragmatically kept quiet and avoided
challenging the regime in the Syrian context, the activities of the PKK and the Iraqi
Kurdish parties made it possible for the Syrian Kurds to remain politically mobilized.
This situation laid the foundations for the eventual collapse of the strategy of
“dissimulation”280 among the Kurdish groups in Syria in the 1990s.
Strategic alliances between Damascus and the PKK, KDP and PUK served to
create tensions between these three competing parties. Furthermore, the collaboration of
these parties with the “Syrian state,” which is deemed an “enemy” for the Syrian Kurds,
resulted in friction with the KDPS. The fact that the leaders of the PKK, KDP and PUK
downplayed the problems of the Syrian Kurds because of the pressure from the Syrian
“boss” was largely seen as a betrayal of the pan-Kurdish doctrine. Nevertheless, while
using the Kurdish movement against Iraq and Turkey, Hafiz Al-Assad ironically
contributed greatly to the consolidation of Kurdish transnational politics by encouraging
the strengthening of cross-border relations between the Syrian Kurds and the Kurds of
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Turkey and Iraq. This led to a revival of Kurdish identity and empowerment of panKurdish ideal in Syria by “proxy.”
As the Syrian Kurdish parties were unable to establish themselves as a significant
political opposition in the country, the political and cultural activities of the better
organized and stronger Kurdish groups of Iraq and Turkey helped Kurdish politics in
Syria maintain a certain level of organizational capacity. It was notably the activities of
the PKK that played a significant role in providing the Kurdish culture with greater
visibility in the Syrian public sphere. The implications of this process were manifested
particularly through the establishment of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) by the
sympathizers of the PKK in Syria in 2003, which became the most influential Kurdish
party in Syria.
Reawakening of Kurdish Nationalism in Syria
During the 1980s and 1990s, the position of the Kurds in Syria can be categorized
into three groups: Those who were responsive to Hafiz Al-Assad’s policy of cooptation,
namely, the Kurdish “clients” of the regime; the small partisan groups, which were
mostly the splinters of the KPDS; and finally, those who joined the ranks of the Iraqi
Kurdish parties or the PKK as a way to remain politically mobilized and express their
Kurdish identity. Joining the Kurdish movements in Turkey and Iraq was very appealing
for the majority of the Syrian Kurds within the framework of pan-Kurdish aims, while as
Kurds of Syria, they remained mostly silent on Syrian issues. The small partisan groups
largely opted for a policy of dissimulation, which was based on a refusal to submit to
official repression while avoiding an open confrontation with the regime. By the 1990s, it
was these groups that eventually broke away from the game of conformity and provided
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the Kurdish movement in Syria with a vocal wing to challenge the Arabist ideology of
the regime through greater visibility.
Before the events of Qamishli, which took the Syrian authorities by surprise in
March 2004, there was already a steady increase in Kurdish activism and outspokenness
in Syria that had started in the 1990s. Periodic protests and confrontations were taking
place, particularly on significant days such as Newroz (the Kurdish new year) or the
anniversary of the 1962 census. The effort to raise the visibility of the Kurdish
movement’s demands was further intensified after the establishment of the Yekîtî Party in
1992, which was created by Kurdish partisan groups of diverse origins including the
proponents of a Marxist ideology and Kurdish nationalism. Coming from the leftist
strand that was primarily affected by the ideological debates of the Cold War, the Yekiti
sought to draw youth into its ranks by focusing on the broader discourse of empowerment
of civil society and respect for human rights, as well as the key events in “ethnic”
memory, particularly the creation of Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq in 1992.
As a clear indication of the collapse of the strategy of dissimulation, the Yekiti
introduced a new repertoire of actions aimed at more “visibility” including publications,
campaigning, protesting, demonstrations, and striking. Compared to the fairly modest
demands of Kurdish parties in Syria in previous years, which were confined largely to
cultural matters with no mention of self-government or regime change, the Yekiti
adopted a more radical program. During the third party congress in November 1999,
territorial demands, referencing a “Syrian Kurdistan” were incorporated into the Yekiti
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program.281 On the Kurdish issue, the party advocated for the constitutional recognition
of the existence of the Kurdish people. On a political level, the Yekiti stressed the need
for a decentralized political system that would take into account the democratic balance
between all the components of the Syrian society and demanded the Kurdish people
manage themselves in their legislative, administrative and judicial matters in the Kurdish
majority areas within the framework of a democratic parliamentary system.282
The end of the strategic alliance between Damascus and the PKK after the
expulsion of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1998, further increased the influence of
the Yekiti on the Kurdish political scene in Syria. Although the capture of Öcalan and its
effects on the PKK dealt a major blow to the Kurdish cause in general, the elimination of
the PKK’s presence in Syria lent a more autonomous character to the Syrian Kurdish
movement. As the PKK plunged into a crisis of reorganization after Öcalan’s arrest, the
Yekiti aspired to fill the void left by the PKK. The Yekiti organized several large and
bold human rights demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo during the early 2000s. In the
meantime, dramatic changes were taking place in the Syrian political arena after the death
of Hafiz Al-Assad, which gave further impetus to Kurdish political activity.
Towards the Qamishli Revolt
By the early 2000s, there were two important developments that had major
impacts on Kurdish politics in Syria: in the domestic field, a period of intense political
and intellectual debate started to take place in after the death of Hafiz Al-Assad, which
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raised hopes for democratic change in Syria. At the regional level, the fall of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq in 2003, and the subsequent gains made by the Iraqi Kurds provided the
Syrian Kurds with encouragement to take a more active stance in demanding their
cultural and political rights in Syria. As a result of these events, the stage of “visibility”
that had been in the making on the Syrian Kurdish political scene over the past decade
gained further momentum and consolidated the status of the Kurdish element in the
opposition movement.
Bashar Al-Assad’s takeover in 2000 raised hopes for change in Syria and it
initiated a civil society movement known as the “Damascus Spring,” which made many
people believe that young Assad might open up the country. From June 2000 to August
2001, Syria’s long silenced civil society took advantage of this changed atmosphere to
call for a democratic opening. Numerous discussion circles, debates, forums, and
assemblies were formed all over the country with the purpose of addressing once taboo
topics as political, economic and human rights reform, corruption, political prisoners and
exiles, and the development of an autonomous civil society in Syria.
In September 2000, leading intellectuals signed the “Manifesto of the 99,” which
called for the repeal of the state of emergency and the emergency laws of 1963, the
release of all political prisoners, the return of Syrians from exile, and freedoms of speech
and press.283 It was followed by the “Manifesto of the 1,000” in January 2001, in which
the demands for electoral reform and abolition of one-party rule were emphasized.
Finally, in May 2001, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood published a National Charter from
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exile in London calling for a modern, democratic Syria and the rejection of any form of
political violence.284 The Kurdish parties and activists also took part in the Damascus
Spring and made contacts with the Syrian opposition. The softening of the government’s
approach to the Kurdish movement allowed the Kurdish political organizations to meet
more openly and increase their activity.
The regime’s initial reaction to the public demand for democratic change was
encouraging. Hundreds of political prisoners, including the communists and members of
Muslim Brothers, were released, and several of the prisons notorious for the brutal
treatment of inmates were shut down.285 However, the democratization drive came to a
rapid halt in February 2001, when the Baath party started accusing activists of weakening
and discrediting state institutions, and harming the stability and unity of Syria. Civil
forums were declared illegal and terminated, and pioneers of the civil society movement
and other prominent human rights activists were arrested. The government tightened
censorship and issued new guidelines on publications that restricted the ownership of
periodical publications to Syrian Arabs, suggesting that members of the Kurdish minority
and stateless Kurds born in Syria were excluded.286
Although Bashar Al-Assad’s regime initially adopted a reconciliatory attitude and
made positive public statements in an attempt to subdue the demands for political change,
it soon became apparent the government was not willing to undertake any real change.
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Nonetheless, despite the end of Damascus Spring and the closed political context,
between 2002 and 2004, Kurdish political actions in Syria in the form of demonstrations
and protests increased dramatically in both frequency and scale. The fact that the return
of suppression after the Damascus Spring was followed by a constant cycle of Kurdish
protests clearly indicated a new level of confidence among the Kurds in Syria.
The most important aspect of Kurdish activism in this period was that increased
international attention on human rights reflected positively on the actions of the Kurds
who started to frame their dispute with the state specifically in human rights terms. As the
leading actor in organizing the protests, the Yekiti played a crucial role during this
process and strengthened its position in the Kurdish movement. On December 10, 2002,
International Human Rights Day, approximately one hundred and fifty members of the
Yekiti demonstrated in front of the Syrian Parliament, shouting demands for citizenship
cultural rights for the Kurds as well as respect for human rights in Syria. The signs
carried during the demonstration read “Syria is the country of all, be they Arab or Kurd,”
“We demand that the Syrian constitution recognize Kurds as the second official ethnicity
of the country” and “We demand a definitive solution to the Kurdish question in the
framework of national unity.”287
The gathering of December 10, 2002, was certainly not the first public
demonstration organized by the Kurds, but it was unique in many ways. First, the
discourse of the protest was quite assertive in spite of the severely restricted political
space in Syria. The demonstrators posed a direct challenge to the official ideology of the
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Baathists by referring to the universal values against injustice and discrimination.
Second, through the messages on the placards, the ideology of the regime was torn apart
in the street, a space that had long been confiscated and manipulated by the state for its
own glorification.288 Third, the demonstration indicated the Kurdish movement in Syria
had managed to overcome its impotency and had revived the peaceful and democratic
struggle it had long advocated. Finally, the gathering was a message to both those in
power and the broader opposition in Syria that the Kurds’ capacity for action can no
longer be underestimated.
Yekiti’s strategy of greater visibility and the subsequent arrest of two Kurdish
leaders led to disputes with other parties in the Syrian-Kurdish party spectrum that argued
further confrontation with the government could be damaging. Nevertheless, despite the
arrests and repression, demonstrations and public actions organized by the Yekiti
increasingly continued in 2003 and 2004.
On June 25, 2003, Yekiti organized a “parade of children” in front of the UNICEF
building in Damascus, on the occasion of the World Children’s Day. Once again, a
symbolic date was chosen as part of Yekiti’s strategy to associate Kurdish demands with
universal issues. The banners were asking for freedom of cultural expression and
language, particularly the right to teach in Kurdish language. This time, Yekiti did not
find itself alone as other Kurdish parties agreed to participate. Broader participation was
achieved on October 6, 2003, when Yekiti agreed to avoid overtly politicized messages
and participate in a silent demonstration with other Kurdish parties to commemorate the
census of 1962. Although, it was a retreat from the Yekiti’s offensive strategy, the
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demonstration not only provided greater collaboration among the Kurdish parties but also
made it possible, for the first time, for the Kurds and the Arab opposition as well as
certain human rights organizations to act in concert in Syria.
This cooperation further solidified on December 10, 2003, International Human
Rights Day. The demonstration showed how dramatically things had changed in the one
year after the December 2002 demonstration. Yekiti had broken its isolation and
managed to obtain the support of a number of groups from both the Kurdish and Arab
opposition. The number of participants in the December 2003 demonstration increased
remarkably involving around a thousand people in front of the Syrian Parliament.
In late 2003 and early 2004, a number of demonstrations took place outside court
buildings in protest of the trials of political detainees, Kurdish and other. In February
2004, the release of the Yekiti leaders, Marwan Usman and Hasan Salih, who were
arrested after the December 2002 demonstration, mobilized 15,000 people who gave
them a triumphant welcome to the city of al-Qamishli.289 On March 8, 2004, a counterdemonstration was organized by the Kurdish and Arab parties in front of the Syrian
Parliament in Damascus on the anniversary of the 1963 revolution through which the
Baath Party had come to power. The same day, large crowds of Kurds spontaneously
appeared in the streets in the majority of Kurdish towns to celebrate the recognition of
federalism in Iraq. Another large gathering on March 8, 2004 took place in al-Qamishli to
celebrate International Women’s Day. Despite the inclusive title, the celebration was
used mainly as a “pretext” to affirm Kurdish identity in the public sphere.
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The regularity of the demonstrations, the choice of symbolic dates associated with
universal human rights, and the diversity of the actors involved – students, human rights
associations, Kurdish and Arab parties – made the protests between 2002 and 2004 an
undeniably new phenomenon in Syria. They represent not only the rapidly developing
organizational capacity of democratic forces in Syria, but also the growing influence of
the Kurds in the larger opposition movement. The security forces’ repression continued
against the Kurdish leaders as well as other activists, with increased numbers of people
taken into custody after each action. Four days after the events of March 8, the Qamishli
Revolt erupted, which intensified the Kurdish struggle against the state and opened
another chapter in the process of democratization in Syria.
The Beginning of a New Era: The Qamishli Revolt
If the period between 2002 and 2004 showed the potential of the Kurdish
movement to become an active member of the opposition movement in Syria, the
Qamishli revolt and the events that unfolded in its aftermath represented the
transformation of this potential into a substantial political force. On March 12, 2004, the
protest movement of the previous two years took a different turn after unrest at a soccer
match in al-Qamishli resulted in six dead, all Kurds. This situation quickly led to the
ethnicization of the incident. The outrage over the death of six Kurds was transformed
into Kurdish nationalist rallies during the demonstrations and funeral marches on March
13. A series of protests and violent incidents took place in Kurdish areas across Syria,
including in other Kurdish towns in Jazira and further afield to Kobani, Aleppo, Afrin
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and Damascus.290 Massive clashes occurred between protesters and the security forces.
More than thirty people were killed, several hundred injured, and roughly two thousand
people were detained and exposed to ill treatment.291
It was particularly the young Kurds who took part in protests in large numbers.
Grown up largely with ethnic discrimination and economic marginalization, they
interpreted the events of March 12 as the state’s attack on the Kurdish community and
reacted with nationalist symbols. The regularity of arrests and torture between 2002 and
2004, had already reinforced solidarity among the Kurds in Syria and fueled Kurdish
dissent against the state.
The nationalist charge of the situation was intensified by the political
developments in Iraq, which had an undeniable impact on the events in Qamishli. The
Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law, which secured the autonomous status of the
Kurdistan region of Iraq, was signed on March 8, 2012. This development had its own
dynamic in Syria, both among the Kurds and within the government. While the change of
circumstances in Iraq was a major inspiration for the Syrian Kurds, for the Syrian
government, events in Iraq created the fear of a domino effect. The mass demonstrations
in Qamishli and other cities confirmed this fear. Accordingly, the reaction of the Syrian
state against the demonstrators was considerably harsh and the number of those killed or
arrested was unparalleled in comparison to earlier events.292
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As far as the scale of protests, the numbers involved, and the extent of the
casualties, the Qamishli revolt was minor compared to Kurdish unrest in Turkey, Iran,
and Iraq, but for Kurds in Syria, it was a momentous event. Qamishli not only redefined
the Kurdish question in Syria, but also transformed the status quo between the Kurds and
the Syrian government. Demonstrations of this magnitude had never before occurred in
the history of the Kurds in Syria and the Syrian state faced the greatest popular challenge
to its authority since the insurrection of the Islamic opposition led by the Muslim
Brotherhood in 1982. For the first time, the protest movement united all the Kurdish
parties and involved all the Kurdish territories in the country as well as the major Syrian
cities with significant Kurdish populations, such as Damascus and Aleppo. This gave a
powerful new expression to the existence of Kurds in Syria and underscored the symbolic
unity of the Kurdish Syrian space. A Kurdish militant based in Germany clarified the
importance of the events of March 2004, by stating, “the intifada of March delineated the
map of Syrian Kurdistan.”293
It is important to emphasize the popular and spontaneous nature of the uprising;
Kurdish parties were certainly not the driving force behind the unrest. The
demonstrations represented a genuinely popular expression of discontent and increased
confidence in the public expression of Kurdish identity. At no other point in time was the
Kurdish community’s potential to mobilize as high as it was in March 2004. However,
instead of seizing the occasion to strengthen their ranks and create greater unity, the
Kurdish parties chose to pacify the street in the immediate aftermath of the regime’s
crackdown. Thus, the events in 2004 did not lead to political concessions by the
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government. In June 2005, however, when mass rallies were held yet again, the approach
of the Kurdish parties was different. Containing the riots was no longer the strategy in
2005, although, opinions differed greatly on how to deal with the regime’s ban on
demonstrations. A split in the party spectrum gave way to the emergence of a passive
wing known as the “moderates” and a more active wing known as the “radicals,” which
advocated for a more open confrontation with the state.
The split among the Kurdish parties was already evident in the late 1990s after the
establishment of the Yekiti and the reorganization of the PKK in Syria. The collaboration
between the PKK and the Syrian regime came to an end in 1999, following the Syrian
government’s decision to hand over Öcalan. The PYD was established in Syria in 2003,
which immediately joined the ranks of the radical wing. Besides the Yekiti and PYD, the
Azadi and the Future Movement, emerged as a result of the events in 2004, were the
other members of the active wing.
The split within the Kurdish party landscape was well suited to the regime’s
traditional “divide and rule” policy, which was based on favoring one section of the
Kurdish opposition while persecuting others. However, although the lines separating the
“moderates” from the “radicals” hardened in 2005, the potential for a unified Kurdish
movement in Syria had never been more present. The regime tried to prevent unified
Kurdish action by favoring relations with the official representatives of the moderates to
the detriment of the radicals. Nevertheless, it was apparent by 2005 that the traditional
cooptation policy towards the Kurds in Syria was no longer a sustainable strategy to
contain the Kurdish movement in the long term.
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Another significant impact of the Qamishli revolt was that it gave rise to a
previously unknown degree of solidarity, not only among the Syrian Kurds but also
between the Syrian Kurds, the Iraqi-Kurdish, and the Turkish-Kurdish populations.
Traditionally, it had been the Syrian Kurds who were engaged in the national movements
of Kurds in neighboring countries. The Kurds of Syria not only held demonstrations to
express concern over events that took place in Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan such as the
poison gas attack on Halabja and the arrest of Öcalan, but had also joined the armed
movements of the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. During March 2004, countless Iraqi and
Turkish Kurds in the European diaspora, as well as in Diyarbakir (Turkey), Erbil, Dohuk,
Sulaymaniyah (Iraq) demonstrated to show solidarity with the Syrian Kurds.294 The
events of Qamishli not only reaffirmed Kurdish identity as a transnational phenomenon,
but also legitimized the autonomous character of the Kurdish movement in Syria and
reinforced the sense of “Syrian Kurdishness.”
Evolving Relations between the Kurdish and Arab Opposition
The demonstrations of March 2004 made the Kurdish capacity for mobilization
acutely apparent to the Syrian opposition. The fact that a certain ethnic group was able to
appear on the streets in such large numbers in defiance of the authorities was remarkable
to other ethnic, religious and political groups in the country. The impact of the Qamishli
revolt on the relations between the Arab and Kurdish opposition movements was twofold:
first, the size of the Qamishli revolt forced Arab activists to recognize the Kurds
constitute a political force in Syria that could no longer be ignored, and second, the
growing Arab-Kurdish cooperation emerged in the wake of the Qamishli revolt ironically
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crystallized the striking differences between Kurdish and Arab opposition groups’ vision
of a democratic Syria.
There had been certain level of cooperation between the Kurdish and Arab
opposition groups since the Damascus Spring. However, prior to the events of Qamishli,
the Kurdish issue had been largely ignored by the Arab opposition because of the
perceptions regarding Kurdish secessionist aims. The events of March 2004 significantly
brought the Kurdish question to the attention of Syrian opposition and led to increased
contact between Arab and Kurdish leaders. Opposition groups issued a statement of unity
and democratic change known as the Damascus Declaration in October 2005, which
marked the official recognition of Kurdish opposition as a powerful political force in
Syria. The document was signed by a large number of opposition figures and parties,
including both secular and religious, Arab and Kurdish. The Declaration was an
important initiative particularly because it included the Muslim Brotherhood, which was
the most powerful Sunni-based Islamic opposition group in Syria. Furthermore, it was the
first time the Muslim Brotherhood had publicly acknowledged the legitimacy of Kurdish
grievances. The statement included an explicit reference to the status of the Kurds in
Syria. The signatories declared that they were committed to:
Find a just democratic solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria, in a manner
that guarantees the complete equality of Syrian Kurdish citizens with the
other citizens, with regard to nationality rights, culture, learning the
national language, and the other constitutional, political, social, and legal
rights on the basis of the unity of the Syrian land and people. Nationality
and citizenship rights must be restored to those who have been deprived of
them, and the file must be completely settled.295
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However, despite the increased consciousness of Kurdish groups by the Arab
opposition, cooperation remained limited because of the transformation of the Syrian
Kurdish movement into a popular struggle. As the size of the Qamishli revolt
conspicuously transcended the boundaries of Kurdish partisanship and underscored the
mass base of the Kurdish movement in Syria, increased emphasis on the “identity” theme
in the articulation of Kurdish demands radicalized the politicized ethnic divides in the
country. Although the Damascus Declaration was an important step in terms of inserting
the “Kurdish question” into the Arab opposition’s agenda, striking differences between
the opinions of Kurds and Arabs regarding democratic transformation in Syria and the
solution to the Kurdish problem soon became apparent.
First, the limited Kurdish-Arab cooperation that took place in the aftermath of the
Qamishli revolt soon fell victim to the mutual suspicions that had long been cultivated by
the regime. The strongest opposition to the Baath regime during the 1970s and 1980s was
the Sunni-based Islamic political groups, among which the Muslim Brotherhood was the
most prominent. The Islamic insurgency that grew by the mid-1970s was eventually
crushed by the bloody Hama massacre of 1982, in which thousands were killed including
civilians. The Hama incident generally marked the defeat of the Islamic opposition
movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.
The relations between the Kurds and the Syrian government at the time were
generally defined by Hafez Al-Assad’s policy of alliance with the civil and religious
Kurdish elites in order to keep the Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria in check and
contain the Islamist threat in Syria. Collaboration with various Kurdish groups was
strategically important for Hafez Al-Assad in order to maintain the stability of the regime
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as the Sunni affiliation of the majority of the Kurds helped him tone down the Sunni
opposition’s challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. A major implication of this
arrangement was that the Arab Sunni majority regarded the Kurds as partners of the
regime. Moreover, having identified themselves as secularist parties characterized mainly
by a tendency toward Marxist and socialist discourse, Kurdish parties in Syria never
embraced the Islamic doctrine, which always put them at odds with the Islamist
movement.
As second, Arab-Kurdish distinction was tied to the sudden outburst of Kurdish
nationalism in 2004 that coincided with increasing U.S. and Israeli pressure on Syria as
well as the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, creating a great deal of suspicion
among the Arab nationalists who had shown support towards the Kurdish plight during
the 2002-2004 protest movement. During the demonstrations of March 2004, there were
explicit Iraqi-Kurdish references. The slogans “Free Kurdistan” and the use of nationalist
symbols such as the Kurdish flag highlighted the territorial nature of Kurdish claims in
Syria. The fact the demonstrators carried portraits of Iraqi-Kurdish leaders Masoud
Barzani and Celal Talabani as well as of Abdullah Öcalan, suggested the Qamishli revolt
represented the Syrian Kurds’ solidarity with the Kurdish movements in Turkey and Iraq.
Furthermore, through the demonstrators’ references to the Iraqi government’s poison gas
attack on the Iraqi-Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988, a direct parallel was drawn between
the suffering of the Iraqi Kurds in Halabja and that of the Kurds in Syria in al-Qamishli.
The references to the Iraqi-Kurdish experience played directly into the regime’s
hands. The extremely violent repression of demonstrations risked fueling Kurdish
nationalist sentiments and contradicted the Syrian regime’s traditional policy of
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cooperation with certain groups and individuals in the Kurdish community. This renewed
assault on the Kurds was mainly a result of the changing dynamics of the Kurdish
question at the regional level and concerns over the regime’s internal legitimacy. Hence,
it would be pertinent to interpret the regime’s violent crackdown on the Kurds both as an
indication of the Syrian authorities’ concern over the growing American presence in the
region, and as a response to the growing cooperation between the Kurds and Arabs after
the Damascus Spring. This perspective suggests the regime intended to profit from the
events in Qamishli by creating a schism between Arabs and Kurds in order to tighten the
Arab ranks in defense of the regime and reorient the Sunni opposition towards
Islamic/pan-Arab solidarity.296
The Assad government exploited the military and political events in Iraq after
2003 in order to “kill two birds with one stone.” On the one hand, playing on the Arab
concerns for Kurdish secessionism, the regime justified the violent dispersal of
demonstrations by promoting the importance of preserving Syrian national unity. The
emergence of a more aggressive Kurdish strategy towards the government and parallels
drawn by the Syrian Kurds between the fall of Saddam Hussein and a possible fall of
Bashar Al-Assad were used by the regime to accuse against the Kurdish parties of
seeking U.S. intervention in Syria comparable to that in Iraq. The regime and official
media established explicit parallels between the riots of Qamishli and the deteriorating
public order in Iraq, playing on the fear that Syria would plunge into a similar situation of
ethnic and religious violence after a foreign intervention.297
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On the other hand, playing on the secularists’ concern of a possible rise of
Islamism in Syria, the regime presented itself as the only solution to safeguard Syria from
falling into the same sectarian violence and chaos as experienced in Iraq. This argument
particularly resonated with some secularist Kurds who opposed the rise of an Islamic
power in Syria and an increase in the Sunni Arab majority in politics, to the detriment of
ethnic and religious minorities. Despite their strong distrust of the Baath regime, for the
majority of the Syrian Kurds, Bashar Al-Assad was a more preferable enemy than a
regime dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.
The primary fear behind the regime’s efforts to fracture the opposition was the
potential for cooperation between the Kurds and the Muslim Brotherhood, the two largest
opposition groups in Syria. It was believed that the Syrian opposition’s ability to pose a
real challenge to the regime was, to a large extent, contingent upon a compromise
between the nationalist doctrine of the Kurds and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic
doctrine. Although the Damascus Declaration of October 2005 was a significant step for
the Syrian opposition to surmount the mutual suspicions defined along the lines of
religious-secular and Arab-Kurd, the regime’s strategy played on certain ethnic- and
religiously-based fears in the Syrian society and took its toll on the nascent Arab-Kurdish
cooperation that emerged following the Qamishli revolt. The radical wing composed of
the Yekiti, Azadi, Future Movement and the PYD, despite praising the Damascus
Declaration’s demands for democratic change, did not sign the text due to their
reservations regarding the absence of a passage referring to the explicit recognition of the
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Kurds as an independent national group with historic ties to the land along with the Arabs
in Syria.298
The Damascus Declaration proposed no clear solution to the Kurdish problem
other than emphasizing it had to be resolved within a democratic and inclusive
framework. Furthermore, the text’s special reference to Syria’s affiliation to Arab order
was decried by some of the Kurdish groups as evidence of unceasing Arab chauvinism.299
The territorial demands of the Kurds were seen unacceptable, particularly to the Muslim
Brotherhood, which rejected every autonomist plan for the Kurds and insisted on the
general rhetoric of democratization in Syria and equality for all citizens as a solution to
the Kurdish question.
The fundamental problem was that while the majority of the Syrian opposition
was confining the Kurdish question to the single issue of nationality rights and the return
of citizenship to the stateless, the Yekiti and PYD and their allies were demanding the
recognition of the Kurds as a separate nation and acceptance of the principle of
administrative decentralization in Syria. After the launch of the Damascus Declaration,
despite conciliatory declarations by the Muslim Brotherhood leadership concerning the
cultural demands of the Kurds, there was widespread distrust among certain Kurdish
parties upon seeing the reemergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organized force
inside Syria.
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The radicalization of ethnic divides in Syria after the events of Qamishli as well
as the fracture between the Kurdish parties and the rest of the Syrian opposition during
the negotiation process of the Damascus Declaration made it acutely apparent that the
basis of the problem was in the concept of the nation state. The radical wing of the
Kurdish parties attempted to place their actions and demands under a more universal
human rights framework with an emphasis on administrative decentralization in Syria. In
other words, Kurdish cultural, political, social and legal rights and demands for complete
equality of Syrian Kurds with the other citizens were linked directly to the demands for
the recognition of the Kurds as a separate nation with their historic ties to the Kurdish
lands in Syria. However, according to the majority of Syrian parties and human rights
associations in the opposition, the Kurds, rather than constituting a separate nation, were
ordinary Syrian citizens who had been deprived of some of their rights. Recognition of
the Kurds as a separate nation would mean the official recognition of Syria as a
multinational country, which, in the minds of the Syrian opposition figures, was not
compatible with the idea of “national unity” required by the concept of nation state.
Accordingly, rather than a principle of democracy, administrative decentralization was
seen primarily in the context of the “hidden objectives” of certain Kurdish parties,
notably the radicals.
As the wave of mass demonstrations and protests of the revolt of Qamishli cooled
down at the end of 2005, the Syrian political arena consisted of three main forces. The
first, Bashar Al-Assad, imposed a large-scale crackdown on all opposition groups in
Syria and managed to stabilize the regime in the international arena by 2006. Departing
from the Bush administration’s policy of sanctions and lumping Syria together with Iran,
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Barack Obama adopted a new policy of engagement with Syria after he took office in
2009. This shift in American policy towards Syria helped Assad reduce its international
isolation. Regarding the relations between the Kurds and the Syrian regime, Bashar AlAssad took note of this new era marked by a strong public display of the “Kurdish
problem” in the Syrian political sphere. In his attempt at defusing the Kurdish unrest and
international human rights criticisms, the Syrian government publicly raised the issue of
the 1962 census and the problem of statelessness for the Syrian Kurds for the first time.
Nonetheless, these occasional gestures and statements contradicted the government’s
policies, which, since 2004, have squeezed the political and cultural space available to the
Kurds.300 The regime continued to favor relations with certain parties as official
representatives of the Kurds, while increasing arrests and persecutions for others, most
notably the Yekiti and the PYD, on grounds they sought to undermine the unity of the
state through sectarianism.
The Syrian opposition, which is the second of the three major political forces in
Syria, established a broad-based alliance as a result of the social and political
mobilization provoked by the Kurdish parties between 2002 and 2005. For the first time
in decades, Syria’s bickering political parties, outspoken intellectuals, and civil society
groupings came together, Kurdish and Arab nationalists found common ground, and
socialists, communists, liberals and Islamists showed a willingness to unite over a single
platform of democratic change and respect for another.301 The most crucial aspect of the
Damascus Declaration was the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular groups
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were finally able to set aside their mutual suspicions and collaborate with the shared goal
of democratic transformation in Syria. Nevertheless, while the secular and Islamist camps
in the opposition managed to mitigate popular suspicions against each other, each camp
continued to maintain its strong opposition to certain “identity” demands by the Kurds.
Although the Syrian opposition, for its part, established ties with the Kurdish parties
following the events of Qamishli, their refusal to look at the “Kurdish problem” beyond
the nation state framework persisted.
In the wake of the Qamishli uprising, the Kurdish movement in Syria emerged as
the “third force” within the movement for change in the country. The oppositional
coalition formed by the Damascus Declaration set off alarm bells for the regime,
particularly in terms of the reinstatement of an Islamist presence in the public sphere in
Syria. Given the fact that the fundamental ideological principle of the Baathist regime
was Arab nationalism, the striking rise of the Kurds within the opposition raised an even
greater concern for the preservation of the last remaining pillar of the regime’s
ideological legitimacy. The Syrian opposition shared the Kurdish goal of advancing
democracy in Syria, all the while maintaining their strong opposition to the recognition of
the Kurds as a separate nation and their demands for decentralization. Although the
radical wing of the Kurdish movement strived to place its actions in a more universal
framework, emphasized human rights and peaceful coexistence of different nationalities,
the identity theme embedded in the demands resulted in the exclusion of the movement
by both the regime and the opposition.
After the events of Qamishli, a new equilibrium was put into place between not
only the Kurds and the regime, but also the Kurds and the Syrian opposition. For the
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regime, Kurdish national identity was no longer the marginal political question that could
be dealt with through the traditional cooptation policy. As for the opposition, the Kurdish
movement became a major political force that constantly pushes the boundaries of the
discourse of human rights and democratization promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Arab opposition figures. Hence, accommodation with the Kurds in Syria became
largely contingent on the capacity of both the regime and the opposition to meet the
economic, political and cultural expectations of the Kurdish movement. While the
question of how the aspirations of those politicized and radical Kurds would evolve
remained on hold during the years following the Qamishli revolt, the spread of the Arab
uprisings to Syria in 2011 opened a new chapter in the complex relationships among the
Kurds, the Assad regime, and the Syrian opposition. The Kurdish movement, once again,
emerged as a crucial player whose political leverage became critically important in
tipping the scales of the emerging political instability.
Syria: The Arab Spring’s Final Destination
When a series of pro-democracy uprisings hit the Arab world in late 2010, Bashar
Al-Assad was confident that the spread of ongoing protests in other Arab countries to
Syria was unlikely. Assad’s belief in the stability of Syria was derived primarily from his
contention that the state was aligned with its people in terms of its foreign policy.302
Assad’s argument was based mainly on Syria’s defiance towards the U.S, and support for
the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements, which have long been the primary
tools of the regime to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people. However,
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the other side of the coin, the domestic field, had been marked by sporadic social unrest
and demands for reform towards democracy and open government since the Damascus
Spring. The protests that started in Syria in March 2011, eventually proved Assad wrong
and Syria became the last Arab country to join the wave of uprisings sweeping across the
Middle East.
The Kurds have been active in the protests since the beginning of the uprising.
There has been a large-scale mobilization, particularly among the Kurdish youth, in the
form of street demonstrations. However, it is important to distinguish those activities
from the official stance of the Kurdish parties in Syria, which largely avoided voicing
open support for the Syrian opposition. The fact that the party-based Kurdish opposition
maintained a low profile throughout the uprising did not derive from a reluctance to
support regime change. Rather, it needs to be viewed more as a continuation of with the
Kurdish position to act as a “third force” in the movement for change in Syria.
Anti-regime sentiment is deeply rooted among the Kurds in Syria given the
discriminatory policies of Syrian Arab Baathism throughout the twentieth century.
Furthermore, the Kurds have clearly shown they would not refrain from confronting the
regime and resisting its oppressive policies after 2004. However, as Syria’s conflict
expanded, and many young Kurds joined the calls for the downfall of the regime,
skepticism grew among the Kurdish parties that the Arab-dominated Sunni opposition
lacked the inclusive vision necessary to satisfy the various minority groups in Syria.
Hence, contesting the opposition’s “anti-regime” rhetoric, the Kurdish response to the
uprising was marked more by an “anti-systemic” stance, which was based on challenging
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both the regime and the Arab opposition on their exclusionary policies and insistence
upon a particularist identity in Syria.
As the Kurds opted to remain on the sidelines of the Syrian uprising, their mode
of participation in the ongoing upheaval was shaped by a complex set of factors including
the Kurds’ representation on the Syrian National Council (SNC) and National
Coordination Body (NCB), the two main opposition coalitions established after the
outbreak of the protests; the formation of a third body, the Syrian Kurdish National
Council (KNC); the role of the PYD, which was facing alleged claims for getting support
from the Assad regime; and the role of Turkey.
The Kurds and the Syrian Opposition in the Wake of the Syrian Uprising
Efforts to incorporate the Kurds into a unified opposition in Syria were
problematic from the beginning of the uprising. The Kurds’ skepticism approach of the
opposition stemmed mainly from the predominantly Arab nationalist and Islamist
ideology put forth by the opposition as well as its dependence on the sponsorship of
Turkey whose inability to solve its own Kurdish problem was worrisome for many Kurds
in Syria.
The Kurds attended successive meetings held by the opposition in Turkey and
Brussels after the outbreak of the protests, which resulted in the establishment of Syrian
National Council (SNC) in October 2011, an opposition coalition composed mostly of
exiles. However, despite the shared goal of overthrowing the Assad regime, it quickly
became evident the Kurdish and Arab opposition groups had largely differing visions of
Syria’s future. The Kurds were estranged immediately after the establishment of the SNC
when the Arab opposition groups and the Kurdish parties remained sharply at odds over
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Kurdish demands for recognition as a distinct people within Syria, with their own cultural
and linguistic rights under some form of "political decentralization."303 In the “Mission
and Program” of the SNC, the opposition’s vision for post-Assad Syria was described as:
The new Syria is a democratic, pluralistic, and civil state; a parliamentary
republic with sovereignty of the people based on the principles of equal
citizenship with separation of powers, smooth transfer of power, the rule
of law, and the protection and guarantee of the rights of minorities.304
The SNC’s political program also envisioned a transitional constitution for the
post-Assad era, which included guarantees for the recognition of Kurdish identity and
national rights:
The constitution guarantees national rights for the Kurdish people and a
resolution to the Kurdish question in a democratic and fair manner within
the framework of the unity of Syrian territory and people, as well as the
exercise of rights and responsibilities of equal citizenship among all
citizens.305
Regarding the establishment of democratic rule in Syria and the solution of the
Kurdish question, the SNC maintained the language of the Damascus Declaration by
putting emphasis on the opposition’s commitment to protect the minorities and their
rights, including the Kurds, in the Syria’s new constitution after the toppling of the Assad
regime.306 While the SNC documents fulfilled the basic Kurdish demands for equal
citizenship and an end to government discrimination, they fell short of the more
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fundamental demands for the recognition of the Kurds as a distinct “nation” in Syria and
their right to self-determination according to the international conventions and
agreements.
Besides the concerns over constitutional guarantees for Kurdish rights in the postAssad era, the larger factor that fueled Kurdish skepticism towards the SNC was the
Council’s dependence on its host nation, Turkey, and particularly its ruling Islamist
Justice and Development Party. The Kurdish question was the prism through which
Turkey approached the Syrian uprising because any constitutional recognition of the
Kurds in Syria would have inevitable repercussions for Turkey’s own Kurdish problem.
Thus, the close relationship of the AKP to the Muslim Brotherhood and the prointervention stance of the SNC were alienating for most of the Kurdish parties that were
concerned about the influence of a Turkish agenda aimed at marginalizing the demands
of the Kurds and giving the Syrian Islamists a larger role in the opposition.
The Kurds remained wary about joining forces with the SNC anticipating they
might be oppressed by a new Islamic Arab government in the post-Assad era if no powersharing guarantees were put in place. Those concerns were not unfounded. Dominated by
an Arab/Islamist agenda advanced by the Muslim Brotherhood, the SNC failed to attract
significant representation from the country’s diverse ethnic and religious groups such as
the Kurds as well as the Christians, Alawites and Druze. Furthermore, the delegates of
the Council refused to change the name of the country from the “Syrian Arab Republic”
to “Republic of Syria,” which resulted in a walkout by almost all the Kurdish political
parties at the Syrian National Salvation opposition conference held in Istanbul, Turkey,
on July 16, 2011.
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The opposition, on the other hand, accused the Kurds of not adequately
supporting the uprising against the Assad regime. The accusations against the Kurds were
partly based on the fact that several Kurdish parties were members of the National
Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB), an internal opposition group formed
in June 2011, which was largely made up of secularist, leftist Arabs and Kurdish groups.
The creation of the NCB was intended to rival the radical anti-regime line of Turkey
conferences in the spring and summer of 2011, which resulted in the creation of the
SNC.307 Although the NCB believed the Syrian regime had to be replaced by a
democratic government, the coalition adopted a more moderate stance that encourages
reform and dialogue instead of an open confrontation with the regime. The members
declared they stood on the side of the revolution, yet were staunchly opposed to foreign
intervention supported by pro-Western exiles. In this respect, the group’s political line
was generally determined by an anti-imperialist ideology and strong opposition to
Western influence in the Middle East, as well as the severe security constraints facing its
Syrian-based leadership.
The conservative Sunni groups, particularly the exiles, viewed the NCB’s strong
secularist and anti-imperialist credentials with great suspicion. The group was accused by
the supporters of the SNC of “treachery” and being on the regime’s side. Accordingly,
the NCB remained considerably unattractive to Sunni Islamist opinion, which limited the
coalition’s popular outreach. Its strong secularist and anti-sectarian message encouraged
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more minority participation than the overtly Sunni dominated SNC, which later came
under criticism on the grounds it lacked effective minority representation.
Given its moderate stance, the NCB, to a certain degree, was tolerated by the
Assad government because it was in the interest of the regime to both agitate against
foreign intervention and create infighting by the opposition, which was of great benefit to
Assad. In addition, the government also wanted to send the message that as long as the
opposition remains open to dialogue and stay clear of foreign ties, they will be able to
express themselves freely. Aware of the regime’s self-interested motives, the NCB, in
return, maintained a pragmatic stance by taking advantage of this room to maneuver,
while carefully confronting accusations of being pro-regime by avoiding any action that
would confer legitimacy on the government.308
The regime’s attitude towards the Kurds in the early days of the uprising emerged
as another major factor that strained the relationship between the Kurds and the Arab
opposition. When the uprising broke out in March 2011, fearful of the Kurds’ ability to
gear up the unrest, the regime promptly made political overtures to the Kurds. After half
a century of regime indifference, the citizenship issue was suddenly resolved by a
presidential decree in April 2011. Concerned primarily with diverting precious resources
to the anti-regime demonstrations taking place in majority-Arab cities, the regime
pursued the strategy of maintaining the loyalty of minority groups and depicting the
uprising as an essentially Sunni Arab sectarian revolt.309
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The Kurds had little sympathy for the regime and the memories of the Syrian
Arabs’ indifference towards the brutal regime crackdown on the Kurds in 2004 were still
fresh. For the Kurds, being at the forefront of the protest movement not only carried the
risk of harsh regime repression, but also might have allowed the regime to play up the
ethnic divide and rally Arab support against “Kurdish secessionism” just as it had in
2004. Hence, the Kurdish parties kept any inclination to protest in check in order to spare
the Kurdish areas violent confrontation, and to benefit from the regime’s weakness to
gain concessions regarding Kurdish rights. As a consequence, both the demonstrators and
the government forces in Kurdish areas kept a low profile throughout 2011 to minimize
the risk of clashes. This situation was interpreted by the radically anti-regime Sunni Arab
opposition as an indication the Kurdish parties bet on a dialogue with the regime to the
detriment of the revolution.
Establishment of the Syrian Kurdish National Council
Despite the fact that both the Kurds and the regime were intent on minimizing
risks of confrontation in accordance with their own individual political concerns, this
situation in no way meant that the Kurdish opinion of the regime, shaped by decades of
repression, had shifted. According to the Kurdish parties, discrimination against the
Kurds was not limited to either the regime or the opposition groups who would
potentially come to power in case Al-Assad falls. In that sense, for the Kurdish parties
and activists at large, the problem of the Kurds was not necessarily with the regime, but
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with the political and social structure that works to exclude them, disrupts their
livelihood, and attempts to Arabize them.310
Hence, rejecting both the opposition and the regime and determined to keep the
Kurdish areas free from fighting between the rebels and the government forces, the
Kurdish parties took matters in their own hands by establishing their own opposition
coalition in late 2011, the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC was
officially formed on October 26, 2011 in Erbil, Iraq, under the sponsorship of the
Kurdistan Regional Government, following the creation of the SNC. The mission of the
KNC was to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue within the framework of a
democratic and pluralistic Syria, while emphasizing that the Council is part of the
revolution and refusing all negotiations with the regime.311
The KNC lists four main demands for the Kurds in the post-Assad era:
1. Political decentralization for the government that would be based on
the recognition that Syria is a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multiethnic country.
2. A secular state.
3. Constitutional recognition of the Kurdish issue, a constitutional
assurance that the Kurdish people are on their historic land, and the lifting
of all discriminatory policies that have been deliberately applied to the
Kurdish people such as the Arabization policies in Syria, the Arabized
name changes of existing towns and villages and demographic changes.
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4. The recognition of the Kurds’ right to self-determination in a form that
would be decided in a national Kurdish referendum within the integrity
and unity of the Syrian land.312
Dr. Abdulhakim Bashar, Chairman of the KNC, asserts that it is not only the
Kurds, but also the Druze, Ismailis, Alawites and Christians in Syria who have been
ignored by the SNC, which is responsible for the failure of Syria’s minorities to
participate as united communities in the revolution. He underscores the importance of
political decentralization in Syria, particularly in the context of achieving an effective
transition to democracy, which requires giving guarantees and assurances to the
minorities befitting of their rights and benefits.313 He explains the role of the Kurds
within this process as follows:
We (the Kurds) are more organized and recognized as a society within
Syria and other Arab countries than other minorities. If we do participate
(in the revolution) more actively, other minorities will feel more assured
and follow suit. The regime has tried to convince the world that the
conflict is between them and the Arab Sunnis. We want to prove that
wrong. The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by
sectarian interests.314
In its inaugural session, the KNC voted against a demand to overthrow the regime
and restricted itself to a more general call for democracy. It was declared that:
The crisis in Syria can only be resolved through a change in the
authoritarian and totalitarian system and its organizational, political, and
intellectual structures. The security state must be dissolved and a more
secular, democratic, diverse, parliamentary, and decentralized state must
be constructed.315
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Alongside the protests organized by youth groups, the KNC staged
demonstrations to promote its particular agenda. Rather than solidarity with the
nationwide rebellion, street protests organized by the Kurdish parties specifically voiced
demands for Kurdish self-determination and systemic change. A member of the KNC
explains the Council’s position in the following way:
It’s not that we don’t want the regime to fall. Let it fall 1,000 times. But if
the political infrastructure stays the same, regardless of whether the
regime stays or goes, we as Kurds won’t have our rights. So we need to
change the whole system, because the infrastructure hammers in the idea
of a centralized state.316
The SNC made repeated attempts to incorporate the KNC, as bringing in a major
minority group was crucial for the SNC to claim that it represents a broad spectrum of the
opposition. Nonetheless, the talks between the SNC and KNC collapsed in January 2012
when the SNC refused to provide in written guarantees of political decentralization and
the right to self-determination for the Kurds within Syria’s territorial unity.317 The
attempts of the SNC to integrate the Kurdish parties continued in the “Friends of Syria”
conference convened in Tunis in February 2013. Burhan Ghalioun, the head of the SNC,
sought to reassure the Kurds by stating that the new Syria will have a decentralized
government through the empowerment of local authorities. However, it was noted that
the SNC is open to discuss only “administrative” decentralization and refuses any form of
“political” decentralization that implies formal autonomy or federalism. Given the SNC’s
weak position on the Kurdish demands, all the Kurdish parties in the SNC, with the
exception of the Future Party, suspended their membership and joined the KNC.
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Tensions between the KNC and the SNC escalated further when the latter
published a new document in April 2012,, titled “National Charter: The Kurdish Issue in
Syria.” The document confirmed the SNC’s “commitment to constitutional recognition of
the national identity of Kurdish people, and consider the Kurdish issue part and parcel of
the national discourse, and recognize the national rights of the Kurdish people within the
framework of the unity of Syria’s land and people.”318 The document also called for the
“expansion and empowerment of local government” in order to mitigate Kurdish
demands for decentralization. However, these overtures did little to advance SNC-KNC
negotiations as the document excluded language recognizing the Kurdish nation within
Syria living on their historical land. Furthermore, immediately following the publication
of the document, Burhan Ghalioun stated in an interview there is no such thing as “Syrian
Kurdistan” and that the Kurds should not be taken over with the illusion of federalism,
equating it with a demand for secessionism.319 Ghalioun’s statements caused renewed
protests from the KNC and in Kurdish areas in Syria.
The Kurds became further alienated during the Arab League-hosted opposition
meeting in Cairo in July 2012, when Arab participants refused to include the term
“Kurdish nation” in the meeting’s final declaration, which resulted in the withdrawal of
Kurdish groups from the conference. It was stated by the Arab groups that the term
“Kurdish nation” was rejected because of the “consequences” it might have. For Kurds,
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on the other hand, the stance of the Arab opposition signified the possibility of a new era
of persecution against them in the future.320
The Kurds’ relationship with the Syrian opposition did not markedly improve
after the decision of the SNC to unify with several other opposition groups, which
resulted in the creation of the Syrian National Coalition in Doha, Qatar in November
2012. The members of the KNC participated in the preliminary talks. Nevertheless,
immediately after the formation of the Coalition, its leader, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib,
stated that the Kurdish demands on a new constitution would be discussed only after the
regime’s ouster. As the new coalition insisted on postponing negotiations over the future
status of Kurds after the regime’s fall, the relations between the KNC and Syrian
opposition once again came to an impasse. It was declared that the KNC refused to
participate in the Syrian National Coalition unless written the opposition provided
guarantees that Kurdish demands will be satisfied in the post-Assad state.
The Role of the Democratic Union Party
The PYD has considerable popular support in the Kurdish regions in Syria, which
goes back to the support base the PKK built among the Syrian Kurds during the 1980s
and 1990s. The establishment of the PYD in Syria in 2003 was the PKK’s response to its
weakened presence in Syria due to the improved Turkish-Syrian ties following the
capture of Abdullah Öcalan. As the relationship between the PKK and the Syrian regime
deteriorated after 1999, members of the PYD were exposed to widespread arrest and
persecution during the regime’s brutal repression of the Qamishli uprising in 2004.
Nonetheless, this situation changed when Turkish-Syrian relations once again became
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strained because of Turkey’s active support for the Syrian opposition after the eruption of
the 2011 uprising. Bashar Al-Assad quickly revived the old policy of playing the
“Kurdish card” by seeking to co-opt the PYD to strengthen his leverage vis-à-vis Turkey
by using the threat of an empowered PKK. While this shifting landscape offered the PYD
an opportunity to strengthen its presence in Syria, its reluctance to confront the regime
prompted increasing charges of collusion.
The link between the PYD and the PKK has been a major matter of controversy
for both the Syrian opposition and Turkey because of concerns over preventing the PKK
from regaining power in northern Syria. The PYD leaders never denied PYD’s affiliation
with the PKK. Salih Muslim, the chairman of the PYD, has noted the PKK and the PYD
share the same ideology and respect for Öcalan’s leadership, but underscored that the
organizational structure of the two parties is different and that the PYD is a distinct
organization that acts according to the distinct characteristics of politics in Syria.321
Muslim acknowledged that the PKK and the PYD consult to each other in making
decisions, yet the PKK respects that the PYD is in charge in Syrian Kurdistan and can do
what is best for Syria’s Kurds.322
Since the beginning of the uprising, PYD demonstrations were more pro-Kurd
than anti-regime. In other words, rather than adopting the discourse of “regime change,”
the PYD focused on bolstering the position of the Kurds within the uprising as well as
boosting its standing on the ground in Syrian Kurdistan. The fact the PYD abstained from
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using anti-regime language, coupled with its reputation as the successor of the PKK’s
legacy in Syria, quickly put it in the spotlight on accusations of siding with the regime.
Nonetheless, the accusations against the PYD relied largely on “suspicions” and
“speculations” rather than any credible evidence.323 After the eruption of the uprising, the
relationship between the PYD and the regime could be best explained in the context of
their coinciding interests under the existing political circumstances in Syria. The regime
sought to contain anti-regime protests by benefiting from Kurdish-Turkish and TurkishArab tensions while the PYD seized the opportunity to consolidate its position and
advance the Kurdish cause in Syria. While the positions taken by the two towards each
other developed mainly out of convenience, their relationship remained essentially
contentious. The growing influence of the PYD in the Kurdish regions of Syria weakened
the regime’s hold in the country’s northeast. The PYD, in the meantime, came into
conflict with both the Arab and other Kurdish opposition groups due to persistent
allegations of cooperating with the government.
In July 2012, significant developments took place in Syria that directly affected
both the uprising and the Kurdish opposition. In mid-July, the PYD drove out
government officials and security forces from several Kurdish cities, effectively taking
control of these territories. On July 21, 2012, an ultimatum was issued by the PYD
calling on all members of the Syrian army to withdraw from the Kurdish areas or face
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consequences.324 By July 24, 2012, the PYD forces took control of all the Kurdish areas
in Syria except for the city of Qamishli, following the withdrawal of the government
security and political units from these areas. Anti-PYD actors, particularly Turkey,
claimed that the capture of Kurdish towns by the PYD without resistance from the
government forces is further proof of collaboration between the PYD and the regime.
Nonetheless, the PYD pointed to the weakening of the regime and the Kurds’
organizational power as reasons for the government’s decision to avoid confronting the
Kurds. In a BBC interview Salih Muslim underscored that observation:
As the clashes were spreading all over Syria, we took action to protect the
Kurdish regions from violence. We are able to govern ourselves. We have
the power for to do so. We warned them (government forces) to leave the
Kurdish areas. Otherwise we would resort to different measures. They
were aware of the people’s demands and that’s why they gave in without
blood being spilled.325
It is true that despite sporadic clashes between the regime forces and the Kurds,
the main Kurdish towns and cities in northern Syria were secured without much of a
fight. The importance of July 2012 for the regime was that the Arab opposition launched
an offensive in Damascus. For the first time, the uprising spread to the capital, which was
alarming for the government. Bashar Al-Assad had loosened his grip on the Kurdish
regions, which allowed him to tighten it elsewhere. Enhanced PYD control in the
country’s north was potentially beneficial for Assad in terms of constraining the Arab
opposition and preventing them from taking control of the border areas, which provided
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the regime a further opportunity to exploit both the Turkish and Arab fears of Kurdish
secessionist aspirations.
However, the regime was also aware of the Kurds’ organizational capacity and its
ability to mobilize on a large scale since the events of Qamishli in 2004. The PYD, in
particular, draws its strength from its effective organization. After it was officially
established in Syria, the PYD formed local committees that were in charge with specific
activities in Kurdish regions. The local committees were formed mainly for the
organization of Kurdish society as part of the PYD’s “democratic self-governance
project,” which was accepted in the third party conference in 2007. After the beginning of
the unrest, those committees took a more active stance by opening cultural and language
centers throughout Kurd-populated areas. The fact that these activities met no
government resistance played a significant role in raising suspicions about Baath-PYD
collaboration. Nonetheless, Salih Muslim states that:
The regime has had no possibility to attack us. If it does attack us, it will
see what happens. We are profiting from the unrest. It is a historical
chance for us. We have a right and we are making use of it.326
Muslim also explains the purpose of these activities in the context of PYD’s
vision of the future of the Kurds and democracy in Syria:
These are concrete steps to democratic autonomy. By this we do not mean
autonomy that needs to be clear. It’s a matter of creating a new society
from the bottom up. It’s about culture, institutions, structure, organization,
towns, and cities…the PYD advocates for a free, democratic and plural
Syria in which all minorities are recognized and respected within the
country’s political framework. In this sense, what has been achieved so far
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in Western Kurdistan could be seen as a model for the rest of the
country.327
The PYD also established a militia named People’s Protection Units (YPG),
which are responsible for maintaining order and protecting the lives of the people in
Kurdish-inhabited areas. The YPG was established after the 2004 Qamishli clashes, but it
did not become active until the 2011 uprising. Since the uprising, the YPG has functioned
as a defensive security force in the Kurdish areas, deploying forces in cities, forming
security check points, and controlling the boundaries of majority-Kurd populated areas as
well as border areas alongside Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey.
On the ground, Arab rebel groups have largely stayed away from Kurdishmajority areas. Similar to the strategy pursued with respect to the regime, the PYD
leadership repeatedly warned the armed Arab opposition group, Free Syrian Army (FSA),
to not intrude into Kurdish areas. The main concern of the PYD as well as the other
Kurdish parties is to protect the Kurdish areas from Arab-Baath clashes as it is well
known that once the FSA enters Kurdish towns, it will attract regime forces to intervene
as well. The FSA, on the other hand, despite its priority to overthrow the regime, is
unwilling to project weakness by allowing the Kurds to assert control in certain parts of
Syria. With more important battles to wage elsewhere in the country, the FSA heeded to
the warnings of the Kurds in practice, while at the same time adhering to its refusal to
concede to Kurdish demands for political decentralization in principle. Although the
FSA’s continued efforts to form battalions in Kurdish areas caused tensions between the
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FSA rebels and YPG militias, the parties signed a truce on 5 November 2012, agreeing
on cooperation in fight against the Assad regime.328
The actions of the PYD created discontent on all fronts. Turkey claimed that the
PYD took control of the Kurdish areas in coordination with the regime, while the KNC
and Arab opposition accused the PYD of betraying the revolution by collaborating with
the government. Nevertheless, regardless of how each party interpreted the events, the
movement of the PYD drew substantial world attention to the Syrian Kurds. As of
November 2012, the PYD emerged as the dominant force on the ground in Syrian
Kurdistan and established itself as a powerful third force in Syria that is willing to
confront Turkey, the Arab opposition, and the Assad regime.
Intra-Kurdish Party Relations
Since the beginning of the uprising, the PYD has been exposed to much criticism
by the other Kurdish parties because it primarily strives to consolidate its own position
and monopolize the Syrian Kurds instead of working to advance the Kurdish cause. The
party was also exposed to numerous allegations of threatening and kidnapping Kurdish
activists from both the SNC and KNC, which were all rejected by Salih Muslim.
Moreover, membership of the PYD in the NCB further exacerbated the claims that the
party is co-opted by the Assad regime.
On July 11, 2012, the PYD and KNC decided to take a united stand against Assad
and signed an agreement to jointly administer the Kurdish areas in Syria that were
liberated from the Assad regime with the newly-created Supreme Kurdish Committee
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(SKC). Until this accord (the Erbil Agreement), the Syrian Kurdish scene was largely
defined by an uneasy rivalry between the KNC and the PYD. When the KNC was
established in October 2011, the primary reason behind the PYD’s refusal to join was the
KNC’s ties with the alliance between Turkey, the US and Kurdistan Regional
Government. The fact the KNC was formed under the sponsorship of KRG distanced the
PYD particularly because of the party’s concern over a possible Turkish influence on
Kurdish politics in Syria. Salih Muslim claimed that the PYD would not work with
anyone who supports foreign intervention and that the PYD would join the KNC on the
condition that the Council openly denounces its support for Turkish intervention in Syria.
The Erbil Agreement was the result of the two Kurdish camps’ recognition of
their own vulnerabilities. The discontent among the Kurdish opposition groups regarding
the rise of the PYD had been mixed with an awareness concerning its efficiency.
“Whether we want it or not, the PYD is currently the strongest force in al-Qamishli,” said
Azad Muhiyuddin, a member of a Kurdish youth group. “Without the PYD nothing
works. What the PYD has accomplished in fifteen days, the KNC could not achieve in
five months.”329 Although the KNC was critical of the cultural and military activities of
the PYD, the local committees and security forces organized by the PYD in the Kurdish
areas played a significant role in filling the vacuum caused by the state’s weakening
power and it effectively responded to the Kurdish populations’ thirst for strong and
efficient leadership. Lacking both the grassroots support and a military force, it became
increasingly hard for other Kurdish groups to avoid cooperation with the PYD.
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As for the PYD, cooperation with the KNC was a necessary step in order for the
party to strengthen both its domestic and international legitimacy. While the KNC enjoys
international partners, the PYD has been largely isolated internationally despite being
strong locally. There has also been a widespread expectation among Syrian Kurds,
including the supporters of the PYD, that the Kurdish parties work together to secure
Syrian Kurdish rights. Despite the strong domestic support it enjoys, it has been
increasingly difficult for the PYD leadership to ignore this expectation. In that sense, the
reconciliation reached through the Erbil Agreement was significant for the PYD in terms
of both maintaining local legitimacy and countering the accusations of loyalty to the PKK
and the regime by reassuring the Kurdish public that Syrian Kurdish interests are the
party’s priority.
The creation of the Supreme Kurdish Committee was an important step in terms
of overcoming mutual suspicions. Nevertheless, tensions persisted mainly because of the
fact that the PYD remained dominant in administering the Kurdish towns and
commanding the Kurdish militia. As a single party, the PYD’s organizational capacity
largely derives from its ability to make decisions and execute tasks quickly, whereas the
fact that the KNC has to accommodate the interests of fifteen different parties greatly
hampers its ability to organize effectively. Despite the conciliatory rhetoric of the Erbil
Agreement, distrust persisted on both sides. Both the PYD and the KNC accused each
other of pursuing separate agendas instead of committing to the authority of the SKC. For
the KNC, the relationship of the PYD with the PKK and the regime continued to be a
controversial issue. The PYD, for its part, expressed concern over fragmentation within
KNC and its dysfunctional decision-making procedures.
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The implementation of the Erbil Agreement remained fragile. However, despite
attempts by both parties to suspend their membership during the months following the
accord, by late 2012, both the PYD and the KNC came to the conclusion that none of
them could afford antagonizing the other and that preventing Kurdish infighting should
be the priority of all the Kurdish parties in Syria. Although they hold different visions for
the Kurds’ role in a post-Assad Syria,330 the PYD and KNC reflect common concern over
the Arab opposition’s reluctance to recognize Kurdish rights, judging from the
dominance of Muslim Brotherhood in the SNC and its vision of the new order that will
eventually emerge in Damascus.
The Erbil Agreement created an opportunity for both camps to focus on the
common desire to resist both the regime and Arab domination. The unfolding of the
Syrian Kurdish political scene as a battleground between the pro-PKK and pro-Barzani
forces only played into the hands of the regime and the Arab opposition which seek to
benefit from Kurdish infighting. Furthermore, the lack of unity among the Kurdish
political forces on the ground severely diminished the international backing that Syrian
Kurds strongly need in order to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the Arab opposition and
achieve Kurdish demands in the post-Assad Syria. Despite their ideological and political
affiliations with their external sponsors, both the PYD and the members of the KNC must
forge a political role that is attuned to local realities. Continued efforts to implement the
Erbil accord despite continuing tensions are primarily the result of the understanding that
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a strategy of reconciliation in the name of Syrian Kurdish unity has the best chance of
succeeding.
The Role of the Regional Actors in the Syrian Uprising
The Syrian uprising has significant potential to challenge the status-quo in the
Middle East as the consequences of a possible regime change in Syria are likely to affect
the foreign policies of a number of critical players in the region. As far as the Kurdish
question in Syria is concerned, this is shown in the relationships of the PYD and the KNC
with three important actors: Turkey, the PKK and the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Throughout the first half of 2012, the KRG President Massoud Barzani made a
concerted effort to reconcile the two Kurdish blocs in Syria. His attempts finally
succeeded in July 2012 with the conclusion of the Erbil Agreement between the PYD and
the KNC. The Erbil Agreement highlighted a number of concerns held by Barzani. By
hosting the founding meetings of the KNC, Barzani aimed at enhancing his potential role
in Syrian Kurdish politics by uniting the fragmented Kurdish parties in the country.
Nonetheless, Barzani’s involvement with the Syrian Kurds was largely shaped by both
the long-term tensions between the PKK and Barzani’s KDP, and the KRG’s close
relationship with Turkey, whose primary aim was to contain the influence of the PYD in
Syria.
Given their different ideological roots, Abdullah Öcalan’s PKK and Barzani’s
KDP have always presented two competing paradigms of Kurdish nationalism. The
PKK’s Marxist-Leninist background was set against the KDP’s conservative-tribal
character. The PKK abandoned most of its Marxist-Leninist thinking by the early 1990s,
but remained essentially opposed to tribalism. Furthermore, the relationship of each party
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with Turkey has been in stark contrast since 2007, when the KRG started to develop
strong economic ties with Turkey in order to reduce the Iraqi Kurds’ dependence on
Baghdad as opposed to the PKK’s continued struggle against the Turkish government for
the political and cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey.
Barzani’s strategy of supporting the KNC after the eruption of the uprising served
the purposes of both expanding the KPD’s sphere of influence among the Syrian Kurds
vis-à-vis the PKK, and mitigating the concerns of Ankara, which saw Barzani as an ally
in containing and marginalizing the PYD. However, given the political and military
strength of the PYD, it soon became apparent that this strategy was not sustainable in the
long run, particularly in the context of the pan-Kurdish ambitions of Barzani. There is no
doubt Barzani has considerable influence over the Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iran,
Iraq and Syria given the international legitimacy enjoyed by KRG as well as the respect
for long-term political and military struggle conducted by the KDP throughout the
twentieth century under the leadership of his father, Mullah Mustafa Barzani.
Nevertheless, since its launch in the 1980s, the PKK movement has posed a serious
challenge to the KDP by achieving extensive grassroots support not only among the
Kurds of Turkey, but also in other parts of Kurdistan. In this respect, the Erbil Agreement
underscored both Barzani’s acknowledgement of the strength of the PKK and the
recognition of the political and military risks associated with PYD-KNC fighting.
Given the memories of a bloody civil war between the KDP and PUK in the
1990s, Kurd-to-Kurd warfare is highly unpopular among the Kurds across the Middle
East. Both the KDP and PKK are aware that they cannot ignore the expectations of the
masses for Kurdish unity. Besides, it is well known that any Kurdish infighting in Syria
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will have implications for the already delicate PKK-KDP relations in northern Iraq. Thus,
Barzani’s efforts to establish a PYD-KNC pact reflects a careful balancing act between
avoiding a PKK-KRG conflict in Iraq, refraining from antagonizing the KRG’s regional
ally, Turkey, and a quest for enhancing his regional image among the Kurds.
Turkey’s policy towards the Kurdish issue in Syria is shaped entirely in the
context of the long-term battle between the PKK and the Turkish government. It was
alarming for Turkey when the PYD took control of several Kurdish towns in northern
Syria in July 2012. Perceiving these developments as a manifestation of the PKK’s
growing power in Syrian Kurdistan, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
immediately declared that Turkey had the “undisputed right” to intervene if the PKK
were to set up camps in Syria.331
Looking back on what happened in Iraq after the US intervention in 2003,
Turkey’s major concern is the possibility that Syrian Kurds might enjoy the same
autonomy in the post-Assad Syria as did the Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq. However, a
possible unilateral Turkish intervention not only lacks international backing but also
carries the risk of causing conflict between Turkey and PYD’s armed militia with direct
consequences for Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. The revival of the peace talks between
Turkey and the PKK in the first half of 2013 put further pressure on Turkey to soften its
policy towards the Syrian Kurds. Thus, Turkey increasingly turned to its ally, the
Kurdistan Regional Government, in order to maintain influence over the course of events
shaping the Syrian Kurdish politics throughout the uprising.
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Although Turkey gave Barzani a leading role in containing the PYD, the interests
of the two actors are likely to diverge in the long term. Since the development of closer
economic and diplomatic ties between Turkey and KRG after 2007, Turkey constantly
put pressure on Barzani to fight against the PKK in Qandil Mountain. However, these
pressures never led to a Turkish-KRG military cooperation against the PKK. Barzani
declared the KRG is principally opposed to a military solution of the Kurdish problem in
Turkey and that the peshmerga forces would not take part in any military operation
against the PKK within Iraqi territory. Barzani’s refusal to confront the PKK derives
from both his unwillingness to get involved in a Kurd-on-Kurd military confrontation,
and the popularity of the PKK among the Kurdish youth in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Since 2011, Turkey used the same strategy of putting pressure on Barzani to limit
the influence of the PYD in Syria by playing on the competition between the KDP and
PKK and Barzani’s pan-Kurdish ambitions. From the perspective of Turkey, the Erbil
Agreement represents a strategy of containing the PYD by increasing the voice of the
pro-Barzani KNC in the decision-making procedures concerning the Kurds in Syria. For
Barzani, the Erbil Agreement serves more to “integrate” the PYD, as opposed to
“containing” it, with the expectation the PYD would be encouraged to cut ties with the
PKK in order to become a political body focused exclusively on the Syrian Kurdish
interests. This strategy gives Barzani additional leverage over Ankara by strengthening
the KRG’s soft power by putting it in the position to be a possible mediator between
Turkey and the PYD, similar to the role Barzani is willing to play in the peace talks
between Turkey and the PKK.
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The peace process that took effect between the PKK and Turkey in early 2013 is
undeniably tied to the developments in Syria with important effects on Iraq. The
possibility of the emergence of a decentralized Syria similar to the federal structure in
Iraq after the collapse of the Assad regime coupled with the rise of the PYD among the
Syrian Kurds, prompted Turkey to launch a solution process. The PKK, on the other
hand, uses the power of the PYD in Syria as leverage against Turkey during the peace
negotiations. As a response to the Turkish fears of the emergence of another autonomous
Kurdish region across its borders, the PYD leader Salih Muslim repeated several times
that he is ready to engage in dialogue with Turkey and that the PYD has no intention of
threatening Turkish security.332
The relations between Turkey and PYD largely echo the pre-2007 situation
between Turkey and KRG. Nonetheless, a more sanguine approach towards the alliance
between the KNC and PYD and the emerging Kurdish region in Syria might, in fact,
provide Turkey with significant opportunities to consolidate its regional power. Turkish
support for the Syrian Kurds will not only make significant contributions to the ongoing
peace process in Turkey, but also expand Turkey’s role in the evolution of the Kurdish
question in the Middle East. Lacking significant international support and largely
alienated from the Tehran, Damascus and Baghdad regimes, the Kurds of the Middle East
are increasingly looking to Turkey as their only potential ally in the region. Salih
Muslim’s statements since the Erbil Agreement confirm this stance, but on the condition
that Turkey solves its own Kurdish problem in a democratic way and recognizes the
rights of the Kurds in the region.
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CHAPTER VI
KURDS IN IRAN
It was a sensitive time and the world media was watching Iran. Kurdish
participation in the protests would have shown that the Iranian movement
was not only the Green Movement, and that the Kurdish movement was
part of it. Because Kurds make up only twelve percent of the population in
Iran, they cannot change Iran alone.333
The post-presidential election protests in Iran in 2009 had grown into a major
popular opposition movement that posed a great challenge to Iran’s power structure. It
was a unique phenomenon that had not occurred since the Iranian revolution that took
place nearly 30 years ago. The Kurdish areas in Iran as well as the other areas populated
predominantly by Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities remained mostly calm and did not
join the so-called Green movement. Commenting on the Green movement’s approach to
the ethnic movements in Iran, Abdullah Muhtadi, the leader of one of the major Iranian
Kurdish organizations, the Komala, emphasized, “the Green movement’s platform was
not very clear and did not include anything that would please the Kurds.”334
Muhtadi’s statement is significant in the context of the multi-ethnic and multicultural structure of Iranian society, which goes back to pre-Islamic times, but this
diversity has become a significant component of Iranian political life particularly during
the post-constitutionalism era. Rather than homogeneous, the Iranian citizenry is a
differentiated community with important crisscross divisions in terms of socioeconomic
class backgrounds, genders, cultural practices, provincial and ethnic ties, and political
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aspirations.335 In this respect, while the Iranian Kurdish movement has common ground
with Kurdish movements in other parts of Kurdistan, its development in the Iranian
context has been considerably intertwined with the broader problem of national
minorities in Iran.
Although Iran had several characteristics favorable for the development of
nationalism in the pre-modern period, such as the concept of a territorial Iran, the Persian
language and Shia Islam, the phenomenon of nationalism has become a major key to
understanding Iranian attitudes and political behavior in the twentieth century. There
have been many different conceptions of Iranian nationalism in the modern era, including
linguistic, territorial, ethnic and religious. Firouzeh Kashani-Sabet points out that “what
is unique to the nationalist discourse in Iran is the way in which the varying emphasis on
these complementary but often competing articulations of nationalism has transformed
Iranian politics in radical ways.”336 In this regard, different constructions of nationalism
have generated a contentious sociocultural sphere at various stages of Iran’s modern
history.
Among the various articulations of Iranian nationalism, the policies of centralism
and the emphasis on territorial integrity remain to be the most persistent themes when
addressing the national question in Iran particularly after the inception of the first Pahlavi
state in 1926. This situation created a relatively stable type of relationship between the
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state and minority groups in Iran that was manifested in the successive regimes’
perception of Iran’s national diversity as more of a “problem” than as a matter of
pluralism and democratic participation. While the definition of “Iranianness” was
affected by dramatic alterations in the understanding of nationalism in Iran throughout its
modern history – ranging from the secular nationalism of the Pahlavi State to the
religious focus of the Islamic Republic – minority-state relationships have been
principally marked by “continuity” rather than “change.”
Abbas Vali observes that Kurdish nationalism in Iran has its roots in the political
and cultural processes and practices of the construction of the modern nation state and
national identity in Iran.337 If the revolution of 1905-6 marks the birth of Iranian
nationalism, Kurdish responses to the politics of territorial centralism and the cultural
process of the construction of a uniform Iranian national identity pursued by the Pahlavi
state mark the formation of a Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran, which culminated in
the Republic of Mahabad in 1946.338 The Mahabad Republic not only marked the advent
of modern nationalism in Kurdistan, but it also defined the Kurdish issue in Iran as a
denial of the Kurdish identity by the sovereign power and the Kurds’ resistance to this
denial.
The establishment of the Republic of Mahabad, along with the Azerbaijani
movement in northern Iran during 1945-46, played a significant role in transforming the
discursive articulation of the “national question,” which was mainly defined in terms of a
single Iranian national identity that eclipsed ethnic loyalties. In effect, the nationalist
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movements of the Kurds and Azeris transformed the national question in Iran into an
“ethnic question” and challenged the democratic promise of the constitutional movement
of 1906 on grounds it failed to recognize the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Iranian
society.
In the essentially settled territorial self-understanding of Iran, the ethnic challenge
the Kurdish and Azerbaijani movements posed was portrayed as a threat to the territorial
integrity and unity of the Iranian nation. Additionally, the fact the ethnic challenges to the
sovereign power emerged as Soviet-backed movements expanded the anti-imperialist
scope of the Iranian national discourse and consolidated the territorial conception of
Iranian nationalism, which was defined in terms of ethnic separatism and external
intervention. The popular appeal of this anti-imperialist narrative has historically been
facilitated by the association of domestic problems with external threats, which became
an integral part of Iran’s intricate political culture. The oil nationalization of 1951, the
Iran-Iraq war of 1980s, and the recent discussions on Iran’s nuclear program enabled
successive governments to unite and rally the Iranian people around a common discourse
of national strength, defense, and national pride. In this context, the reality of Iran’s
ethnonational diversity has often been represented as a national security issue in official
state discourses rather than a political question of how to respond to the demands of
ethnic minorities for equal rights.
The Status of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Iran
The question of minorities has often remained obscure in Iranian nationalist
historiography. The nationalist ideas promoted by the Constitutional Revolution of 1906
were oriented towards establishing a modern nation state, protecting Iran’s autonomy vis-
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à-vis foreign powers and consolidating democracy through greater citizen participation in
political life. Although the Constitutional Law of 1906 sets forth the institutional form
and organizational structure of the state, the conditions of citizenship were explained
vaguely and the concepts of citizen and citizenship were not explicitly addressed. Rather,
Iranians are considered “subjects” of the monarch. The rights and obligations commonly
associated with citizenship in the modern democratic sense of the term appear in this
notion of “subject” in the Constitution.
The constitutionalist discourse introduced the millat (the people) as a unified
force and the source of sovereignty, invested with the right to determine the policies of
the government through its representatives to the Majlis (Parliament).339 In the
constitutionalist discourse, millat signified everyone regardless of professional, social, or
religious status.340 In defining the constituent elements of the millat, the constitutionalists
emphasized language as the essential component of national identity, which resulted in
attempts to purify the Persian language of Arabic terms and to dissociate Iran from Islam.
In their struggle for a new identity, the emphasis on pre-Islamic history and the Persian
language emerged as important components of a strategy for breaking away from ArabIslamic culture and identity and forming a new political conceptualization.341
The Constitutional Law of 1906-07 does not contain an ethnic definition of the
conditions of citizenship and remains silent on the subject of minorities. The ethnic and
339

According to article 26 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907, "The powers of the state
derive from the nation." Quoted in Tavakoli-Targhi, Mohamad (1990). “Refashioning Iran: Language and
Culture during the Constitutional Revolution,” Iranian Studies, 23 (1/4): 98.
340

Article 8 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907 states: “The inhabitants of the Empire of
Iran shall enjoy equal rights before the law.”
341

Tavakoli-Targhi, 93.

242

cultural diversity of the Iranian society were subsumed under the general notion of the
Iranian people, whose identity was defined by pre-Islamic history and the Persian
language. Using this framework, Millat was defined as a people speaking in one language
and provided the primary discursive condition for the articulation of the Constitutionalist
language and identity. Although the Constitution contains a separate section on the
institutional framework for local administrations, the ethnic and linguistic particularities
of certain provinces simply were not taken into consideration. The local and regional
languages, including Kurdish, were neither recognized nor denied.
The marginalization of ethnic differences in the Constitutional era revealed the
latent authoritarianism of the discourse of modernization, which required unity,
permanence and the incorporation of citizens into Iran’s nascent democratic polity on the
basis of the rights and obligations defined in the Constitution. The incorporation of
citizens on the basis of a collective identity was precluded by the silence of the
Constitution on the ethnic and cultural diversity of Iran. Soon, however, the emerging
Iranian nationalism broke this silence through the official public discourse, particularly
after the rise of the Pahlavi State, with an argument for national revival and progress that
was premised on the need for political and economic modernization requiring political
and administrative centralism.342
Reza Shah Pahlavi (1926-1941) extended state control over all aspects of life –
the economy, transportation, education, language, culture, media, foreign trade, and
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religion.343 History and language were the primary constituent elements of the emerging
Iranian nationalism under the Pahlavis. In his attempt to diminish the influence of Islam
in Iran, Reza Shah sought to shape Iranian nationalism by infusing it with a distinctly
secular ideology. The state ideology advertised “Iranians” as a “pure Aryan race” in order
to de-emphasize Arab and any Islamic influences on Iranian history. Hence, pre-Islamic
culture and Persian language were officially promoted while writing or speaking in nonPersian languages in public places was declared illegal and punished.344 During Reza
Shah’s reign, all school textbooks were printed in Persian by the authorities in Tehran,
and the teaching of any other languages was strictly prohibited.345
The policies of territorial centralism and the construction of a uniform Iranian
national identity were pursued by force by the first Pahlavi state from 1926 to 1941, and
then, after a short lull, enforced again by the second Pahlavi state until 1979.346 The
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the downfall of the monarchy did nothing to effectively
change the national dynamic. Despite the dramatic and significant shift from the secular
nationalism of the Pahlavi State to the religious focus of the Islamic Republic, relatively
little change was seen in minority-state relations following the Islamic revolution.347 The
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Islamic Revolution emphasized religious identity as supranational and supra-ethnic, and
like the linguistically-defined conception of national identity promoted by the Pahlavis,
the Republic refused to recognize heterogeneity in Iran.
After years of difficulties under the monarchy, minorities expected the Islamic
Revolution would enhance their position and afford them greater autonomy and cultural
rights. Some believed Ayatollah Khomeini’s calls for the revival of the Islamic
community would promote the recognition of the ethno-religious pluralistic nature of
society and pave the way for the acknowledgement of the loyal, but autonomous ethnic
areas. However, hopes for decentralization and greater rights for minorities were dashed
early on as the new government continued to enforce the extant system and proved to be
largely negligent of the ethnic issue in Iran. The Islamic Republic created a centrally
controlled system similar to the Shah but, did it within an Islamic framework.
The most striking and obvious contrast between the Pahlavi and Islamic
Republican State is the use of Islam as an element of common culture. Although the
Pahlavis identified themselves as Muslims, religion was not used as a basis for
identification with the state. Rather, the monarchy sought to develop and extend the sense
of Iranian nation defined primarily in terms of Persian language and literature and preIslamic history. Islam is taken as the focal symbol of identity between the state and the
people in the Islamic Republic, and is central to the common culture promoted by the
state.348 However, the revolution imbedded Shia Islam as the main pillar of the Iranians’
348
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collective identity, which prompted grievances by the Sunnis who were mostly Turkmen,
a minority of Arabs, Balochs and Kurds. According to the Shia leadership, to talk about
ethnic minorities in the Islamic domain was considered an offence against true religion.
In November 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini explained why the mention of ethnic
minorities had been eliminated from the common culture:
Sometimes the word minority is used to refer to people such as the Kurds,
Lurs, Turks, Persians, Balochs, and such. These people should not be
called minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference
between these brothers. In Islam, such a difference has no place at all.
There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages,
for instance, the Arabs or the Persians. It is very probable that such
problems have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim
countries to be united. They create the issues of nationalism, of panArabism, pan-Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic
doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and the Islamic philosophy.349
Ethnic differences lie at the intersections of religious differences in Iran. Most of
the Sunnis constitute distinct ethnic minorities residing in the Kurdistan, Sistan and
Balochistan, Golestan and Khuzestan provinces.350 Under the Constitution of Islamic
Republic, only certain religious minorities, such as Zaroastrians, Christians and Jews, are
recognized.351 The constitution does not recognize ethnic minorities and the government
does not use ethnicity or language as a variable in conducting the national census. Thus,
it is difficult to find accurate numbers on the different ethnic groups in Iran. Estimates
suggest that fifty-one percent of Iran’s population is ethnic Persian with the rest being
Azeris (twenty-four percent), Gilaki and Mazandarani (eight percent), Kurd (seven
349
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percent), Arab (three percent), Lur (two percent), Baloch (two percent), Turkmen (two
percent), and other (one percent).352
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic establishes the principle of equality in
Article 19, which states that “all people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to
which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like, do not
bestow any privilege.” The constitution also has specific provisions guaranteeing equal
rights to minorities. Article 15 of the constitution states that:
The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is
Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as textbooks, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional
and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching
of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.
Persian, despite being the official language, is the mother tongue of barely half of
the population in Iran. Other languages include Turkic, Kurdish, Balochi, Luri, Arabic,
Gilaki, Assyrian, and Armenian. 353 As a state entity, Iran is constitutionally at ease with
its ethnic minorities and the Islamic Republican state has not passed sweeping laws to
restrict minority language publications or cultural activities. Nor does the Islamic
Republic proclaim itself for Persians in an exclusive way. Its constitution recognizes the
national minorities’ right to use their languages in the mass media and education so long
as they are used in conjunction with Persian.
Although the constitution allows the teaching of local and ethnic languages in
schools, no permanent measures have been introduced in Iran’s education system to
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facilitate teaching in minority languages or to teach such languages as a second
language.354 Even if Article 15 is fully implemented, it falls short of guaranteeing the full
scope of human rights associated with the use of one’s mother tongue. While it permits
the use of local languages in media and education, the phrase “regional and tribal
languages” includes no recognition of the linguistic identities of national and ethnic
minorities or of the mother language as a fundamental principle. Further, the article does
not obligate – only “allows” – the state or private sector to provide instruction of
literature or presentation of mass media in ethnic languages.355
The use of the Kurdish language in print and education in Iran is frequently
thwarted. The ability to teach Kurdish in schools has long been an issue of contention
between the Kurds and the central government. There are no Kurdish public schools in
Iran. There are Kurdish courses in both public and private universities in Tehran, but not
in the areas inhabited by the Kurds.356 The state-run radio and television broadcasts are
predominantly in Persian and only a limited number of programs are run in minority
languages.357 There are media in the Kurdish language, but this is subject to censorship as
is any other media in the country. There is no Kurdish television channel but some
programs broadcast in Kurdish on the general channels.358 Self-censorship is best strategy
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to survive for many media-outlets. The regime establishes boundaries on discourse and
topics such as regional ethnic demands are off limits.359 Journalist accounts and news
media publishing in Kurdish or coverage of Kurdish-related issues have been targeted by
the regime, especially since President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad took office in 2005.
The Islamic Republic clearly broke with the Pahlavi practice of disallowing the
use of regional languages in broadcasting and publications. Problems arise when Kurdish
rights activists link their human rights work - drawing attention to the government’s
failure to observe international human rights standards - to their Kurdish identity.360 In
other words, while limited space exists to assert Kurdish cultural identity, there is no
space to operate as Kurds politically. Kurds seeking to express their views or beliefs in
connection with their opposition politics face the same restrictions as all Iranians. Thus, it
can be said that it is the destruction of the political organization of the Kurds rather than
their ethnic identity per se, that forms the strategic objective of successive regimes in
Iran, particularly in the context of the persistent emphasis placed on politics of territorial
centralism.
When analyzing the role of minority politics in the Islamic Republic, it is
important to note the central problem lies more with the implementation than with the
law itself. Though the correct implementation of the constitution could contribute to the
solution of Iran’s ethnic issues, the aforementioned provisions were never fully
implemented and had little potency in reality. The essence of the legal problems facing
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Iran’s national minorities is not that there is a body of discriminatory, anti-minority or
Persian-first legislation. Rather, the ethnic movements in Iran face the same obstacles
confronted by other pluralistic, secular political movements in the country – that much
law in the Islamic Republic permits arbitrary clerical rule and fails to protect basic
freedoms.361 Constitutional provisions establishing the right to freedom of expression,
political participation and other basic freedoms are rendered impotent by clauses
asserting the primacy of undefined Islamic interests.362
The Legacy of the Republic of Mahabad
The discourse on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities officially became
part of Iran’s political agenda during the post-revolutionary period and importance of the
ethnicity in the discussion on democratization in Iran increased in the 1990s. The issue of
minority rights became part of the political agenda during the reform movement of the
1990s, which was evidenced in the slogan of Mohammad Khatami’s presidential election
campaign in 1997, “Iran for all Iranians.” To better understand of both the pro-democracy
movement in Iran and the role of ethnicity in the evolution of the democratization
discourse, one needs to focus on the process that resulted in the establishment of the
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946.
The Mahabad Republic is generally addressed in academic discourse from two
perspectives: as a symbol of Kurdish nationalism and statehood in the twentieth century
and as an attempt at Kurdish independence that was victimized by the power politics of
361
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the Cold War era and Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf. Western scholarship
explains the Kurdish movement of 1945-46 in terms of Soviet communist intentions
rather than from the perspective of the Kurds’ legitimate rights to self-determination or
self-rule.363 Unified by the ideological and political perspectives of anticommunism,
these accounts protected the monarchical system that was a stronghold of the West
against the USSR and avoided highlighting the struggle of the peoples of Iran for
democracy, rights, and freedom.364 Besides providing historical and descriptive accounts
of the rise and fall of the Republic, the literature generally falls short of portraying the
Mahabad Republic as a genuine national struggle of the Kurds, particularly in terms of its
repercussions for the transformation of the “national” question in Iran into a question of
rights, civil and democratic liberties.
Abbas Vali’s (2011) detailed discussion of Kurdish nationalism from 1905 to
1947 provides an in-depth analysis of the Kurdish nationalist discourse promoted by the
Republic of Mahabad. However, Vali considers the relationship between the Kurdish
movement and Iranian government largely within the framework of an ethnically and
linguistically defined dichotomy between the Kurdish “self” and Persian “other,” which
he sees as the main defining characteristic of Kurdish identity.365 In this respect, Vali
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emphasizes the importance of the Kurdish Republic in terms of the Kurdish resistance to
strategies of domination and control, which were expressed in terms of the struggle for
the defense of ethnic and linguistic rights. Accordingly, he does not consider the demands
for cultural rights and autonomy as part of the Kurdish political endeavor to challenge
and transform the foundations of Iran’s body politic. Rather, he views the political
requirements of the autonomist discourse emphasized in the founding manifesto of the
Republic as incompatible with the ethnic-nationalist political project as defined in terms
of political sovereignty of the Kurdish nation.
Shortly before the declaration of the Republic, when asked whether it was true
that the Kurds wanted separation and independence from Iran, Qazi Muhamad, the leader
of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), responded, “No, it is not true, this
is because we want the Iranian government to implement the constitutional law, we want
to live autonomously under the Iranian flag.”366 He explained the position of the KDPI by
stating, “The Kurdish nation in Iran should be free to administer its own affairs and live
within the Iranian borders.”367 The political objectives expressed in Muhammad’s
statements were also listed in the KDPI’s party program, declared on November 8, 1945.
According to the program, some of the party policies were:
1. The Kurds to be free and independent in the management of their local
affairs and to receive Kurdish independence within the borders of Persia.
2. Be allowed to study Kurdish and to administer their affairs in the
Kurdish language.
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3. Government officials definitely to be appointed from among the local
population.
4. Members of the Kurdistan Provincial Council to be elected immediately
in accordance with the Constitutional laws, to supervise all public and
Government works.368
The autonomist discourse in the KDPI Program and the founding manifesto of the
Republic of Mahabad is informed by a specific reading of the Iranian Constitution of
1906, which provides the legal basis for advocating pluralism, the decentralization of
political power, administrative and cultural autonomy, and respect for ethnic and
religious differences. The Iranian Kurdish movement tied the realization of the ethnic and
linguistic rights of the Kurds directly to the establishment of a genuine and lasting
democratic political process in Iran through the “correct” implementation of the
constitution. The Kurdish leadership referred to the institutional framework outlined by
the constitutional provisions that regulate the Provincial and District Councils (anjumans)
in providing their demands for self-government with legal legitimacy. The articles
concerning the Provincial Councils in the Constitution of 1906 included:
Art. 90. Throughout the whole empire provincial and departmental
councils shall be established in the accordance with special regulations.
The fundamental laws regulating such assemblies are as follows.
Art. 91. The members of the provincial and departmental councils shall be
elected immediately by the people, according to the regulations governing
provincial and departmental councils.
Art. 92. The provincial and departmental councils are free to exercise
complete supervision over all reforms connected with the public
advantage, always provided that they observe the limitations prescribed by
Law.
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The Kurdish leadership considered to the Provincial and District Councils to be
democratic measures and devices for the decentralization of power in Iran, which could
provide an appropriate venue for the recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
structure of Iranian society. Thus, it became tantamount to revive the Provincial and
District Councils in order to implement decentralized administration, which had been
suppressed by the Pahlavi regime, and fulfill the Kurdish quest for cultural and
administrative autonomy.
Speaking as the leader of the KDPI at a press conference in Mahabad two weeks
before the declaration of the Republic, Qazi Muhammad made it clear the Kurdish
demands were based on the “implementation of the Constitutional Law by the Iranian
Government and that the Provincial and District Council for Kurdistan, as stipulated in
the Constitutional Law, should be established at once to administer and supervise all
social and governmental affairs.”369 The Kurdish leadership’s articulation of the demand
for regional autonomy not only underscores a legitimate, popular democratic right central
to democratic governance in Iran as a whole, but also the ethno-cultural aspect of the
movement that demanded the recognition of Kurdish identity and cultural and
administrative autonomy.
According to Vali, the popular-democratic presentation of the politics of regional
autonomy marginalized Kurdish ethnicity and ethnic/national differences.370 He asserts
that “early statements of the Kurdish position played down ethnic differences with
Persians; they are subordinated to the necessity of a common Iranian cause, the struggle
369
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for democracy in Iran.”371 Vali’s analysis of the discursive dynamics of Kurdish demands
is driven essentially by his definition of Kurdish identity, which he characterizes
primarily by the Kurdish community’s ethnic-linguistic difference and its “otherness”
relative to the sovereign identity in Iran. Accordingly, for Vali, the Kurdish search for
autonomy and cultural rights in the struggle for democracy in Iran marginalizes the
Kurdish ethnicity and its ethnic and linguistic otherness in the Kurdish nationalist
discourse.
Consider, on the other hand, the democratic discourse promoted both in Qazi
Muhammad’s statements and in KDPI’s party program, which principally targets the
dictatorial apparatus in Tehran which is viewed as the primary obstacle to the recognition
of the distinctiveness of the Kurds vis-à-vis the Persians and other ethnicities. For them, it
is the ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness of the Kurds that underlies the conception of
Kurdish independence, which is principally associated with the establishment of a
democratic institutional framework to provide the Kurds with authority over the
management of their local affairs. Qazi Muhammad, addressing a public meeting in
Mahabad shortly after the declaration of the Republic, argues:
The dictatorial apparatus in Tehran . . . for reasons that I have explained
has not yet understood the affairs of the Kurds properly. Otherwise [it
would have understood that] even after achieving our full independence,
we would wish to make it clear to the central government and also show to
the world that the Kurds have not done these things in order to deny their
brotherhood with the Persians, or to be proved not to be Iranians, but
rather to oppose the dictatorial apparatus [in Tehran] . . . . Otherwise if
freedom could be established in Iran there is no reason why all those who
live in Iran could not hold hands in brotherhood.372
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There is no doubt ethnic and linguistic differences played a role in the formation
of the Kurdish identity not only in Iran, but also in other parts of Kurdistan. However, as
confirmed by Qazi’s statements, if “otherness” is to be considered as a constitutive
element in the formation of Kurdish identity, then it is not the “Persian” ethnicity per se,
but the dictatorial apparatus of the Iranian central government that defines “otherness” for
the Kurds. The presentation of the Kurdish cause as such does not serve to marginalize
the Kurdish ethnicity as claimed by Vali. On the contrary, it promotes a discourse of
“coexistence” between the Kurds and the Persians as two distinct ethnicities under a
single democratic framework.
Kurdish demands for the implementation of the 1906 Constitution focused on the
need to implement the Provincial and District Councils, but the discourse of the Republic
involved more than political and administrative decentralization. Implicit in the demands
for the use of the Kurdish language in cultural, educational and administrative realms and
the appointment of government officials in the Kurdistan Province from among the local
population was a demand for a reformulation of the constitutional concept of citizenship.
The demand for local administrative autonomy not only involved political
decentralization, but also sought recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of Iranian society.
The autonomous governments established by the Kurdish and Azerbaijani
movements in 1945-46 implemented various reforms in the fields of education, economy,
agriculture, women’s and minority rights, which were seen by opposition forces
throughout Iran as a model of progress under a democratic regime.373 The emergence of
Kurdish and Azerbaijani autonomous regimes transformed the crucial problem
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confronting the various collectivities co-existing under the same political rubric in Iran.
The national question was no longer defined merely as a question of national identity and
national rights, but also as a constant reminder of the deficiencies and shortcomings of
the citizenship, democracy, and democratic political process within the juridico-political
framework of Iranian sovereignty. In other words, the focus of the national question in
Iran became less of an identity issue – “Who is an Iranian?” – and more of an
institutional matter – “How can the Iranians of all colors and ethnicities build a common
political life and effective institutions of government?”374
The Kurds and the State After the Islamic Revolution
After the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, the Kurdish movement in Iran
suffered serious setbacks. The KDPI continued its presence mostly as a clandestine
organization. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Kurdish political activists sought safe
haven in Iraqi Kurdistan, which made it practically impossible to effect change in Iran.
Since the autonomous governments in Mahabad and Tabriz were crushed by the
central government of Tehran in 1945-1946, successive governments saw any ethnicrelated demands as a security issue and threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. These
autonomous movements remained largely in the background until they reappeared in the
antimonarchy push that precipitated the 1979 Revolution. As the Iranian regime was
facing serious unrest in the late 1970s, the political conditions provided the KDPI an
opportunity to come back and raised hopes it could once again be a legal political party.
The end of the monarchy was viewed by the Kurds as a unique opportunity to push for
autonomy and recognition of their cultural rights by the new government in Iran.
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Therefore, the Kurds enthusiastically supported the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and
broadly participated in the revolutionary process from the outset. However, Kurdistan
and Tehran quickly became antagonistic as it became apparent the goals of the Kurds
were not compatible with Ayatollah Khomeini’s objective of establishing a strong and
centralized Islamic state.
Although the purpose of ridding Iran of the Pahlavi Dynasty’s rule mobilized the
entire Iranian population and brought together diverse political interests, from clerics to
communists as well as democrats and human rights activists in 1979, the democratic and
republican interests were soon subsumed by the more conservative, theocratic rule of
Ayatollah Khomeini. A renewed opposition to the Islamic government in Iran began to
form shortly after the revolution. Having toppled the Shah, the former revolutionaries
were soon being challenged by groups thirsting for change.
In post-revolutionary Iran, religion became a major divisive factor. The 1979
revolution created an Islamic state with a Shia leadership and marked a shift from a
linguistic nationalism to a religious one. The new Iranian nationalism gained great
strength from having the majority of the people from a single sect, but for those outside
the Shia orbit, identification with this nationalism became difficult.375 Sunni Muslims
made up about ten percent of the population in Iran and majority of Kurd, Baloch and
Turkmen populations are of this sect. As non-Persian speakers in Sunni Muslim
communities, the Kurds found their relationship vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic similar to
their relationship with the Pahlavi state.
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After the fall of the Shah’s regime, Kurdistan was among the first areas to rise up
against the new Islamic Republic. The reasons were easily discernible. When the Kurds
put their demands before the Islamic Republic, they were told all Iranians are Muslim and
ethnic identification is not to be emphasized. As individuals of non-Persian Muslim
background, one might expect the Kurds to have been integrated into the Islamic
Republican state more easily than into the Pahlavi state. However, according to Article
12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the official religion of Iran is Islam and
the Twelver Ja'fari School, which emphasizes the Shia nature of the state and establishes
Shia Islam as the principle of unity. The article states, “this principle will remain
eternally immutable.” If the Kurds could not be distinguished as an ethnic minority, then
a majority of them might have been able to invoke minority status as Sunnis. However,
Article 13 of the Constitution recognizes only the Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian
Iranians

as

religious

minorities.

Consequently,

the

Islamic

Republic’s

Shia

exceptionalism as well as its binding ideology of pan-Islamism, which dismisses ethnic
identification, the Kurds remain marginalized with respect to the state either as Kurds or
as Sunnis.
The first official Kurdish challenge to the new government occurred on April 1,
1979, when a national referendum was held in Iran concerning the name and form of the
new government. The Kurds, at the decision of the major Kurdish parties, KDPI and
Komala, and many other secular groups in the country boycotted the referendum. When
the referendum resulted in an overwhelming victory for the new Islamic regime, the
Kurds shifted the focus of their political struggle to the drafting of Iran’s new
constitution. They took part in the election of Assembly of Experts on August 18, 1979,
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a group responsible for writing the new constitution. However, the Kurds were denied
seats at the Assembly of Experts gathering in 1979, when Dr. Abdul Rahman
Ghassemlou, the elected representative of the Kurdistan region, was prevented from
participating in the Assembly’s first meeting.376
Although the draft constitution contained democratic provisions to safeguard the
rights of all Iranians, the Kurds as well as many other nationalist and secularist groups
felt the constitution did not address their demands adequately. For example, Sheikh
Ezzeddin Hussein, the spiritual leader of the Sunni Kurds in Mahabad, argued since Iran
was a multinational state, its constitution must legally recognize the cultural, economic,
and sociopolitical rights of all ethnic and religious groups in the country.377 Having no
identity as Kurds or as Sunnis, according the constitution, the Kurds saw no point in
voting for the new constitution after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic. They
abstained almost unanimously.
Because of their numbers, the Kurds’ actions had little effect in hampering the
project of the Islamic government, but they were strong enough to present a localized
threat to the fledgling regime. The new leadership ignored the Kurdish demands and
opted to crush unrest through military means. Regular clashes between the Kurds and
government forces continued until the late 1980s with occasional interruption for peace
negotiations. In 1988, following the Iran-Iraq war, several negotiations took place
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between the Iranian government and the Kurdish side, led by the KDPI and Dr. Abdul
Rahman Ghassemlou. Ghassemlou was ultimately assassinated by the armed diplomats of
the Iranian government in Vienna on July 13, 1989, and three years later his successor,
Dr. Sadiq Sharafkandi was also assassinated in Berlin on September 17, 1992.378 The
deaths of the two leading Kurdish figures dealt a heavy blow to the Kurdish nationalist
movement in Iran and evidenced the determination of the Islamic government to silence
any opposition to its authority and.
Towards the First Wave of Reform
The wave of reform that emerged in Iran in the 1990s was a result of pressure
coming from social forces such as students, women, and secularist and nationalist groups,
who were seeking to change Iran’s authoritarian political system and foster a
democratized polity that respects fundamental human rights and freedoms. The reform
movement played a significant role in crystallizing the power struggle among the
contending forces within the Iranian regime: those who favored the democratization of
the state, expansion of civil society and the creation of a legal order versus the
conservative opposition. The reformist faction’s popular quest for democracy, human
rights and civil society posed a crucial challenge to the status of the Velayat-e Faqih and
questioned its legitimacy.379
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The source of power struggle between the reformist and conservative factions
within the regime was rooted in the two conflicting and competing conceptions of
sovereignty enshrined in the Iranian Constitution. One is the “popular sovereignty,”
which is derived from the indivisible will of the Iranian nation. The other one is the
“divine” conception of sovereignty as derived from God’s will. According to Article 5 of
the constitution, the divine concept of sovereignty is by definition indisputable,
unquestionable and absolute. It defines the predominance of the living "faqih" as the
supreme source of authority and legitimacy whose absolute will defines the boundaries of
political power and the juridical-political framework for the conduct of the state.380
The reform movement underscored the antagonism between the popular and
divine conceptions of sovereignty in Iranian politics and tried to marginalize the divine
conception of sovereignty in order to give the popular-democratic conception its due
place in the constitution.381 The contentious relationship between the conservatives and
reformists also gave rise to a conflict regarding the question of national identity in Iran.
The religio-national identity promoted by the conservatives maintained a continuity from
the Pahlavi state’s focus on territorial centralism as the foundation of a nation-state and a
uniform Iranian national identity, but based on the Shia culture. The reformists, on the
other hand, emphasized liberal nationalist ideas identified with popular nationalism,
which is distanced from strict Islamic morality and emphasizes instead the development
of civil society, basic freedoms and human rights.
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Many reformist intellectuals moved beyond the old paradigms of secular Aryancentered and religious Shia-centered homogenized Iranian identity.382 As the next
revolution came of age, the reformist ideas showed an awareness that the experience with
the Islamic Republic had made Islam, from a political standpoint, part of the problem and
not the solution.383 The Iranian youth who comprise a large portion of the country’s
population became the main force behind the reform movement. The restrictive social
conditions under which they lived increasingly alienated the youth from the conservative
clerical establishment and led young people to distance themselves from religion and
turned them, instead, into proponents of democracy and human rights. Nonetheless,
despite the rights-based language of the pro-democracy forces in Iran, the status of
religious and ethnic minorities continued to be a neglected in the movement’s human
rights discourse. The reformist goal to democratize the Iranian political culture did not
question the state-sponsored notion of national identity that was based on the Shia
Islamist exclusionary discourse of the conservatives.
Activists concerned with ethnic minority rights argue their ethnic-related demands
are inseparable from national demands for greater democracy and socioeconomic
development for all people of Iran.384 However, tension and distrust exist between many
of the Iranian pro-democracy and human rights activists, and the ethno-nationalists who
emphasize ethnic and minority rights.385 The tension derives from the fact that many
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politically active minority groups bear the stigma of separatism. On many occasions,
human rights activists, intellectuals, and political organizations in the opposition were
criticized by the minority groups on grounds they have been hesitant to speak out in
support of ethnic and religious minorities of Iran or to condemn government repression of
minorities.386 According to the proponents of ethnic minority rights, the democratic
discourse of the Iranian opposition does not aim genuine political change in Iran, but
serves to preserve the status-quo. In this respect, they accuse the opposition forces of
making common cause with the regime’s efforts to concentrate power in the central state
and deny the political and cultural rights of minorities in Iran.
In challenging the state-sponsored notion of national identity, the ethnic
movements emerged as “the third force” within the reform movement in Iran. While
minority demands were congruent with the reformists’ goals for greater democracy,
economic progress and an end to clerical control over law and behavior, they also
advocated for pluralism and multiculturalism, and criticized the reformist intellectuals for
their failure to recognize Iran’s multiethnic reality. In their attempt to shift the question of
Iranian identity from its “national” perspective to its component peoples, minority groups
speak not of an Iranian nation, but of Iranian peoples who are made up of different
nationalities with distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics. Implicit in this notion is the
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promotion of Iranian nationalism as a political force that is pluralistic and inclusive rather
than homogeneous and exclusive.
The atmosphere of distrust is particularly strong between the Kurdish political
parties and Iranian opposition groups because of the old suspicions of secessionism and
autonomy-phobia among the Persian population. Similar to the successive regimes in
Iran, the Iranian opposition groups including liberals, republicans, moderate Islamists and
leftists, often showed indifference to Kurdish demands by rebutting the idea Iran is a
multinational country. Given the continual socio-economic disparity between central Iran
and its provincial peripheries, which are predominantly populated by ethnic minority
groups, the interests of the minorities are linked with those of the Persian underclasses.
Accordingly, the Marxist and socialist groups in Iran often had a closer association with
the Kurdish cause than other opposition groups. However, even the Marxist-inclined
Tudeh Party, which the KDPI relied on after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic,
avoided the term “nationalities” in referring to the minorities in Iran in its program.387
Other opposition groups such as the National Front and Iranian National Republicans
accused the KDPI leadership of separatism and argued that the idea that Iran is a
multinational country was incompatible with the structure of the Iranian society and
would cause the possible partition of Iran.388

387

Ghassemlou, A. R. (1993). “Kurdistan in Iran” in A People Without A Country: The Kurds and
Kurdistan edited by Gerard Chaliand, New York: Olive Branch Press, 116-117.

388

Quoted in Tahiri, Hussein (December 2008). “Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: A Reassessment,” Kurdish
Issue in Iran: Journal of Ghasemlou Center for Research and Political Development, Issue 1, 13; Reaction
to the Events of Kurdistan in Persian Publications, Compiled and published by the KDPI, No.7, June 1993,
31; Kurdistan, Organ of the Central Committee of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, No.189,
September 1992, 4.

265

Concerns over territorial integrity and the external threat of exploitation of ethnic
tensions in Iran date back to the Kurdish and Azerbaijani movements of 1946-47. Kurds
are only one-third the size of the Azeri community, which is the largest ethnic minority
group in Iran. However, after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, while the
relationship between the Kurds and the Iranian state became strained, the Azeri
community ceased to constitute a threat in the eyes of the new regime. Although Azeri
aspirations for cultural rights continued, the Azeri people as a Shia community were
better integrated into the religio-national identity promoted by the Islamic Republic. In
this regard, despite the persistence of cultural, regional and linguistic differences, Azeri
integration to the social and political system in Iran was smoother than other minorities,
and they enjoyed representation at all levels of the political, military, intellectual and
religious hierarchy.389
After the Islamic revolutionary regime established power, Iran’s Turkmen,
Baloch, Arabs, and Kurds staged revolts. The demands, despite their diversity, had much
in common. Autonomous peoples in Kurdistan, Turkman Sahra, Balochistan or
Khuzestan should exercise power in their own social, cultural, linguistic and economic
affairs while the federal government managed foreign policy and economic, financial and
defense issues at the national level.390 With the exception of the Kurdish challenge, the
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regime put each down relatively quickly.391 While the Islamic Republic was able to
suppress the autonomous movements in Turkman Sahra, Khuzistan and Balochistan, it
lost control to the Kurds in much of Kurdistan, especially in Mahabad.392 Although the
regime eventually won the battle militarily in 1985, it lost the ideological and political
war against Kurdish nationalism and there has been little support for the Islamic state, its
ideology and politics in Iranian Kurdistan.
The Iranian state feels less threatened by Kurdish aspirations than Turkey, Iraq or
Syria. However, from the perspective of the central government, the Kurds are more
threatening than other ethnic groups in Iran not only because they are more
geographically concentrated and a border minority, but because they are not demanding
minor changes to the state framework, but a major reorganization.393 The major Kurdish
opposition groups in Iran, KDPI and Komala, not only underscore the necessity of
democratizing the political process in Iran, but also stress the need to accommodate the
demands of the Kurds and other national minorities in a decentralized structure. The
Kurdish call for democratization includes demands for rights and freedoms, and an
examination of the rules and institutions Iranian society requires in order to achieve a
more inclusive democracy. This articulation of Kurdish demands generates a new
discursive terrain whereby the “ethnic” question becomes one of important arenas in
which democratic and civil liberties in Iran and the struggle to build effective institutions
converge with one.
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The Kurdish political forces in Iran have managed to continue their activities and
maintain their organizational capacity to revive and challenge the regime time and again
since 1946, despite the repression they have suffered. Although they lack the power to
independently influence the course of events within Iran, the Kurds remained active in
voicing the political, cultural and economic demands of minorities and played a crucial
role in instigating public discussion of the ethnic minority issues in Iran. In sum, the
Kurds became pivotal players with respect to the emergent role of the minorities as a
“third force” in oppositional politics and in the movement for change in Iran.
The Kurdish movement’s ability to sustain its capacity for struggle has led to
recognition by the Islamic regime that should Kurds be joined by similarly situated
minorities and/or by Shia Persian forces intent on the establishment of a secular state and
a confederacy, the regime’s support could be severely undermined.394 Given the fact the
minorities make up a significant portion of the population, the Kurds had the potential to
become key actors in achieving political change in Iran. Although the situation of the
Kurds remained stagnant in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, as the reform movement
unfolded during the mid-1990s, the Kurds’ potential to wield power was a factor difficult
to dismiss by either the regime or the opposition.
The Reform Movement and the Kurdish Challenge
Muhammad Khatami’s presidential election victory on May 23, 1997, was
unexpected for the conservatives who had monopolized politics since the Islamic
Revolution. The subsequent defeat of the conservatives in the February 2000
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parliamentary elections further increased expectations of political change. Khatami’s
election not only heightened hopes he would take Iran in new directions both at home and
abroad, but also showed the genuine public demand for democratization in Iran.
Whether President Mohammad Khatami and his administration were truly
advocates for reform and whether they lived up to the Iranian society’s expectations of
change are complicated questions to answer. Khatami’s campaign promises did not
materialize during his two terms in office and even though his policies opened up cultural
and political space to a degree not previously witnessed in the Islamic Republic, he was
harshly criticized by some opposition groups who claimed he was part and parcel of the
clerical establishment that had ruled Iran with ferocity in the past two decades. They
believed his presidency failed to bring major changes to any of the fundamental policies
of the theocratic regime, particularly in terms of executions and the assassination of
dissidents as well as women’s rights.395 For these groups, Khatami’s victory was nothing
more than an extension of the internal factional fighting of the Shia political elite and
genuine change in Iran could only come through the organization of a general uprising to
overthrow the regime completely.
Regarding the question of minorities in Iran, Khatami’s campaign put
considerable emphasis on the inclusion of all Iranians in the political decision-making
process with a specific focus on greater social and political freedoms for religious and
ethnic minorities. Feeling deeply unhappy about the hardline Islamic regime, the Kurds
and a majority of other ethnic groups, supported Khatami and his reform movement.
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After taking office in 1997, Khatami appointed Abdullah Ramazanzadeh to be the first
Kurdish Governor General of Iranian Kurdistan. Ramazanzadeh, himself a Shia,
appointed many Sunni Kurds to key roles in the government.396 In the sixth parliament
(2000-2004), the Kurdish members of the Iranian Parliament organized themselves into a
single faction representing the Kurdish provinces of Kurdistan and Kermanshah.397
Despite the relative cultural and political freedom enjoyed by the Kurds during
Khatami’s administration, political tensions and cultural grievances remained high in
Iranian Kurdistan. The situation deteriorated following Khatami’s failure to do anything
about the violent suppression of the Kurdish demonstrators in February 1999, when
Iranian Kurds staged mass protests against Turkey’s arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan. The President was exposed to harsh criticisms by the Kurdish parliamentarians
who complained the central government did not apply same attention to the legal matters
of the Kurds as it did in the capital.398 In 2001, the Kurdish representatives resigned en
masse from the parliament, accusing Khatami’s government of discrimination against the
Kurds.399 Khatami’s credibility further decreased when over half of the Kurdish MPs
were prevented from participating in the February 2004 parliamentary elections. The
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election was boycotted by over seventy percent of the Kurds, and civil unrest occurred in
Kurdish cities to protest the unfair elections.400
While Khatami enjoyed unprecedented public support, he had to work under
certain institutional and operational constraints intrinsic to the complex nature of the
Iranian political system, which is based on an uneven distribution of power divided
between institutional political power and religious power. By the end of Khatami’s eight
years in office, the Iranian public was greatly disappointed with him and the reformist
process. Similarly, the Iranian Kurds expressed dissatisfaction with the government,
believing that Khatami’s reformist platform fell far short of the promised improvement in
integration and participation and had failed to engage the Kurds in a political process
with the regime.401
Despite the overall dissatisfaction of the Iranian society with the Khatami
government, the movement for change in Iran gained enormous momentum during the
reformist process. The reformist ideal of advancing human rights, democracy and
freedom in Iran had important effects on Iranian society. It is important to note, however,
that reformist ideas derived from within the society itself, which had gradually became
vigorous in initiation and agency after the revolution and eight-year war against Iraq.
Therefore, although Khatami significantly influenced the grassroots movements in Iran,
the changes promoted during his presidency were shaped by the social transformations
that took place over a few decades that led to growing social pressure for democratic
change.
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During the election that culminated in Khatami’s victory, the ethnic factor
emerged as one of the important aspects of the movement for change in Iran. This was
particularly important in the context of the Islamist authorities’ portrayal of Iran as a
cohesive Shia state and its policy of denying recognition of ethnicities. As the rise of
ethno-nationalism clearly influenced the reform movement, the power struggle between
the reformist and conservative factions within the regime entered into a new phase.
Challenging both the conservatives’ portrayal of the ethnic problem in Iran as “artificial”
and “foreign instigated,” and the opposition’s concerns about ethnic issues and
“separatism,” minority groups in Iran played a significant role in influencing Khatami’s
election campaign and the presidential election of 1997.
The focus of Khatami’s presidential campaign was on the rule of law, democracy
and inclusion of all Iranians in the political decision-making process. Khatami made a
concerted effort to reach out to non-Persian and non-Shia constituencies. His supporters
distributed election materials in Kurdish and Azeri, and Khatami campaigned on a pledge
to expand the language rights of Iran’s non-Persian minorities.402 This theme of
inclusiveness and respect for differences featured prominently in his campaign slogan,
“Iran for all Iranians,” which implicated a major re-articulation of Iranian nationalism.
Indeed, the support of minority groups was crucial to his two electoral victories.
Alongside the youth and women, who were the primary supporters of Khatami, the ethnic
minority participation in the 1997 elections showed the potential of these groups to make
a difference in the democratic process in Iran. The support for Khatami in Iranian
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Kurdistan as well as in the other minority provinces was overwhelming and was clearly
reflected in the election results.
One of the striking aspects of 1997 presidential elections in Iran was the
overwhelming increase in the voter turnout compared to previous elections. The total
voter turnout in 1997 elections was around eighty percent compared to 50.66 percent in
the 1993 presidential elections, and 54.59 percent in 1989.403 Seventy percent of the
voting population, roughly twenty million out of twenty-nine million voters, cast their
votes in favor of Khatami, that is, in favor of democracy, civil rights and liberties. Both
the increase in voter turnout over previous years and the margin of support for Khatami
were significant indicators of the potency of the pro-democracy movement in Iran.
In the presidential election of 1997, more than seventy percent of the population
of ethnic regions voted for Khatami. This vast participation was a record in these areas.404
The level of popular participation in the elections in Kurdistan was itself very significant.
The Kurds refused to participate in the referendum to ratify the Islamic identity of the
post-revolutionary state, did not vote for the constitution of the Islamic Republic in 1979,
and basically boycotted the previous presidential elections. The KDPI, which had
boycotted the elections for about twenty years, encouraged the Kurdish people participate
in 1997, and the change in Kurdish political participation behavior was remarkable. In the
1997 presidential elections, the voter turnouts in West Azerbaijan, Ilam, Kurdistan and
Kermanshah – the provinces inhabited primarily by the Kurds in Iran – were 73.71
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percent, 87.16 percent, 79.04 percent and 75.15 percent, respectively. The voter turnout
in these provinces in the presidential elections of 1993 and 1989 was much lower.405
A quick look at the voting behavior in other major minority provinces in 1997
elections shows similar results. Sistan and Balochistan, where the Iranian Balochs live,
showed a voter turnout of 65.28 percent in the 1997 election, compared to 42.87 percent
in the 1993 presidential election and 38.68 percent in the 1989 elections. Khuzestan,
which is inhabited by a number of ethnic minorities, particularly the Arabs, showed a
voter turnout of 74.08 percent in the presidential election of 1997, compared to 45.60
percent in the 1993 presidential election and 59.02 percent in the 1989 election.406
The high participation in the 1997 elections in the minority provinces was the
response of ethnic groups to Khatami’s campaign mottos and inclusive statements.
Although his support of ethnic rights might be viewed as a strategy to attract voters,
Khatami’s emphasis on democracy, rule of law and political participation was the result
of ongoing pressure from minority political groups and political and civil rights activists
in the ethnic regions. Even before the 1997 election, Iranian ethnicities were an important
force for change in the status quo in Iran.
In their open letters to presidential candidates, both Azeri and Kurdish groups
focus on the failure of the state to properly implement the Article 100 of the Constitution,
which regulates the establishment of Provincial Councils for the management of local
affairs. Although the idea of “councils” and administrative decentralization had been in
405
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Iranian constitutions since the constitutional revolution of 1906, it was never
implemented because of the centrist approaches of both the Pahlavi and Islamic
Republican states. The implementation of city and village councils was one of the most
important of Khatami’s campaign mottos. Moving towards decentralization and in
response to the minority demands to run their own local social, cultural and economic
affairs, Khatami announced the elections for the city and village councils less than one
year after he took office. A national election, with active participation in the minority
provinces, led to the creation of the councils in 1999.
The unelected power organs of the state, which were dominated by the
conservatives, and internal conflicts within many city councils left them deprived of
power, authority, and effectiveness.407 Despite their councils’ marginal status in the
decision making and administrative organs of the country, the implementation of the
councils was very significant and an important first step towards the establishment of
democratic institutions in Iran. The decision to strengthen local administration not only
showed Khatami’s strong will to respond to the minority demands but also the ethnic
movements’ capacity to shape state policies and improveme of the ethnic groups’
participation in power.
After the election of hard-line Islamist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency
in 2005, the meager concessions of the Khatami era for ethnic minorities disappeared.
Nonetheless, the ethnic factor never disappeared from the landscape of Iranian politics.
Presidential candidates continued to place special emphasis on their slogans and promises
concerning ethnic and religious minorities in the 2005, 2009 and 2013 presidential
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elections as the ethnic movements continued to be an influential force in shaping the
political agenda. Although the election of Ahmadinejad was seen as a sign that the
movement for change in Iran had sunk into lassitude, civil unrest and opposition to the
regime’s policies continued in the ethnic regions, which became an increasingly
important component of the growing civil society. Minority politics and ethnic
mobilization provided a crucial social and political outlet for the growth of the prodemocracy oppositional movements in Iran. The vitality of developing a more inclusive
approach to democracy that would address minority demands became evident again as
another wave of reform emerged in the aftermath of 2009 presidential elections, showing
signs that it would make a stronger push to achieve political change in the country.
2009 Presidential Election and the Second Wave of Reform
The reform process that culminated in Khatami’s presidency played a significant
role in infusing democratic thoughts into society and strengthening liberal demands even
though he had failed to realize many of his democratic promises. Iranian civil society had
experienced an important period of rejuvenation during Khatami’s presidency from 1997
to 2005. Preserving the advances of this period of reform became increasingly difficult
after Ahmadinejad’s rise to power, but the voices of civil society that had been gathering
steam over the previous decade proved resilient and nudged the reform movement along
even under conservative rule.
The 2005 presidential election closed the window of opportunity for democratic
reforms. Events since then, however, suggest that the forces for democratic change in
Iran continued to display considerable dynamism. Disputed results of the presidential
election in 2009 triggered pro-democracy protests, but the protest movement had been in
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the making since the 2005 election. Developments on the minority rights front were
particularly stirring.
In April 2005, the oil-rich Khuzestan province became the scene of severe ethnicrelated clashes. The uprising was against a government plan to alter the Arab composition
of Khuzestan by transferring a great number of Arabs to other parts of Iran and replacing
them with non-Arab ethnic groups, and changing the Arab names of various places and
streets in the province to Persian names.408 Following the election of Ahmadinejad, the
appointment of a Shia from Sistan as the governor of Balochestan, Habibollah
Dehmordeh, who was known for his hard-line anti-Sunni Islamism, resulted in outrage
among the Baloch and two Baloch deputies in the parliament resigned in protest.409 The
same year, the Kurds took to the streets when the security forces killed and dragged the
body of a Kurdish activist, Shawaneh Ghaderi, throughout Mahabad. Mass
demonstrations took place in Kurdish towns and villages in July and August 2005, which
resulted in an untold number of arrests and the deaths of at least seventeen people at the
hands of security forces.410 In May 2006, a widespread campaign was organized by the
Azerbaijanis following the publication of an insulting article by a state-sponsored daily.
In February 2007, the Azerbaijanis marched in massive numbers in observance of the
International Mother Language Day to protest the state-sponsored suppression of their
heritage and language.
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Similar to the Khatami era, ethnic factors continued to influence the presidential
campaigns of the candidates in 2005. The fact that massive riots and confrontations
occurred in Khuzestan only two months before the election played an important role in
prompting the candidates emphasizing the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in
their slogans and promises. Both conservative candidates, such as Ali Larijani and
Mohsen Rezai, and reformist candidates, such as Mustafa Moin and Mehdi Karrubi,
visited the minority regions and made promises to implement the articles of the
constitution regarding the cultural rights of the minorities and provincial councils.
The results of the 2005 election indicate the ethnic-related promises of the
candidates were not received as favorably as they were in the presidential election of
1997. In the first round, the five provinces with the lowest turnouts were either Kurdish
or Azeri regions.411 The rate of participation in the Kurdish cities was the lowest: nine
percent in Mahabad, eleven percent in Bukan, twenty percent in Sanandaj, and fifteen
percent in Mariwan.412 Increasing signs of alienation among the ethnic and religious
minorities was one of the significant challenges Ahmadinejad had to cope with as
president. Nevertheless, after a year in office, Ahmadinejad’s intention to roll back the
little progress that had been made during Khatami’s presidency on minorities’ rights and
freedoms was clear. Banning Kurdish newspapers and imprisoning Kurdish activists
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became a common occurrence during Ahmadinejad’s presidency.413 Following the 2005
demonstrations, the Iranian government forcibly closed down or banned more than 43
Kurdish publications, detained several Kurdish journalists and human rights, activists and
forbid the study of the Kurdish language in universities.414
The post-presidential election protests in Iran in 2009 erupted against the
officially declared victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and grew into a major popular
opposition movement, posing a great challenge to the country’s power structure. This was
a unique phenomenon not seen since the Iranian revolution that took place nearly 30
years ago. Just as the show of popular will and resistance through street protests brought
down the Shah’s regime in 1979, so the new protest movement, called the green
movement, cast the divine authority of the Islamic Republic into a shadow of perpetual
doubt.415 The green movement emerged as a result a sense of agency among different
strata in Iranian society. While it was an important step in terms of moving the reform
process forward in Iran, the green movement also underscored significant developments
concerning the relations between diverse actors that constituted the pro-democracy
movement.
First, the green movement crystallized the fact that the reformist leaders were no
longer the only actors to shape the reform agenda in Iran. Different from the reform
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process during Khatami era, Iranian people who took to the streets in June 2009, were
ahead of the political leaders of the green movement and reflected the increasing strength
of Iran’s emerging civil society. The leaders of the reform movement of the 1990s
remained loyal to the Islamic movement, but rejected the conservatives’ Islamic
orthodoxy and fundamentalism and demanded, instead, the consolidation of democratic
institutions. Given the absence of any discourse of democracy for nearly twenty years,
Khatami’s electoral campaign had led people to view him as the leader who could signal
change and liberalize the political system.
The democratic discourse surrounding the green movement, on the other hand,
was shaped by a sharper rejection of the existing political system and a deeper demand
for structural changes. It explicitly underscored the contradictions associated with
demanding democratic change within the framework of the many anti-democratic
institutions fundamental to the Islamic Republic. Although they were recognized as
leaders of the green movement, Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who were
former high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic, did not have a significant role in
creating and organizing the movement and were only swept into power by a spontaneous
wave of activism and the grass-roots movement.
Second, the loss of momentum the green movement suffered in the months
following the election highlighted the drawbacks in the opposition’s failure to develop an
agenda that includes the demands of the ethnic minorities. Although the inhuman
crackdown by the government security forces played a major role in suppressing the
protests, a significant deficiency of the movement was its lack of widespread support
from Iran’s ethnic minorities, including the Kurds, Balochs, Arabs, Turkmen and others.
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The fact the protests remained limited to the northern areas of Tehran and a few more
Persian cities considerably limited the green movement’s struggle for power. As the
ethnic minorities make up almost half of Iran’s population, their reluctance to figure
significantly in the protests restricted the green movement’s potential to become a
nationwide movement and painted it mostly an internal struggle or factional divisions of
the Shia political elite.
The green movement was largely limited to Tehran and the peripheral ethnic
minority-dominated areas that were under more pressure and exposed to greater
discrimination remained silent. The green movement’s unsuccessful campaign outside of
Tehran was due in large part to the movement’s leaders’ lack of plans to include the
Arabs, Azeris, Kurds and the Baloch, as well as the pro-democracy opposition groups’
historical tendency to steer clear of direct contact with minority political groups. Wary
about their status in the future of the movement, ethnic groups kept their distance from
the protest movement despite the fact that they share most of the goals of the green
movement such as increasing popular representation in government and opening Iranian
society for greater internal political dialogue.
The discourse on ethnic politics expanded drastically during the 2009 presidential
campaigns. Both of the reformist candidates, Mousavi and Karroubi, campaigned
intensely in the minority regions to gain support from Iran’s large ethnic and religious
minority voting blocs. Mousavi, in particular, campaigned widely in the minoritydominated provinces of Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, Mazandaran and Golestan
and proposed detailed policies to address minority grievances in addition to standard
assurances of respect for cultural rights and greater minority incorporation in
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government. Given the failure of the Khatami administration to bring about any
sustainable changes to the status of ethnic groups in Iran, expectations remained low
among Kurds and other ethnic groups that either reformist would have the political
capital to implement the full range of their promises and change the authoritarian bent of
the regime. The fact that pro-democracy reformists did not pay much attention to the
human rights abuses of the Kurds during the first term of President Ahmadinejad played a
significant role in dissolving the last remaining ties between the reform movement and
ethnic minority demands.
Although demonstrations were not as widespread as in Tehran, minorities outside
the capital did participate in protests pressing for their specific demands along with the
green movement. However, given that no known formal or informal ties were ever
established between the green movement’s prominent politicians and minority political
groups, it makes more sense to view the participation of ethnic minorities as a
continuation of their long-term grievances and active opposition to the regime rather than
a commitment to the green movement. The security and militarized atmosphere of the
ethnic regions and the vulnerability of these areas to repressive activities by the regime
are also factors that influenced the degree of minority participation in protests.
After the start of the protests in June 2009, many minority political groups
expressed reluctance to put any faith in the Green Movement. The Kurdish Globe, an
Erbil-based website affiliated with the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, declared
that the dispute between opposition leaders and the government was simply the latest of
many internal power struggles among the political elites of Tehran, which have existed
since the early years of the Islamic Republic. A new leader would not fundamentally
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change the government’s position on minority rights or its human rights stand.416 The
Kurdish political groups were reluctant to become involved with the green movement in
any tangible way, opting instead for silence, or, at most, a statement of solidarity. In
January 2010, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan issued a statement regarding the
Kurdish movement’s stance on the future of the green movement:
Democracy in its real form can only be obtainable when the national rights
of the various nationalities are acknowledged explicitly. The Green
Movement will succeed if it joins its cause with ethnic minorities. But
that’s something we believe the Green Movement is, so far, afraid to do.417
On June 7, 2010, Abdullah Mohtadi, secretary general of the Kurdish Komala
Party, issued a statement aimed at forging solidarity between the Kurds and the green
movement:
The people of Kurdistan do not demand special rights or benefits for
themselves. They do not demand separation from Iran. Their demands are
not outside the common framework of contemporary democratic regimes
and recognized standards of human rights. The people of Kurdistan rightly
demand that the effective leaders and political and cultural figures of the
Green Movement and the practical activists of the movement, approve and
support the demands of the people of Kurdistan, and in so doing allay their
rather legitimate fears.418
Realization of the green movement’s goals, by definition, includes the goals of
many Iranian minority groups for increased self-expression and cultural autonomy. The
reformist arguments for democratization and constitutional change, however, have
largely left out appreciation and respect for ethnic and religious differences in the
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country. That said, throughout the green movement the Kurdish leadership was not very
assertive in putting their case forward, but opted for silence. The green movement
provided the Kurds with an opportunity to consolidate their position as the “third force”
of democratization in Iran and integrate their demands into the emergent grassroots
democratic front in the country. Although the Kurds criticized the green leadership’s lack
of an inclusive discourse to satisfy Iran’s minorities, they did not make any real attempt
to become a part of the protest movement by critically challenging the positions of both
the regime and the reformists, and making their case.
The Kurdish movement in Iran is strong, but realizes its fate is intertwined with
the Iranian opposition, as the minorities cannot overthrow the regime alone. Building
alliances between the Iranian opposition and ethnic political groups depends on the
ability of green movement to develop a more inclusive leadership who would approach
the ethnic groups while ignoring the discourse of separatism. The establishment of
mutual trust is possible only if a common discourse is formed with a common democratic
agenda that genuinely includes the demands of the minorities.
The Kurds and the Iranian Opposition: New Horizons for Cooperation
The green movement has done more to rock the foundation of the Islamic
Republic than three decades of sanctions and containment imposed by the U.S. and the
United Nations. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic pursued a policy of harboring
nationalist sentiments in Iran by referring to the “external enemy” argument as a method
of avoiding intractable internal problems. The reformist process that started with the
Khatami era and continued with the 2009 green movement has significantly challenged
this policy by bringing the internal problems of Iran to the attention of both domestic and
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international actors. Although the regime managed to suppress the protests of June 2009,
the green movement or the pro-democracy movement in Iran should be regarded as an
ongoing political project rather than a failed attempt to challenge the government. In this
regard, while the regime appears unyielding, the political and moral victories Iran’s
reform movement has achieved is beyond dispute and are likely to propel further efforts
for democratic change.
While the regime’s violent crackdown on activists in 2009 widened the gap
between ethnic minorities and the regime, the reformists’ failure to effectively confront
the conservatives and challenge the status quo was disappointing for the minority
political groups. Since the repression of the protest movement, the Iranian opposition and
minority groups held a number of meetings under the name, “Unity for Democracy in
Iran,” in an attempt to unite the opposition and strengthen the green movement. The first
sitting of the conference took place on February 4-5, 2012, in Stockholm, Sweden, where
the participants discussed the political conditions in Iran, and methods to establish
democratic rule, free elections and the future of minorities. To implement the
recommendations of the Stockholm conference, a second meeting of the movement
convened in Brussels on July 7-8, 2012, which proposed a further extension of the
membership of the conference. Finally, on November 17-18, 2012, a third conference
was held in Prague, which addressed the issues of unity within the Iranian opposition, the
plight of women, and the political demands of the various nations living within Iran’s
borders.
Kurdish opposition leaders stressed the importance of achieving a federal
democracy in Iran in order to accommodate the political demands of the minorities living
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within Iran’s borders. In the last meeting, which was held in Prague, Hassan Sharafi, the
Deputy Secretary General of the KDPI, and Abdullah Mohtadi, leader of Komala Party of
Iranian Kurdistan, highlighted the importance of genuine and frank dialogue among
various opposition groups and underscored that denying the multinational character of
Iran and describing it as a country consisting of one nation is contrary to reality.419
Although the opposition groups showed a general reluctance to address and respond to
the Kurdish demands for a democratic federalist state as an alternative to the Islamic
Republic, the meetings provided the Kurds with a chance to express their views and show
they are a strong and active part of the Iranian opposition. Considering the decades-long
separatist stigma attached to the minority political groups in Iran – particularly, the
Kurdish parties – the fact the Iranian opposition groups took part in the meetings and
listened to the aspirations of the Kurds was itself a sign of progress and a growing
awareness on the part of all groups that ethnic demands in Iran need to be addressed.
After the protest movement of 2009, both the green movement leadership and the
Iranian opposition showed signs of willingness to compromise and work with ethnic
groups. As a daring move, Mir Hussein Moussavi released a statement on May 10, 2010,
condemning the “unjust” executions of five Kurdish activists by the Iranian judiciary.
Moussavi’s remarks particularly surprised the hardliners in the Iranian government who
did not expect the leader of the green movement to take an anti-government position on a
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topic deemed sensitive even by the members of the Iranian opposition.420 Likewise, in a
statement issued on January 15, 2013, the Coordination Council of the Green Path of
Hope, an important body within the opposition movement, voiced its criticism of
government measures aimed at curbing the use of Kurdish at schools in the province of
Kermanshah. The Coordination Council stated that the move was a clear breach of article
15 of the Iranian constitution, which allows for the use of local languages in press, media
and the education system, and such actions are against human rights norms and the will
of the majority of Iranians from all ethnicities, languages and religions.421
The eleventh presidential election in Iran, which was held on June 14, 2013,
renewed hopes for the Kurds and the other ethnic groups for greater rights for Iran’s
minorities. Newly elected President Hassan Rouhani’s election motto was “moderation
and change.” He was the only candidate who promised to ensure the cultural and
language rights of minority groups, and assist in the return of Iranian Kurds living
abroad.422 Rouhani won the votes of seventy percent of fifty million eligible voters in
Iran.423 His campaign pledge during to work for minority rights and include minorities in
his administration resulted in a high voter turnout in favor of Rouhani in major Kurdish
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populated provinces such as West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah and Kurdistan.424 However,
the hopes of the Kurds and other minorities for greater rights in Iran were soon dashed
when Rouhani, immediately following his election victory, stated in a television
interview that Iran is “not a multi-ethnic state” and that “there is only one nation in Iran
and that is structured by Islamic system.”425
It might be too early to judge Rouhani’s attitude towards the ethnic question in
Iran, but his rhetoric so far displays continuity rather than a break with the policies of
previous administrations. Voting patterns since the establishment of Islamic Republic
show that ethnic groups turn out to vote in higher numbers for the candidates who
support their rights. The reformists, however, have failed to improve minority rights in
Iran, and the Kurds’ already skeptical attitude towards the election system in the country
has deepened and since the Khatami era, led to consistently lower rates of Kurdish voter
turnout compared to other provinces in the country. Lower rates of turnout in provinces
where non-Persian ethnic groups are concentrated indicate a strong “rejectionist”
sentiment towards the political system in general. Before the 2013 elections, in an
interview with BBC Arabic, Khalid Azizi, secretary general of the Iran’s Kurdistan
Democratic Party (IKDP), said that:
The elections and their outcome would not change anything for the
people of Iran. These elections aren’t about human rights or the rights of
the Iranian people. It is a way for the Iranian regime to come out of its
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own crisis. People participate only to find a solution for the economic
crisis the regime has got them into.426
Unless the deep-rooted flaws embedded in the core institutions of representative
democracy in Iran are eliminated, a regime change would be unlikely to change the
political and social positions of ethnic or religious minorities in Iran. It has been shown
time and again, be they reformist or conservative, successive regimes in Iran have refused
to recognize the multi-ethnic reality of the country and the legitimate rights of the
minorities. That is why it is imperative for the Kurds and other pro-democracy forces in
Iran to collaborate under the common theme of systemic political change. Political
developments since Mohammad Khatami’s presidential victory in 1997, and the
corresponding rise of the reform movement reveal that the ethnic dimension of Iranian
politics is the country’s most revolutionary force. Many Iranian officials, religious
leaders, and intellectuals, particularly those associated with the reformist movement, have
gradually come to realize that Iran’s ethnic minorities have significant potential to wield
power in terms of challenging the regime. This growing awareness concerning the
capacity of ethnic groups might propel further rapprochement between the opposition and
the minority political groups. Within this framework, the incorporation of the
perspectives of Iran’s different ethnic groups into the reformist agenda may constitute an
important part of the evolution of the green movement.
The International Dimension of the Kurdish Question in Iran
The internationalization of the Kurdish issue that affected three parts of Kurdistan
since the early 1990s, in Iraq, Turkey and Syria, may appear to have bypassed the Kurds
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of Iran. Even though the Iranian Kurdish movement seems to be politically dormant in
recent years compared to the Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, the Kurds in
Iran have never stopped opposing the country’s successive governments and have always
maintained the potential for profound change in Iran.427
The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, the EU accession
process of Turkey, the expansion of the PKK movement beyond Turkey’s borders and the
dramatic developments taking place in Syrian Kurdistan resulted in increased world
attention to the Kurdish movements in Iraq, Turkey and Syria. The Kurds of Iran, on the
other hand, have been isolated internationally, and lack allies outside the country. The
establishment of political ties between external actors and Iran’s ethnic movements to
support political change in Iran is not very likely at the moment. The sheer size of Iran, in
terms of both territory and population, the stability of the regime, and the support base
the regime has among the Shia conservatives make it quite challenging for any outside
actor to intervene in Iran. Unlike Iraq and Syria, which are weak states and had been
ruled by minorities, Iran is ruled by its largest ethnic and religious group, the Shia
Persians, supported by the tradition of a strong and bureaucratic state.
That said, the Iranian regime has its own vulnerabilities. Iran is extremely
troubled by the regional uprisings, particularly in Syria. Given the long-term strategic
alliance between Iran and the Assad regime, the prevalent view concerning the possible
consequences of Assad’s overthrow in Syria is that “when Assad is defeated it is the turn
of Iran.” Therefore, Iran has supported Bashar Al-Assad at all costs. Should Assad’s
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regime collapse, Iran will lose its most important ally in the region with significant
repercussions for its own Kurdish population. Should the upheavals reach Iran, the
Iranian Kurds are likely to be the pioneers of change along with the other minority groups
and pro-democracy forces in the country.
In the meantime, the synergy of cooperation among the Kurds of Iran as well as
with Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan is increasing rapidly. The Iranian Kurds have
benefited from the pan-Kurdish spirit developing in the Kurdistan Regional Government
of Iraq, closely watching the ongoing peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish
government and following the inspiring developments taking place on the Syrian Kurdish
political scene. In August 2012, two major Iranian Kurdish parties, KDPI and Komala,
signed a cooperation agreement that raised hopes for a united Iranian Kurdish front. It
was declared that the agreement would not only be the basis for collaboration between
the two parties in policy, diplomacy and media, but also serve as a basis for more
cooperation among the other Kurdish political forces in Iran.428
A few months later, in December 2012, the KDPI and Iran’s Kurdistan
Democratic Party (IKDP) met for the first time since splitting in 2006 for talks at possible
reunification. At a 2006 convention, KDPI members elected Mustafa Hijri as the leader
of the KDPI, which led to a split in the party that created IKDP under the leadership of
Khalid Azizi.429 Although the meeting did not result in the conclusion of an official
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agreement for reunification, it marked an important step towards reconciliation and
reaching a common settlement.
Finally, in July 2013, thirty-nine Kurdish political groups from all parts of
Kurdistan gathered in Erbil, Iraq, under the auspices of the Kurdistan Regional
Government for preliminary talks to organize a Kurdish National Conference. This
became an important unifying factor for the Iranian Kurdish parties, particularly the three
different branches of the Komala Party. Since its foundation, Komala has gone through
several divisions due to ideological differences. The planned National Conference made a
significant impact on bringing together Komala’s three factions to win a seat at the
conference and improved the dialogue between all groups working under the name,
Komala. The preliminary talks on the organization of the conference also played an
important role in toning down the tension between the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan
(PJAK) and the other Kurdish parties in Iran by creating a common ground of action.
PJAK, since its establishment in 2004, gained significant popular support among the
Kurdish youth in Iran and managed to capture the attention of the world with its guerilla
actions against the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, the party’s affiliation with the PKK has
always strained the relations between PJAK and the other major Kurdish parties in Iran.
In an interview following his party’s cooperation agreement with Komala,
Mustafa Hejri, Secretary General of the KDPI, observed that the agreement was made in
preparation for the collapse of the Iranian regime.430 The creation of a common ground of
action is crucial in order for the Kurdish political groups to effect change in Iran.
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Overcoming internal divisions is important for the Iranian Kurds so they can enhance the
status of the Iranian Kurdish movement as a strategic partner in the eyes of both the
Iranian opposition and international actors. Considering the possibility that the ongoing
revolutionary wave in the Middle East might reach Iran, it is imperative the Iranian Kurds
reduce their own internal conflicts and develop a strategic plan to improve their situation
in the event Iran, too, undergoes a process of political change in the future.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Since the early 1990s, the Kurdish national movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Syria have undergone important political and ideological transformations that created
multiple and intertwined layers of domestic and foreign policy considerations in each
country. The most significant aspect of this transformation process is the incorporation of
“democratic

discourse”

into

the

movement’s

objectives

and

the

resulting

reconceptualization of Kurdish nationalism. The democratic discourse is characterized by
demands for recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of the countries in
which the Kurds live, and by requests for an inclusive definition of citizenship that would
transform the ethno-national hierarchies and pave the way for redistribution of power and
sovereignty on an equal basis. Within this framework, over the past two decades, the
Kurdish national movement has acquired a dual character: it is at once an ethno-cultural
struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity and demands, and also a democratization
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movement that seeks to redefine the concepts of governance and citizenship in Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria.
There has been a significant realization within the Kurdish movement that the
preservation of their ethnic identity and culture can be possible only within a democratic
polity. From this perspective, the struggle for an ethno-cultural identity and the struggle
for democracy have become closely intertwined and it is not possible to win one without
winning the other. In line with this reconceptualization of Kurdish nationalism, the Kurds
began to play an increasingly important role in shaping the debates on governance,
human rights and democratization in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria starting in the early
1990s. In this context, the Kurds’ role as ethnic actors has been largely transformed into
one that is centered on the Kurds as “democratic agents” who influence the relationship
of the Kurds to their respective central governments in significant ways. These
observations raise four questions: (1) Under what conditions have the Kurds become
agents of change for democratization? (2) Why did this role become particularly visible
in the 1990s? (3) How does this role affect the political systems of the countries in which
the Kurds live? (3) How does the adoption of the “democratic discourse” impact the
transnational aspect of the Kurdish movement?
While the Kurdish movements acting in the different parts of Kurdistan share a
number of common characteristics, the answer to each of these questions unfolds
differently in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria due to the fact that each of these countries has
a distinct political and ideological structure, which interacts with the regional and
international dynamics in different ways. Three factors have the strongest explanatory
power in accounting for the first question: the size and geographical location of the
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Kurds; the use of political violence for the accomplishment of Kurdish nationalist goals;
and the definition of Kurdish question as a problem of “democracy” rather than a
problem of “statelessness.”
The Kurds comprise a sizable portion of the population in each of the four
countries in question and this provides them with a the capacity to influence the domestic
politics of the countries in which they live and put pressure on their respective central
governments to effect political change. The Kurds are also a geographically concentrated
group, mostly inhabiting a region known as Kurdistan. The fact that they live
predominantly across the borders of each of the four countries in question creates an
important opportunity for engaging in cross-border activity. This situation underscores
the fact that the Kurds are not only a domestic, but also a foreign policy concern for
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
The size and geographical location of the Kurds become significant for their role
as democratic agents particularly in the context of the Kurdish movements’ use of
political violence to achieve their goals. Armed struggle was seen by the majority of the
Kurds as the only viable way to create an effective political struggle and to force the
central governments to a solution because of the highly authoritarian structure of all the
four countries in which the Kurds live. In this respect, Turkey can be considered as an
exception due to its more open political system as compared to the other three countries.
This was the main reason why the Kurds in Turkey initially embraced political struggle in
the 1960s and 1970s, yet felt obliged to turn to armed struggle when it became apparent
there were no sufficient political avenues available to force the Turkish state to consider a
negotiated settlement.
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The link between armed struggle and democratization is more visible in Turkey
and Iraq than in Iran and Syria because of the proportion of Kurds among the total
population in Turkey and Iraq is considerably higher as compared to Syria and Iran. This
situation influences not only the potential number of recruits for the guerilla forces, but
also the number of people who can be politically mobilized through armed struggle. Both
in Turkey and Iraq, masses followed the PKK, the PUK and the KDP because of their
capacity to successfully challenge the military forces of their respective central
governments. In both countries, armed struggle played a significant role in mobilizing the
Kurds and opening space for the political struggle, which made it considerably difficult
for both Turkey and Iraq to ignore the Kurdish demands. Given the strong military
capacity of the Kurdish movements in both Iraq and Turkey, the armed conflict became
protracted in both countries, which made the political costs of ignoring the demands of
the Kurds increase and put pressure on the central governments to open negotiations to
find a political solution. These processes of negotiation encouraged both democratization
and the peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question in Iraq and Turkey.
In Iran, on the other hand, the armed struggle of the Kurds did not bring the same
results for a number of reasons. Iranian Kurds are a sizable minority in Iran like the
Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, but the Kurdish parties in Iran never managed to develop a
military capacity as strong as their counterparts in Turkey and Iraq. The armed
confrontations between the Kurds and the Iranian regime often resulted in brutal
suppression and the defeat of the Kurdish movement. While Iranian Kurds always
maintained their organizational capacity to revive and challenge the regime, this only led
to an intermittent war rather than the protracted battle that tormented the Turkish and
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Iraqi governments and made it difficult to ignore the Kurds’ demands. In other words, the
political costs of ignoring the Kurds’ demands never became high enough for the Iranian
regime to open negotiations to implement concrete political changes.
Armed struggle did not play a major role in mobilizing the Kurdish populations in
Iran politically as it did in Turkey and Iraq. After each defeat, resources were used to
revive the armed struggle, which prevented the emergence of a strong pro-Kurdish
political opposition in Iran. Another factor that influenced the Kurdish movement in Iran
is the Sunni-Shia divide – the most significant factor that determines the policies of
inclusion and exclusion in the country. Different from the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey who
were able to mobilize around the common theme of “ethnic unity,” the Kurds in Iran
were vulnerable to the cooptation policies of the Iranian government on the basis of
sectarian divides.
In Syria, the relatively smaller number of the Kurds within the total population
considerably reduced the capacity of the Syrian Kurds to develop a strong movement
either politically or militarily. The cross-border activities between the Kurds worked both
against and in favor of the Syrian Kurds. The fact the Kurdish movements in Turkey and
Iraq cooperated with the Syrian regime worked against the formation of an autonomous
Syrian Kurdish movement until the early 1990s. However, that the Kurdish parties of
Turkey and Iraq had relative freedom of action in Syrian Kurdistan was a positive
contribution to the development of national consciousness among the Kurds of Syria.
This situation not only increased Kurdish political mobilization in Syria in the 1990s, but
also prompted the emergence of the Kurdish movement as a key actor in the Syrian
uprising since 2011.
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The definition of the Kurdish question as a problem of “democracy” rather than a
problem of “statelessness” considerably increases the chances of a negotiated settlement.
The use of political violence, and the size and geographical location of the Kurds plays an
important role in bringing the Kurdish question to the attention of the central
governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. However, these factors also give the central
governments the opportunity to disregard the Kurdish movements on grounds The Kurds
are “separatists” and “terrorists.” The perception of the Kurds as separatists and terrorists
automatically eliminates the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement and prolongs
the war. Therefore, it is considerably important that the “democratic discourse” be
consistently incorporated into the official party programs and political activities so as to
create incentives for the central governments to respond to the armed struggle and come
to the negotiation table.
The Kurdish movement in Turkey has repeatedly emphasized a democratic
discourse in defining its goals since the early 1990s. Over the years, the goals of the PKK
were defined and redefined in the official party programs through different formulations
proposed by Öcalan, including “democratic unity,” “democratic civilization,”
“democratic republic,” “democratic confederalism” and “democratic autonomy.” Each of
these proposed solutions was based on respect for the territorial integrity of Turkey and
the idea of a peaceful coexistence between the Kurds and Turks on an equal basis within
a democratic polity. Democratization in Turkey cannot be analyzed without giving due
consideration to the role these concepts had in influencing both public opinion and the
political agenda in Turkey.
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In their negotiations with the successive regimes of Iraq, Iraqi Kurds always
repeated their main motto, “autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq.” This
formulation became even more significant after the establishment of the Kurdistan
Regional Government in 1991, as the external support for the Iraqi Kurds was, for the
most part, tied to an international commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq. By
remaining part of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds not only consolidated their autonomous status, but
also influenced the process of democratization in the country, especially after the
American-led invasion in 2002.
In a similar vein, both the Iranian and Syrian Kurds always mainstreamed the
discourse of autonomy and cultural rights while defining their goals since the 1990s.
Their demands played a significant role in influencing the agenda of a number of
important political opposition movements in both countries such as the Damascus Spring
and the 2011 uprising in Syria and the reformist movement and the 2009 Green
movement in Iran.
The role of the Kurds as “democratic agents” became particularly visible in the
1990s. This dynamic can be explained by considering both regional and international
factors. The Kurdish movements in each of these four countries were affected by socialist
ideas throughout the Cold War due to the appeal of Marxism-Leninism by the oppressed
and marginalized groups. However, socialism’s uneasy relationship with nationalism
made it difficult for the Kurds to reconcile socialist ideology with their national liberation
discourse. Moreover, the position taken by the Soviet Union as well as the post-Cold War
Russia towards the Kurdish question was generally in the form of supporting the Kurds’
central governments because of strategic interests. This situation prevented the
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establishment of strong alliances between the socialist groups and the Kurdish nationalist
groups throughout the Cold War with the exception of Turkey. Until the end of the Cold
War, although the majority of the Kurdish parties declared their commitment to the
emancipatory values of socialist ideology, it was Kurdish nationalism that was the
prominent ideological force in defining the movement’s goals. As a result, the Kurdish
movement figured predominantly as an ethnic actor, which limited its appeal to ethnic
Kurds.
In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global turn to
“democracy” affected the Kurdish movement. As the center-left and socialist groups were
left without an identifiable political project in the post-Cold War era, the discourse of
human rights and democracy provided the Kurdish movement with an opportunity to add
a universal appeal to its demands for decentralization and cultural rights. Throughout the
twentieth century, the lack of international support was one of the biggest political
handicaps of the Kurdish movement. By adopting the democratic discourse in the postCold War era, the Kurds attempted to remove this handicap. The discourse of human
rights and democracy contributed to the establishment of ties between the Kurdish
movements and external actors, particularly in the case of Turkey and Iraq.
The debate on Kurdish rights greatly influenced the political reforms implemented
in Turkey within the framework of Turkey’s EU accession process. The Iraqi Kurds, on
the other hand, have become the most ardent supporters of the promotion of democracy
in Iraq after the establishment of the KRG in 1991, given the close relationship between
Iraq’s democracy and consolidation of the autonomous status of the Kurds. Because of
the highly authoritarian and closed nature of the political systems in Iran and Syria, the
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Kurdish organizations there have not managed to gain direct access to external actors.
However, a strong emphasis on the discourse of human rights and democracy enabled the
Kurdish groups to establish alliances with other pro-democracy groups within their
respective political environments, and expanded the appeal of the Kurdish movement
beyond the ethnic Kurds.
The greatest impact of the Kurds’ role as democratic agents in Turkey, Iran, Iraq
and Syria has been the challenge it posed upon the nation-state system. The Kurds’
demands for the recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure of the
countries in which they live have shaped important debates on democracy, governance
and citizenship in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria since the early 1990s. In Turkey, the
Kurdish movement shapes such important debates as the strengthening of local
administrations in accordance with the EU criteria, and changing the constitution to
establish a more inclusive conception of citizenship and education in the mother tongue.
In Iraq, the autonomous Kurdish rule not only translates into democracy for the people of
Iraqi Kurdistan, but also offers the best way to keep Iraq together and democratic through
decentralization and power sharing. In Iran, the Kurdish movement is the most influential
actor in terms of the expression of minority demands in the country and has the strongest
potential to successfully democratize Iran should similarly situated minorities and/or
other pro-democracy forces join it. The Syrian uprising, which has been ongoing since
2011, is the first serious possibility of democratic change in Syria. In the context of the
fierce struggle for power between the Assad government and the Islamist forces, the
Kurdish parties in Syria currently offer the best democratic alternative and are evidence
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that democracy in Syria cannot be achieved without accommodating Kurdish identity and
demands.
How the Kurds’ emergent role as democratic agents affects the transnational
aspect of the Kurdish question is crucial not only for the countries with sizable Kurdish
populations, but also for the entire Middle East. It can be argued that since the 1990s the
Middle East has witnessed the emergence of a new conception of “Greater Kurdistan”
defined by the goal of establishing decentralized polities across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Syria, which would strengthen the political and cultural interaction between the Kurdish
communities living in different countries and render national borders less significant. The
broader implication of the new conception of Greater Kurdistan is that it offers an
alternative institutional framework to the current state system in the Middle East, a
system that is more suitable to the current era of democratization. As an alternative to the
highly centralized and elitist political structure that prevails in the Middle East, the
Kurdish movement proposes a new political framework that would result in an open,
participatory and plural democratic society.
Today, the Kurdish political situation in the Middle East is largely dominated by
political rivalry between Öcalan and Barzani. While this rivalry is usually portrayed in
the scholarly and policy circles as an indication of the fragmented nature of the Kurdish
movement, it actually suggests a growing understanding among the Kurdish parties
regarding the rules of political competition. One of the major weaknesses of the Kurdish
movement throughout the twentieth century was that the Kurds fought with each other as
much as they fought with their central governments. Bloody episodes of civil war
occurred in Iraq between the KDP and PUK, and armed confrontations between the PKK
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and KDP played a significant role in damaging “Kurdish unity” in the Middle East. This
new conceptualization of Greater Kurdistan not only offers an alternative institutional
framework for the Middle East, but it redefines the concept of “Kurdish unity” within the
framework of respect for the individual characteristics of Kurdish movements in each
part of Kurdistan. Currently, the political competition between the Kurdish movements in
Turkey and Iraq can be observed in the Syrian context. However, there has also been
substantial agreement to avoid infighting among Kurdish groups and to resolve disputes
through regional meetings. The Kurdish meetings that took place in Erbil during the
course of the Syrian uprising should be seen in this light.
The most significant manifestation of the Kurds’ increasing role as democratic
agents in the Middle East is the emergence of the Kurdish movements as a “third force”
in each of the four countries in question. Without the Kurdish dynamic within their
respective political systems, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have a lesser chance of
becoming true democracies. The Kurdish movements in each country act as important
opposition groups by shaping debates over political change. However, what makes the
Kurdish groups key actors in this process is that instead of bandwagoning, they playoff
both the regimes and the main opposition groups. The Kurdish movements take the “third
player” position vis-à-vis the ongoing power struggles between the Shia and Sunni Arabs
in Iraq, the moderate Islamists and Kemalists in Turkey, the conservatives and reformists
in Iran, and the Assad regime and Islamist opposition in Syria.
The Kurds’ position as the “third players” derives directly from the way they
incorporate the democratic discourse within their political objectives. While the regime
and opposition in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria are in a fierce struggle for power, they
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make common cause regarding the protection of the nation-state and the denial of the
ethnic diversity of their respective societies. Hence, from the perspective of the Kurds,
regime change, defined as the replacement of one administration or government by
another, will not lead to genuine democracy in any of the four countries as long as the
exclusionary character of the nation-state system remains intact. What is suggested by the
Kurdish movement instead is the need for a structural transformation of the political
systems of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria that would transform the prevailing ethnonational hierarchies by redistributing political power and sovereignty on an equal basis.
A wave of popular pro-democracy protests has swept through the Middle East
since late 2010 and led to important political transformations in the region. However,
three years after the outbreak of what is now referred to as the Arab Spring, the fledgling
democracies of the Middle East face great uncertainty. Despite the toppling of old
authoritarian regimes in a number of Arab countries and the widespread aspiration for
change, the state of human rights and democracy in the region remains dire. One of
consequences of the disintegration of the authoritarian regimes is they set the stage for
communal strife along ethno-sectarian lines as it was seen in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and
increasingly in Syria. The long-term distrust and bitterness built up under the centralized,
authoritarian nation-states of the Middle East has become a significant barrier to the
establishment of genuine democracies in the region.
The experience of the Kurds indicates that the Middle East’s multi-ethnic and
multi-sect reality needs to be considered not as a “problem,” but as a matter of
“pluralism” and “democratic participation.” By raising claims for a competing vision of
culture, governance and political representation, the Kurdish movement rejects the
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concept of nation-state. Instead, it offers the establishment of decentralized governments
as an alternative institutional framework to address the problems facing the multinational
states of the region and to achieve open, participatory and plural democratic societies.
Given that the nation-state constitutes a fundamental problem for the “identity” demands
in the Middle East, such a perspective has important implications not only for the
countries with significant Kurdish populations, but for the wider debate on regime change
and democratic transition in the region.
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